RIVES, Circuit Judge.
Appellee was a tenant in an apartment building owned by appellant,1 and the rear stairs of which were maintained by [165]*165appellant for the common use of appellee and other tenants. They were made of concrete with a concrete “parapet” running along the outside on which the hand could be rested but too large to grasp. Several of the concrete steps were worn, broken, and jagged “as far as maybe three inches or more.” The stairs were not lighted.
Nine days after her tenancy began, ap-pellee attempted her first night time descent of said stairs. Carrying a paper bag containing her kitchen garbage clutched to her body with her left arm, appellee placed her right hand on the concrete “parapet” for support and attempted to go down the stairs. As she “was stepping on a piece which had broken off” she began to fall, causing her to cast her weight on the supporting right hand and dislocate the “carpal” bone in her right wrist. Her resultant damage, the district court, trying the case without a jury, found to be $1746.50, but awarded her a recovery of only one-third of that amount or $582.16, after finding, “That the want of ordinary care attributable to the plaintiff as proximately contributing to plaintiff’s injury and damages is in the proportion of 66%i%.”
Appellant’s specifications of error will be considered in order.
“Specification of Error No. 1: The court erred in that its finding of negligence on the part of appellant was based on the application of legal standards not recognized in applicable landlord-tenant law.”
The general rule is thus stated in 2 Restatement Torts, § 360:
“A possessor of land, who leases a part thereof and retains in his own possession any other part which the lessee is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to him, is sub ject to liability to his lessee and others lawfully upon the land with the consent of the lessee or a sub-lessee for bodily harm caused to them by a dangerous condition upon that part of the land retained in the lessor’s control, if the lessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the condition and the unreasonable risk involved therein and could have made the condition safe.” 2
The district court found, “that the defective condition of the stair coupled with the failure to illuminate constituted a lack of ordinary care on the part of the defendant which amounted to negligence that was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury;” substantially, we think, following the recognized standard. Appellant complains that, in other parts of its opinion, the district court referred to “the degree of care that is due from the defendant to maintain the reserved passageway in a safe condition” (emphasis supplied), and thereby made the landlord an insurer of the tenant’s safety, that, “The selection of such a standard, the cases hold, erroneously burdens a landlord to so maintain his premises that a person could not be hurt at all.” Appellant, in our opinion, is hypercritical, for in strikingly similar situations “safe” and “reasonably safe” have been held to be synonymous and interchangeable expressions.3
The appellant further insists that the evidence did not sufficiently show that it had notice of the defective condition, a reasonable opportunity thereafter to make repairs, and then failed in its duty. True, the evidence did not establish how long before her injury the appellee notified the appellant by telephone that the steps were broken. That insuffi[166]*166ciency, however, was more than supplied by the testimony of Mr. Fields, appellant’s maintenance inspector, to the effect that he inspected the stairs two weeks before appellant moved in and again six days after the accident and that the condition was approximately the same on each inspection.
“Specification of Error No. II: The court erred in holding that appellant was obligated to keep the common premises in question lighted.”
In finding the appellant guilty of negligence, the district court considered not only the failure to light but “the defective condition of the stair coupled with the failure to illuminate.” Clearly, the two together could constitute such a dangerous condition as to render the landlord liable.4
“Specification of Error No. Ill: The court erred in considering subsequent acts of repairs on the part of appellant (a) as being indicative of appellant’s negligence, and (b) as being indicative of the condition of the steps at the time of the alleged injury.”
The district court complied with the written request and stipulation of the parties 5 to make an ocular inspection of the stairs, as a result of which it stated:
“The ocular inspection made by the Court is highly indicative that plaintiff’s version is correct for the lines of repair between the new concrete and the old are plainly visible and tend to show that the edges of the steps had been extremely rough before reparations.”
Appellant, having requested the court to inspect the stairs, cannot now complain of the inferences and conclusions drawn by the court from such inspection. As to the photographs, we agree with the following observation of the district court:
“The defendant contends in its brief that the Court erred in allowing to be introduced the photographs by the plaintiff to show the steps in their present condition to establish that repairs had been made. It argues that both the method of introduction and the purpose were erroneous but in view of the stipulation between counsel that the Court make an ocular inspection and in the absence of a jury, it is believed that the introduction of the evidence is in no wise prejudicial.”
“Specification of Error No. IV: The court erred in finding that appellee had not assumed the risk since the doctrine of assumption of risk is (a) available in the Canal Zone and (b) is applicable on the basis of the facts found by the court.”
