CHADICK, Chief Justice.
During construction of a manufacturing plant for International Paper Company in Cass County, Texas, Papco, Inc., the general contractor for the project built and supplied a scaffold for the employees of Southern Electrical and Piping Corporation, a subcontractor hereafter called Sep-co, to use in performing construction work. Jimmy Eaton, an employee of the subcontractor, was on the scaffold deck engaged in doing overhead welding just prior to sustaining injury. The scaffold’s deck or work floor where Eaton worked had two by six inch “toe boards” nailed to frame its outer edges and form a six inch high rim around the deck’s topside. The toe boards were useful in preventing tools, material or other objects on the deck from being accidentally dislodged and, as shown by evidence in the record, the boards were fre[540] quently used as handholds by persons climbing up or down the scaffold ladder. Eaton immediately before injury, began to climb down the scaffold on the steel ladder built into the framework and in lowering himself Eaton grasped, as a handhold, the toe board next to the ladder. The toe board pulled loose causing Eaton to fall backwards to the ground some twenty-five to thirty feet below. Eaton’s injury was severe.
Whether Papco, the general contractor is considered an occupier of land or the supplier of a chattel (the scaffold), its liability for injury to Eaton is that of an occupier of land to a business invitee thereon. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.1967); McKee General Contractor Inc., v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954); Roosth & Genecov Production Co., v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953); Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950).
Warren Aulds, Superintendent in charge of all Sepco pipefitting as well as supervis- or over the particular welding work Eaton was performing at the time of injury, testified that Papco management personnel had warned him, Aulds, that it was dangerous to use scaffold toe boards as handholds in ascending and descending the scaffold. He swore that aside from any warning from Papco management, he personally knew such use to be dangerous and had, through channels designated by Sepco's contract with the pipefitter union, warned the men under his supervision of the danger of using scaffold toe boards for handholds.
The opinion in Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation v. Henry, supra, declares the law to be well settled that an occupier of land (such as Papco) may be relieved of liability for harm to invitees thereon (such as the subcontractor’s employee Eaton) resulting from dangerous conditions on the premises that are not open and obvious by taking proper precautions to protect such invitees from danger or by warning them thereof. The rule is supported by Halespeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.1963) and Western Auto Supply Company v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.1963). On the basis of policy discussed therein Delhi-Taylor further holds that “an adequate warning to an independent contractor or one supervising his work will discharge the duty of the landowner or occupier to warn the employees of the independent contractor” of a dangerous condition on the occupier’s premises.
The trial court undertook to allow the jury to determine whether or not the danger warning given by Papco was adequate. The two special issues submitted and the jury’s answer thereto are as follows, to-wit:
“Sp. Issue No. 5: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question the Defendant, Papco, through its agents, servants or employees, had given adequate warning to the Sepco Supervisor, Warren Aulds, that there was a risk of harm to a person using the toe board as a handhold in descending a scaffold.
(Jury) Answer: We do not.
Sp. Issue No. 6: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question the Sepco’s Supervisor, Warren Aulds, had full knowledge that there was a risk of harm to a person using the toe board as a handhold in descending a scaffold.
(Jury) Answer: We do not.”
Papco moved the trial court to disregard the jury’s verdict on both special issues because “the uncontradicted and undisputed testimony of Warren Aulds, the Sepco supervisor, was that he had been given adequate warning, time and again, that there was a risk of harm to the person using the toe board as a handhold in descending a [541] scaffold and that at the safety meetings he had acquired full knowledge that there was a risk of harm to a person using the toe board as a handhold in descending a scaffold.”
