Paniag v. Brown

10 Vet. App. 265, 1997 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 400, 1997 WL 289184
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
DecidedMay 21, 1997
DocketNo. 95-728
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 10 Vet. App. 265 (Paniag v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paniag v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 265, 1997 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 400, 1997 WL 289184 (Cal. 1997).

Opinion

IVERS, Judge:

The appellant appeals a May 2, 1994, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA or Board) denying her recognition as the foster parent of deceased veteran Ammakeo Paniag for purposes of receiving death benefits. The Secretary had filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the appellant’s Notice of Appeal (NOA) was not timely filed, and on April 16, 1996, the Court, by single judge order, denied the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, holding that the BVA had failed to mail a copy of its decision in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e). On November 4, 1996, the Secretary moved to vacate the Court’s April 16, 1996, order, arguing that the Court’s recent decision in Hill v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 246 (1996), “clarified” [266]*266the law with respect to how a veteran must designate his representative on the claimant’s power of attorney form. For the reasons that follow, the Court will revoke the April 1996 order, grant the Secretary’s renewed motion, and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

On August 1, 1995, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (NOA) from the May 1994 BVA decision denying her status as the veteran’s foster parent. The appellant also filed motions for reconsideration on August 31, 1994, and February 7, 1995, which were denied by the Chairman of the Board on October 24, 1994, and May 5, 1995, respectively. On October 2, 1995, the Secretary moved to dismiss the appellant’s claim, contending that her NOA was not timely filed. The Court, on October 6, 1995, ordered the Secretary to file a declaration verifying that the BVA had provided a copy of its May 1994 decision directly to the appellant’s national service representative in compliance with 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e). On November 6,1995, the Secretary filed an affidavit given by the Assistant Director of the Board’s Administrative Service, Mr. Robert L. Ashworth. In that declaration, Mr. Ashworth stated that the Board had mailed its decision to the appellant’s service representative, The American Legion (AL), at its national appeals office in Washington, DC, in accordance with administrative procedures in effect at the time of the May 1994 decision. Mr. Ashworth also stated that the BVA had sent a “courtesy” copy to the AL office located at VA’s regional office (RO) in the Philippines, via its “flat mail” procedure. See Trammell v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 181, 182-83 (1994).

The Court issued another order on April 16, 1996, denying the Secretary’s motion to dismiss the appellant’s claim, deciding that the BVA had not properly mailed its decision to the appellant’s designated representative in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e) and that the appellant had filed an NOA with the Court in a timely fashion. In the April 1996 order the Court stated:

The Secretary has filed a declaration from the Assistant Director of the Board’s Administrative Service. The declaration reflects that (1) the VA Form 23-22 designates The Accredited Representative, American Veterans Legion, U.S. Embassy Office Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila, Philippines, and (2) the Board did not mail a copy of the decision to the representative in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e). Further, the Board has no means of determining the exact date on which the representative received the BVA decision.

On November 4,1996, the Secretary filed a motion to vacate the Court’s April 1996 order and renewed its motion to dismiss the appellant’s claim. In that motion, the Secretary argued that the Court had “mischaracterized” Mr. Ashworth’s declaration as showing that the appellant had actually designated a particular AL office on her VA Form 23-22, Appointment of Service Organization as Claimant’s Representative (VA Form 23-22). The Secretary noted that although the appellant had entered the local address for the AL office in the Philippines in Block 12 of the VA Form 23-22, she did not specify that local address in Block 3 of the form. See Hill, supra.

II. Analysis

To be timely filed under Rule 4 of this Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure and precedents construing 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a), an NOA must be filed with the Court within 120 days after the BVA decision was mailed to a VA claimant and any authorized representative thereof pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e). See Butler v. Derwinski, 960 F.2d 139, 140-41 (Fed.Cir.1992). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that timely filing of an NOA is jurisdictional; that is, if an NOA is not filed with this Court within the 120-day judicial-appeal period, the appeal must be dismissed. See Butler, supra. However, in order to know when the 120-day period begins to run, it is necessary to know the date when the BVA mailed the decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e). When the BVA rendered its decision in this case, § 7104(e) provided:

After reaching a decision in a case, the Board shall promptly mail a copy of its written decision to the claimant and the claimant’s authorized representative (if any) at the last known address of the [267]*267claimant and at the last known address of such representative (if any).

38 U.S.C. § 7104(e) (1991), amended by Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-275, Title V, § 509,110 Stat. 3344 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 7104(e)(1)-(2) (Supp.1997)) [hereinafter VBIA § 509]. The BVA’s mailing obligation under § 7104(e) is to mail copies of its decision to both the claimant and any representative, and a defect in mailing to either one can toll the start of the 120-day period. Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992); Trammell, 6 Vet.App. at 183.

In Ashley, the Court held that there is a “presumption of regularity” that “the Secretary and the BVA properly discharge their official duties by mailing a copy of a BVA decision to the claimant and the claimant’s representative, if any, on the date the decision is issued,” and that that presumption can be overcome only by “clear evidence to the contrary.” Ashley, 2 Vet.App. at 308-09; see also Davis v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 298, 300 (1995). When the presumption of regularity in mailing is rebutted because of clear evidence of a defect in mailing, the burden shifts to the Secretary to establish that the BVA decision was mailed to the “last known address” of the claimant and the claimant’s representative as required by section 7104(e). See Leo v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 410, 413 (1995). In Trammell,

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Bluebook (online)
10 Vet. App. 265, 1997 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 400, 1997 WL 289184, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paniag-v-brown-cavc-1997.