On this issue, the district court concluded :
“The Court finds then that a complaining tenant, fearful of health problems, negligently attempted to negotiate the defective and unlighted stairway negligently maintained by the defendant and does not think that the plaintiff’s negligence was such that she should be completely precluded from recovery.
“She knew of the defects in the stairway and she knew it was dark but she did not acquiesce in them [167]*167and she felt that her familiarity with the stairway would permit her to make a safe descent and although erroneous was not an unnatural assumption and showed no reckless disregard or such a degree of negligence that would preclude her recovery in the face of the degree of care that is due from the defendant to maintain the reserved passageway in a safe condition.”
“Assumption of risk” is a term with at least four meanings.6 In the first two meanings explained by Prosser, footnote (6), supra, it is used simply as another name for non-negligence.7 In those senses it was fully considered by the district court.
The Canal Zone Code expressly treats of assumption of risk in master and servant cases.8
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RIVES, Circuit Judge.
Appellee was a tenant in an apartment building owned by appellant,1 and the rear stairs of which were maintained by [165]*165appellant for the common use of appellee and other tenants. They were made of concrete with a concrete “parapet” running along the outside on which the hand could be rested but too large to grasp. Several of the concrete steps were worn, broken, and jagged “as far as maybe three inches or more.” The stairs were not lighted.
Nine days after her tenancy began, ap-pellee attempted her first night time descent of said stairs. Carrying a paper bag containing her kitchen garbage clutched to her body with her left arm, appellee placed her right hand on the concrete “parapet” for support and attempted to go down the stairs. As she “was stepping on a piece which had broken off” she began to fall, causing her to cast her weight on the supporting right hand and dislocate the “carpal” bone in her right wrist. Her resultant damage, the district court, trying the case without a jury, found to be $1746.50, but awarded her a recovery of only one-third of that amount or $582.16, after finding, “That the want of ordinary care attributable to the plaintiff as proximately contributing to plaintiff’s injury and damages is in the proportion of 66%i%.”
Appellant’s specifications of error will be considered in order.
“Specification of Error No. 1: The court erred in that its finding of negligence on the part of appellant was based on the application of legal standards not recognized in applicable landlord-tenant law.”
The general rule is thus stated in 2 Restatement Torts, § 360:
“A possessor of land, who leases a part thereof and retains in his own possession any other part which the lessee is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to him, is sub ject to liability to his lessee and others lawfully upon the land with the consent of the lessee or a sub-lessee for bodily harm caused to them by a dangerous condition upon that part of the land retained in the lessor’s control, if the lessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the condition and the unreasonable risk involved therein and could have made the condition safe.” 2
The district court found, “that the defective condition of the stair coupled with the failure to illuminate constituted a lack of ordinary care on the part of the defendant which amounted to negligence that was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury;” substantially, we think, following the recognized standard. Appellant complains that, in other parts of its opinion, the district court referred to “the degree of care that is due from the defendant to maintain the reserved passageway in a safe condition” (emphasis supplied), and thereby made the landlord an insurer of the tenant’s safety, that, “The selection of such a standard, the cases hold, erroneously burdens a landlord to so maintain his premises that a person could not be hurt at all.” Appellant, in our opinion, is hypercritical, for in strikingly similar situations “safe” and “reasonably safe” have been held to be synonymous and interchangeable expressions.3
The appellant further insists that the evidence did not sufficiently show that it had notice of the defective condition, a reasonable opportunity thereafter to make repairs, and then failed in its duty. True, the evidence did not establish how long before her injury the appellee notified the appellant by telephone that the steps were broken. That insuffi[166]*166ciency, however, was more than supplied by the testimony of Mr. Fields, appellant’s maintenance inspector, to the effect that he inspected the stairs two weeks before appellant moved in and again six days after the accident and that the condition was approximately the same on each inspection.
“Specification of Error No. II: The court erred in holding that appellant was obligated to keep the common premises in question lighted.”
In finding the appellant guilty of negligence, the district court considered not only the failure to light but “the defective condition of the stair coupled with the failure to illuminate.” Clearly, the two together could constitute such a dangerous condition as to render the landlord liable.4
“Specification of Error No. Ill: The court erred in considering subsequent acts of repairs on the part of appellant (a) as being indicative of appellant’s negligence, and (b) as being indicative of the condition of the steps at the time of the alleged injury.”
The district court complied with the written request and stipulation of the parties 5 to make an ocular inspection of the stairs, as a result of which it stated:
“The ocular inspection made by the Court is highly indicative that plaintiff’s version is correct for the lines of repair between the new concrete and the old are plainly visible and tend to show that the edges of the steps had been extremely rough before reparations.”