Attention has not been called to any direct evidence, except that of Aulds bearing upon the issues. Warren Aulds was an interested witness and his uncontra-dicted testimony merely raised an issue of fact for jury determination. It was not conclusive. A witness in a case is interested, and the credibility and weight to be given such witness’ testimony is a question solely for the jury, when the record shows a reasonable basis for the witness harboring a partisan attitude towards the outcome of the case. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses, § 538; Tex. Jur. 2d Witnesses, Sec. 374. The testimony of an interested witness only raises an issue for jury determination; it is only when such testimony is “clear, direct and positive and there are no circumstances in evidence tending to discredit or impeach” the witness that such testimony must be given probative effect. Great American Reserve Insurance Company v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Company, 391 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.1965); Tex.Jur.2d Witnesses, Sec. 373. Aulds candidly testified that he could not expect to progress as a contruction superintendent if he was indifferent to safety standards and procedures or if the incidence of employee injury, while under his supervision, was unusually high. The jury could have reasoned that it would have been to Aulds’ interest to show that Eaton was injured as a result of Eaton’s independent conduct and violation of warnings; that Aulds was influenced by self interest to testify that Eaton’s injury was not the result of Aulds’ lack of knowledge of danger or failure to impart it; or that Aulds was interested in minimizing or shifting from himself responsibility for the occurrence.
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CHADICK, Chief Justice.
During construction of a manufacturing plant for International Paper Company in Cass County, Texas, Papco, Inc., the general contractor for the project built and supplied a scaffold for the employees of Southern Electrical and Piping Corporation, a subcontractor hereafter called Sep-co, to use in performing construction work. Jimmy Eaton, an employee of the subcontractor, was on the scaffold deck engaged in doing overhead welding just prior to sustaining injury. The scaffold’s deck or work floor where Eaton worked had two by six inch “toe boards” nailed to frame its outer edges and form a six inch high rim around the deck’s topside. The toe boards were useful in preventing tools, material or other objects on the deck from being accidentally dislodged and, as shown by evidence in the record, the boards were fre[540] quently used as handholds by persons climbing up or down the scaffold ladder. Eaton immediately before injury, began to climb down the scaffold on the steel ladder built into the framework and in lowering himself Eaton grasped, as a handhold, the toe board next to the ladder. The toe board pulled loose causing Eaton to fall backwards to the ground some twenty-five to thirty feet below. Eaton’s injury was severe.
Whether Papco, the general contractor is considered an occupier of land or the supplier of a chattel (the scaffold), its liability for injury to Eaton is that of an occupier of land to a business invitee thereon. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.1967); McKee General Contractor Inc., v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954); Roosth & Genecov Production Co., v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953); Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950).
Warren Aulds, Superintendent in charge of all Sepco pipefitting as well as supervis- or over the particular welding work Eaton was performing at the time of injury, testified that Papco management personnel had warned him, Aulds, that it was dangerous to use scaffold toe boards as handholds in ascending and descending the scaffold. He swore that aside from any warning from Papco management, he personally knew such use to be dangerous and had, through channels designated by Sepco's contract with the pipefitter union, warned the men under his supervision of the danger of using scaffold toe boards for handholds.
The opinion in Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation v. Henry, supra, declares the law to be well settled that an occupier of land (such as Papco) may be relieved of liability for harm to invitees thereon (such as the subcontractor’s employee Eaton) resulting from dangerous conditions on the premises that are not open and obvious by taking proper precautions to protect such invitees from danger or by warning them thereof. The rule is supported by Halespeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.1963) and Western Auto Supply Company v. Campbell, 373 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.1963). On the basis of policy discussed therein Delhi-Taylor further holds that “an adequate warning to an independent contractor or one supervising his work will discharge the duty of the landowner or occupier to warn the employees of the independent contractor” of a dangerous condition on the occupier’s premises.
The trial court undertook to allow the jury to determine whether or not the danger warning given by Papco was adequate. The two special issues submitted and the jury’s answer thereto are as follows, to-wit:
“Sp. Issue No. 5: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question the Defendant, Papco, through its agents, servants or employees, had given adequate warning to the Sepco Supervisor, Warren Aulds, that there was a risk of harm to a person using the toe board as a handhold in descending a scaffold.
