Parada v. Small Claims Court
This text of 70 Cal. App. 3d 766 (Parada v. Small Claims Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Trinidad Parada, doing business as Bud’s Auto Service, filed an action in the Small Claims Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District against Leon Gendreau to recover $432.50 alleged to be owing for repairs on Gendreau’s automobile.
The small claims court entered judgment for Gendreau on the grounds that Parada did not have a written authorization for the work. [768]*768That court was of the opinion that Business and Professions Code section 9884.9, subdivision (a),1 required such written authorization.
Parada petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for a writ of mandate to direct the small claims court to enter judgment in his favor. The superior court denied the petition declaring that the case of Bennett v. Hayes, 53 Cal.App.3d 700 [125 Cal.Rptr. 825], appeared to “bar an action for the reasonable value of automotive repair services.” Parada appeals from the judgment denying the petition for mandate.
On May 28, 1975, Gendreau brought his 1966 Oldsmobile to Parada’s auto repair shop in San Pedro, California. Parada made a written estimate of $544.12 for repairs to be made on the automobile. Gendreau asked Parada to repair the car at a lower price by omitting the paint refinishing work. Parada agreed to do the lessened amount of work for the sum of $432.50 and made appropriate notations on the written estimate showing the work which was to be done on the automobile. Gendreau gave his approval to the change in the written estimate showing the omission of the paint refinishing work and also gave his oral authorization for Parada to proceed in making the repairs.
When the automobile was delivered to Gendreau he expressed satisfaction with the work done and gave Parada a check in the amount of $432.50 as agreed. Shortly after the check was deposited it was returned to Parada marked “Payment Stopped.”
The Automotive Repair Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 9880 et seq.) was enacted to “foster fair dealing, [and] to eliminate misunderstandings” (55 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 276, 278) in transactions involving automotive repairs. It serves to prevent, among other things, an auto repair business from obtaining possession of a vehicle by leading the owner to believe that the cost of repair will be in an amount agreeable to him only to return and find that the cost has increased substantially. Under such a situation the [769]*769owner has only two options, (1) to pay the increased price, or (2) to seek legal relief in obtaining possession of his car. (Civ. Code, § 3071.)
Hence the Automotive Repair Act, as noted, requires (1) a written estimate, and (2) customer authorization to proceed with the work. Delivery of the car to the repairer of course suggests authorization to proceed, however the repairer can only perform those services set forth in the written estimate. If additional work, over and above that estimate, is found to be required, the law requires an oral or written consent.
Bennett v. Hayes, supra, held that where no written estimate was prepared then any work done was “excess” and the repair service could not collect for repairs actually made. Here, however, Parada provided a written estimate. The work performed was less than that estimate. Nothing in the statute nor in Bennett v. Hayes, supra, requires that the customer give his consent or authorization in writing. In fact the statute specifically permits oral authorization for “excess” repairs.
Both the small claims court and the superior court were in error in the basis upon which relief was denied to Parada. That, however, does not resolve the matter.
Code of Civil Procedure section 117j, provided at the applicable time that a plaintiff in a small claims action may not appeal from an adverse judgment.2 “A small claims court plaintiff, taking advantage of the speedy, inexpensive procedures and other benefits of that court; accepts all of its attending disadvantages such as the denial of the right... to an appeal.” (Cook v. Superior Court, 274 Cal.App.2d 675, at pp. 677-678 [79 Cal.Rptr. -285].) Inherent in this scheme is, as is the case herein, the possibility of an occasional error of law that will be uncorrectable.
Thus a plaintiff who elects to proceed in the small claims court is finally bound by an adverse judgment. This means that the lack of the right of appeal cannot then be relied upon as a basis for a petition for an extraordinary writ which is designed to seek appellate review of an adverse judgment. Such a procedure would emasculate the prohibition against appeals by plaintiffs from judgments rendered by a small claims court.
[770]*770Hence the superior court correctly denied Parada’s petition for a writ of mandate, albeit for the wrong reason.
The judgment is affirmed.
Beach, J., concurred.
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70 Cal. App. 3d 766, 139 Cal. Rptr. 87, 1977 Cal. App. LEXIS 1561, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parada-v-small-claims-court-calctapp-1977.