Pan-Am Southern Corp. v. Cummins

156 F. Supp. 673, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2844
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Tennessee
DecidedMay 17, 1957
DocketCiv. A. No. 1074
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 156 F. Supp. 673 (Pan-Am Southern Corp. v. Cummins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pan-Am Southern Corp. v. Cummins, 156 F. Supp. 673, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2844 (E.D. Tenn. 1957).

Opinion

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.

Plaintiff has filed what is styled “Various Motions Of Plaintiff After Entry Of Judgment.” In substance the motions are as follows:

1. That the verdict of March 20, 1957, and the judgment of April 3, 1957, be set aside and judgment be entered for the plaintiff.

2. In the alternative, that the judgment be set aside and the Court’s own [675]*675findings be substituted for the jury’s verdict or a new trial be granted in lieu of such findings.

3. In the alternative, that the verdict and judgment be set aside and plaintiff be granted a new trial.

4. That said judgment be set aside and that the Court thereupon make special findings of fact and separate conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.

5. That the Court find the facts specially and the conclusions of law separately thereon, pursuant to Rule 52(a).

6. That the Court make special findings of fact and separate conclusions of law and having so found amend the judgment heretofore entered by the reversal thereof in favor of the plaintiff.

Incorporated in the foregoing motions are those made by plaintiff after evidence and after verdict, with all of the grounds urged in their support, pertinent grounds being the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict or judgment in favor of the defendant, impropriety of admitting evidence respecting the inducement and nature of the lease transactions, impropriety of submitting any issues to a jury, and lack of responsiveness to the pleadings of the issues presented to the jury.

It was at the conclusion of the evidence and is now the Court’s opinion that there was clear and cogent evidence to support a verdict for defendant on the issues presented to the jury and that such verdict, once rendered in favor of defendant was entitled to the respect of the Court. Werthan Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 6 Cir., 202 F.2d 119.

It was then and is now the Court’s opinion that the action as commenced by plaintiff was in substance one in ejectment or unlawful detainer; that it was an action affecting real property, hence was a local action controlled by local law, including common law and statutory law; that defendant’s counterclaim, though it involved equitable matters, was essentially a defense against plaintiff’s action for the recovery of possession of real property, and that by the local law there was no impropriety in submitting certain decisive issues to the jury. 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Tennessee Code Annotated, secs. 23-1302, 23-1604, 23-1606, 23-1632, and 23-1621. As to the equitable character of the counterclaim, there was still no impropriety in submitting decisive fact issues to a jury. Tennessee Code Annotated, secs. 21-1011 and 21-1014; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Burton, 167 Tenn. 606, 72 S.W.2d 778.

As to alleged lack of responsiveness as between the issues submitted to the jury and the pleadings, attention is called to Issue No. 1 of the Pretrial Order, which issue is stated thus: “Should the instruments referred to in the complaint be construed together, and if so should they be held to be financial transactions in the nature of a mortgage rather than leases?” A great quantity of proof was directed toward this question and following the conclusion of the evidence the questions of fact submitted to the jury were directed specifically to that particular issue and none other. In the verdict form presented to the jury for the rendering of its special verdict it was indicated that the result of affirmative answers would be cancellation of the instruments or their reformation to give them the effect of mortgage transactions. Under the local law and rule respecting special verdicts, the verdict was conclusive of the case. Wright v. Jackson Construction Co., 138 Tenn. 145, at pages 149-150, 196 S.W. 488, at page 489. See, also, Geis Construction Co. v. United States of America, 6 Cir., 243 F.2d 568 (April 24, 1957).

Respecting the admission of evidence as to the inducement and nature of the transactions between defendant and agents of the plaintiff, recognized rules of the forum state applicable in real property controversies, especially with respect to reformation, were adhered to. Gibson County v. Fourth & First Nation[676]*676al Bank, 20 Tenn. App. 168, at pages 178-179, 96 S.W.2d 184, at pages 189-190; Mee v. Mee, 118 Tenn. 453, at page 456, 82 S.W. 830; Jones v. Cullen, 100 Tenn. 1, at page 20, 42 S.W. 873, at page 877; Hughes v. Young, 17 Tenn. App. 24, 65 S.W.2d 858; Torbett v. Jones, 19 Tenn.App. 307, at page 312, 86 S.W.2d 898, at page 901. See, also, McCormick on Evidence, 1 ed., page 449, sec. 221.

From consideration of the evidence, the jury’s verdict and the applicable statutes and decisions, it is the Court’s opinion that the various motions of plaintiff, including those not heretofore ruled on, should be overruled, with the exception of that part or those parts of the same which call for special findings of fact and separate conclusions of law. Grounds of uncertainty and possible conflict existing between state statutes, rules, equity practice, and court decisions on the one hand and Rules 38, 39 and 52'(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the other, lend some plausibility to suggestions that the jury’s verdict should be treated as advisory only. In deference to the federal rules and in response to plaintiff’s motions relative thereto, the Court accordingly makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

1. On February 12, 1954, defendant was owner in fee simple of service station premises designated in the record as Service Station No. 1367 and situated in Johnson City, Washington County, Tennessee.

2. On said date and prior thereto negotiations had been carried on between representatives of Pan-Am Southern Corporation, hereinafter called Pan-Am or plaintiff, on the one hand, and Jack W. Cummins, hereinafter referred to as Cummins or defendant, on the other for the leasing of said premises by the defendant to the plaintiff.

3. On said date and for some time prior thereto defendant had been- experiencing financial difficulties, being indebted to plaintiff and others.

4. In the course of the negotiations mentioned in finding No. 2 above, agents of the plaintiff made known to the defendant that plaintiff could and would be willing to negotiate for defendant a loan from a certain bank, identified in the record as The National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, provided certain leasing arrangements were made and the rentals therefrom pledged as security.

5.

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156 F. Supp. 673, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2844, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pan-am-southern-corp-v-cummins-tned-1957.