(Jury) Answer: We do not.
Sp. Issue No. 6: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question the Sepco’s Supervisor, Warren Aulds, had full knowledge that there was a risk of harm to a person using the toe board as a handhold in descending a scaffold.
(Jury) Answer: We do not.”
Papco moved the trial court to disregard the jury’s verdict on both special issues because “the uncontradicted and undisputed testimony of Warren Aulds, the Sepco supervisor, was that he had been given adequate warning, time and again, that there was a risk of harm to the person using the toe board as a handhold in descending a [541] scaffold and that at the safety meetings he had acquired full knowledge that there was a risk of harm to a person using the toe board as a handhold in descending a scaffold.”
Attention has not been called to any direct evidence, except that of Aulds bearing upon the issues. Warren Aulds was an interested witness and his uncontra-dicted testimony merely raised an issue of fact for jury determination. It was not conclusive. A witness in a case is interested, and the credibility and weight to be given such witness’ testimony is a question solely for the jury, when the record shows a reasonable basis for the witness harboring a partisan attitude towards the outcome of the case. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses, § 538; Tex. Jur. 2d Witnesses, Sec. 374. The testimony of an interested witness only raises an issue for jury determination; it is only when such testimony is “clear, direct and positive and there are no circumstances in evidence tending to discredit or impeach” the witness that such testimony must be given probative effect. Great American Reserve Insurance Company v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Company, 391 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.1965); Tex.Jur.2d Witnesses, Sec. 373. Aulds candidly testified that he could not expect to progress as a contruction superintendent if he was indifferent to safety standards and procedures or if the incidence of employee injury, while under his supervision, was unusually high. The jury could have reasoned that it would have been to Aulds’ interest to show that Eaton was injured as a result of Eaton’s independent conduct and violation of warnings; that Aulds was influenced by self interest to testify that Eaton’s injury was not the result of Aulds’ lack of knowledge of danger or failure to impart it; or that Aulds was interested in minimizing or shifting from himself responsibility for the occurrence.
During the trial of the case George Kell and James J. Turchi were employed at the International Paper Company’s mill in Cass County, some twenty-five miles from Linden the county seat and site of the trial. Kell was employed in the plant’s maintenance department and Turchi as safety director. On May 8, 1972, the day Eaton was injured, both were employed in plant construction at the paper mill site. Kell was a pipefitter foreman for Sepco under general supervision of Warren Aulds and Turchi was safety director in charge of the construction safety program acting, according to his testimony, for Pap-co and Sepco, as well as International Paper. At trial time both Kell and Turchi were amenable to subpoena as witnesses under the provisions of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure rule 176.
Testimony closed and the parties rested in the introduction thereof the afternoon of Wednesday, October 2, 1973. The judge and counsel for the parties were engaged that afternoon with preparation of the charge to the jury. At ten o’clock the next morning Thursday, October 3, counsel for Eaton requested leave to reopen the case to present Kell as a rebuttal witness. Objection was made by Papco on the grounds that the witness had been available to Eaton by subpoena or otherwise throughout the trial and that Aulds was no longer available to testify as he had returned to the State of Oregon. The court reopened the case to permit Kell to testify. At one o’clock Thursday afternoon Kell was produced as a witness and interrogation ended shortly after two o’clock. At such time Papco’.s counsel requested and was granted a short recess. Thereupon such counsel telephoned Turchi at the International Paper plant and was told by Turchi, that he, Turchi, could be present in court in twenty-five to thirty minutes. Turchi was instructed to come in and did appear at the courthouse within such time. However, when counsel for Papco returned to the courtroom and reported his desire to offer Turchi as a witness, the request was denied. In the bill of exception preserving Turchi’s testimony the trial judges’ questions developed that Turchi resided within one hundred miles of the county courthouse [542] and had been interviewed by Papco’s counsel prior to trial and had been available to testify as a witness for Papco on thirty minutes notice throughout the trial.