Appellant, having requested the court to inspect the stairs, cannot now complain of the inferences and conclusions drawn by the court from such inspection. As to the photographs, we agree with the following observation of the district court:
“The defendant contends in its brief that the Court erred in allowing to be introduced the photographs by the plaintiff to show the steps in their present condition to establish that repairs had been made. It argues that both the method of introduction and the purpose were erroneous but in view of the stipulation between counsel that the Court make an ocular inspection and in the absence of a jury, it is believed that the introduction of the evidence is in no wise prejudicial.”
“Specification of Error No. IV: The court erred in finding that appellee had not assumed the risk since the doctrine of assumption of risk is (a) available in the Canal Zone and (b) is applicable on the basis of the facts found by the court.”
On this issue, the district court concluded :
“The Court finds then that a complaining tenant, fearful of health problems, negligently attempted to negotiate the defective and unlighted stairway negligently maintained by the defendant and does not think that the plaintiff’s negligence was such that she should be completely precluded from recovery.
“She knew of the defects in the stairway and she knew it was dark but she did not acquiesce in them [167]*167and she felt that her familiarity with the stairway would permit her to make a safe descent and although erroneous was not an unnatural assumption and showed no reckless disregard or such a degree of negligence that would preclude her recovery in the face of the degree of care that is due from the defendant to maintain the reserved passageway in a safe condition.”
“Assumption of risk” is a term with at least four meanings.6 In the first two meanings explained by Prosser, footnote (6), supra, it is used simply as another name for non-negligence.7 In those senses it was fully considered by the district court.
The Canal Zone Code expressly treats of assumption of risk in master and servant cases.8 On the other hand, the section prescribing the general responsibility for negligent acts, Title 3, § 977,9 appears not to contemplate any affirmative defense of assumption of risk unless the person has willfully brought the in[168]*168jury upan himself, and that is not contended.
Appellant insists that, nevertheless, the defense of assumption of risk remains available, relying on the fact that the Canal Zone Code was patterned after the California Code and on the holding in In re Apple, 66 Cal. 432, 6 P. 7, 9, that “where the Code is silent, the common law governs.”
Admittedly, the common law may be resorted to for aid in interpreting the provisions of the Code,10 for example in determining the meaning of the terms used in Title 3, § 977, heretofore quoted, footnote 9, supra. The Canal Zone Code differs, however, in significant respect from the California Code after which it was patterned. The Act approved March 21, 1872 to establish a Civil Code for California contains no language similar to the Act of Congress of June 19,1934, H.R. 8700, Public No. 431, Chapter 667, “To establish a Code of Laws for the Canal Zone and for other purposes”, providing:
■ “Be it enacted by the Semite and Bouse of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the seven titles hereinafter set forth shall constitute the Code of Laws for the Canal Zone and shall, for all purposes, establish conclusively, and be deemed to enbrace, all the permanent laws relating to or applying in the Canal Zone in force on the date of enactment of this Act, except such general laws of the United States as relate to or apply in the Canal Zone.”
Such a positive and unambiguous enactment leaves no room to- doubt that the Congress established a true Code of Laws for the Canal Zone, and not simply a compilation subject to being supplemented by the common law. We hold, therefore, that in ordinary negligence actions covered by Title 3, § 977, of the Canal Zone, heretofore quoted, footnote 9, supra, the affirmative defense of assumption of risk is not available when the conduct is not so gross as to amount to willfully bringing on the injury.
Chief Judge Hutcheson and Judge Brown think that, of appellant’s five specifications of error, only the first four require consideration by us; that this is because our holding, that the judgment must be affirmed for the reasons set forth in our discussion of these specifications, and our rejection of the trial court’s apparent view that, but for the “captive tenant” theory advanced arguendo, plaintiff would under the Canal Zone Code be charged with assumed risk as a matter of law, makes completely innocuous and therefore renders unnecessary a consideration of the claimed error thus set forth in appellant’s fifth specification of error:
“Specification of Error No. V: The court erred (a) in taking ‘judicial notice’ of the never-pleaded, never-argued and demonstrably incorrect status of appellee as a ‘captive tenant’ and (b) in deciding the case upon such theory in such manner, thereby wrongfully depriving appellant- of its property without a fair trial.”
The writer, Judge Rives, concurs in the judgment of affirmance, but states his views as to the fifth specification of error in a separate concurring opinion.
The judgment is
Affirmed.