Panama Ice & Fish Co. v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railway Co.

71 Fla. 419
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedApril 5, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 71 Fla. 419 (Panama Ice & Fish Co. v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Panama Ice & Fish Co. v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railway Co., 71 Fla. 419 (Fla. 1916).

Opinion

Whitfield, J.

Appellant and appellee claim conflicting rights in the use of submerged land lying between certain upland lots and a channel in St. Andrews Bay, a [421]*421navigable bay of the sea or Gulf of Mexico lying south and west of said lots in Bay County, Florida.

Upon the admission of Florida into the Union, the State by virtue of its sovereignty became the owner of all lands under navigable waters within the State, including the shores or space between ordinary high and low water marks, such State ownership being for the benefit of the people of the State to be used for purposes of navigation, commerce, fishing, etc., subject to such regulations as may be provided by law for the general welfare. The State may in the interest of the public welfare make limited dispositions of portions of the lands under navigable waters within its borders, or may permit the use thereof, when the rights of the whole people of the State as to navigation and other lawful uses of the waters are not materially impaired. State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 South. Rep. 353; Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 South. Rep. 826.

By Chapter 791, Acts of 1856, entitled “An Act to Benefit Commerce,” the lawmaking power of the State recited that “it is for the benefit of commerce that wharves be built,” etc.', and enacted that the State be divested “of all right, title and interest to all lands covered by water, lying in front of any tract of land owned by a citizen of the United States, or by the United States for public purposes, lying upon any navigable stream or bay of the sea or harbor, as far as to the edge of the channel, and vested the full title to the same in and to the riparian proprietors, giving them the full right and privilege to build wharves into streams or waters of the bay or harbor as far as may be necessary to effect the purposes described, and to fill up from the shore, bank or beach as far as may be desired, not obstructing the channel, but leaving full space for the requirements of commerce, [422]*422and upon lands so filled in, to erect warehouses or other buildings, and also the right to prevent encroachments of any other person upon all such submerged lands in the direction of their lines continued to the channel.” Sec. 643 Gen. Stats. of 1906; ditto Compiled Laws 1914, and notes.

This statute “does not vest in riparian owners an unqualified fee in the lands below high water mark and out to the edge of the channel-in navigable streams, bays of the sea, or harbors, of this State. So long as such submerged lands remain unimproved by the construction of wharves, or unreclaimed by filling in from the shore and converting the water into land, the riparian owner, though the legal title is in him, has in so far as the statute is concerned, no greater right to the beneficial use of such submerged lands and the waters above them, than any other citizen except for the purpose of protecting from invasion the right to improve which the statute gives. State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 South. Rep. 640.

The State may fix the exterior lines of a navigable river if the rights of the people to the use of the waters and the shores of the river are not thereby substantially impaired; and rights in the submerged lands not within the reasonably fixed exterior lines of the river may be granted by legislative authority if such grant does not impair the rights of the whole people to the use of the waters for any purpose expressed or implied by law.

The rights granted by the riparian statute of 1856 relate to the space between the shore line and the edge of the channel of navigable streams, bays or harbors, and such rights are not controlled by the direction of lines dividing the uplands.

As the rights granted by the riparian Act of 1856, Sections 643, 644, General Statutes of 1906, extend to [423]*423“all lands covered by water lying in front of any tract of land lying upon any navigable stream or bay of the sea or harbor, as far as the edge of the channel,” and the right of action given the grantees to prevent encroachments extends to “all such submerged lands in the direction of their lines continued to the channel,” this right of action extends to the space between lines drawn at right angles from the shore line “to the edge of the channel,” where the channel runs parallel or practically so with the shore line. Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 62 Fla. 549, 57 South. Rep. 428; Sections 643, 644 Compiled Laws of 1914 and notes.

Assuming that the riparian rights acquired under the quoted statute by the owner of lands “lying upon” a navigable stream, bay or harbor within the State, may be alienated separate from the lands to which they attached under the statute, such alienation can carry no greater right than the original owner had by virtue of the conditions and limitations contained in the statute making the qualified grant to stated classes of riparian owners. See Rivas v. Solary, 18 Fla. 122; Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200; State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 South. Rep. 640.

A conveyance of land to which riparian rights to submerged lands are attached under the statute may carry the riparian rights unless such rights are reserved or a contrary intent appears from the conveyance. Axline v. Shaw, 35 Fla. 305, 17 South. Rep. 411.

The railroad company owns a portion at least of Block 27, and the Ice Company a portion of Block 31 of a plat made in 1888. Both lots as claimed by the parties are opposite and extend to the waters of St. Andrews Bay. Block 27 being northwest of Block 31, the water line running northwest and southeast past these and many other blocks. See plats.

[424]

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Bluebook (online)
71 Fla. 419, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/panama-ice-fish-co-v-atlanta-st-andrews-bay-railway-co-fla-1916.