Aulds’ testimony adduced in the trial in chief was noticed earlier. In brief, he said that Papco supervisory personnel had warned him of the danger of using a toe board as a handhold and that he passed the warning on to to his general pipefitter foremen, including Kell, with instructions that the warning be given employees. Likewise adduced in the trial in chief, though in behalf of Eaton, was testimony of two pipefitter foremen. The first, Jimmy Brown, a crew foreman, said he could not recall mention being made by anyone in a safety meeting that toe boards were not to be used as a handrail. He also said that safety meetings were held by a general foreman and not by a superintendent or the safety director. The second to testify, Billy Pat Adcock, a general foreman, stated that neither Aulds nor anyone else instructed him or any workman on the job not to use toe boards as handholds and that he was never in a safety meeting with Aulds, though Aulds had been superintendent over him at various times.
After the case was reopened, on direct examination Kell testified that Aulds did not tell him that he, Aulds, had been told by Papco people not to use toe boards as handholds, nor had Aulds instructed him, Kell, to instruct those working under him not to so use toe boards. Kell also testified that his crews held safety meetings every Monday morning and made written reports thereof to Aulds. On cross-examination Kell testified his safety meetings were rather informal and that Aulds did not attend. Climatically, on redirect examination Kell testified that Aulds never told him, Kell, not to use toe boards as handholds and if Aulds so testified Aulds’ word could not be relied upon.
James J. Turchi’s testimony, as incorporated in a bill of exceptions, was in part as follows:
“Q. Now, in your meeting before May 9, 1972, did you ever have any discussion with Mr. Aulds, concerning the use of toe boards, as handholds on a scaffold?
A. Yes.
Q. And what were those discussions?
A. We had had an accident prior to this one, in the power plant one of these board had pulled loose. The man did not suffer any severe injuries, but we had recommended to these superintendents that they have people not grasp the toe boards in climbing down . to use the handrails or upright posts ... or the ladder on the scaffold.
Q. Was that about the month or six weeks before . . . ?
A. Approximately six weeks prior to this accident.
Q. When you had that meeting with them, was it Papco people there present ?
A. Papco and Sepco Superintendents were there.”
An analysis of Kell’s and Turchi’s testimony shows that the testimony of both would have been admissible in the case in chief, insofar as it was admissible at all; that it was cumulative of testimony previously introduced and that its effect was to bolster and fortify other evidence in the record. Additionally, Kell’s testimony tended to discredit Aulds as a witness while Turchi’s testimony that Aulds attended a safety meeting tended to rebut, by explanation rather then contradiction, the implication of Kell’s statement that he never saw Aulds at a safety meeting. Turchi’s testimony shows Aulds attended a safety meeting for Papco and Sepco Superintendents when the toe board danger and warning was under discussion.
Papco arraigns the trial court’s action associated with reopening the case as re[543] versible error on the ground that, after both parties had closed and rested in the presentation of testimony, the trial court allowed Eaton to reopen the case and present the testimony of George Kell, a witness who lived within one hundred miles of the courthouse etc. but:
(1) refused to permit Papco to introduce Turchi’s testimony in rebuttal thereof;
(2) over Papco’s objection that Aulds, a witness vital to rebuttal of Kell’s testimony, had already returned to his home in Oregon;
(3) refused to allow Papco to reopen and produce the testimony of Turchi, who lived within one hundred miles of the courthouse and had been available to Papco throughout the trial.
Though each particular ruling of the trial court is the subject of a separate point of error the disposition of these issues have a nexus and should not be considered in isolation from each other.
When the case was reopened, evenhanded procedure, “what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander”, would suggest that the trial judge delay proceedings a reasonable time to allow Papco to present Turchi as a witness. But the question is too complex to be settled by a simplistic folk maxim of fair play. A trial judge is afforded a wide discretion