Pam-To-Pee v. United States

187 U.S. 371, 23 S. Ct. 142, 47 L. Ed. 221, 1902 U.S. LEXIS 777

Opinions

Mr. Justice Brewer,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

There is an apparent hardship in the result of this litigation, but one which we are constrained to believe the plaintiffs are chiefly responsible for, and which can be relieved only by the action of Congress. Two sets of claimants appeared in the former suits, each represented by separate counsel, and after a consolidation the litigation proceeded only so far as to determine the fact of the liability of the government and the extent of that liability, leaving undetermined the individuals entitled to share in the amount awarded against the government or the proper basis of distribution between those so entitled. In the first of the suits ninety-one Indians were, it is said, represented, while the petition in the second suit set forth the names of 1371 persons whose names and residences were given, and who were alleged to be entitled to share in whatever money should be awarded against the government. The Court of Claims, after finding the amount that was due, in terms declared' that it left “ the question of distribution to’that department of the government, which by law has incumbent on it the administration of the trust, which in legal contemplation exists between the United States and the different tribes of Indians.” This court affirmed that decision, and in so doing, after saying.that there was nothing in the record which would enable them to identify the claimants, added: “ Perhaps the necessities of the situation demand that the identification of each claimant entitled to share in the distribution shall be left to the officers who are the agents of the government in paying out the fund.” Such being the final orders in the consolidated cases, proceedings for ascertaining the individual beneficiaries were rightfully had in accordance with the directions then made. It is no argument against upholding that which was done to say that some other and more satisfactory procedure might have been ordered. Possibly it would have been better for the court, to have appointed a master and proceeded according to the rules of equity in iden-. tifying the beneficiaries of the fund. However, it was not so ordered, and both the claimants and the government were instructed and concluded by the decision in1 respect to the method of identification.

The mandate of this court was filed in the Court of Claims on April 20, 1893, and on August 23, 1894, Congress passed an act appropriating money for the payment of the judgment. The fund thereby became available for distribution. No action, so far as appears, was taken in the Court of Claims or in the Indian department looking to an identification of the parties entitled to this money until after March 2,1895. Nearly two years had passed and no effort had been made by the petitioners to-establish to the satisfaction of the court or the officers of the Indian department their right to be counted among the distributees of this fund. Obviously these. petition ers, whose names and places of residence were stated in the second of the original petitions, could if they had seen fit have furnished proofs of identification.

After the passage of the act of March 2, 1895, appropriating $1000 for expenses, an inspector was detailed as agent to take a census and prepare a- list or roll. Then for .the first time and after he had commenced his work do we hear of any action on the part of these petitioners, and that action consisted wholly of a single letter from their counsel to the Secretary of the Interior. This was the scope of that letter, which was of date July 27, 1895 : The instructions given to the agent were that in taking the census he should be guided by a pay-roll made in 1866, upon which there had been a pro rata .distribution of money awarded by .Congress, and to account for all the Indians whose names appeared upon that roll, and also to enroll all who could furnish proof of being their legal descendants. The letter was a protest against these instructions, calling attention to the fact that there were prior rolls, particularly those of 1843 and 1844, which should be taken into account in preparing the new census or list. The writer also attached a list of the names of some, who, so far as ascertained, were, he stated, heirs of persons named on one or other of these rolls, and of other individuals who were also entitled to enrollment. Apparently before any action was taken by the department upon this protest the agent had returned'a list or census roll of those found by him entitled to share in the fund.

Nevertheless the contention made in the letter of counsel having been presented to the Secretary of the Interior, he ruled that those persons should be enrolled who were on any of the rolls made during the years from 1843 to 1866, or descended from one upon those rolls. Thereupon a new agent was appointed and directed to ascertain what additions to the list returned by the first agent should be made under the new rulings. The work of this agent was not fruitful in results, as he only reported the names of two persons entitled to be added to the list or roll. Thereafter one was added by the department, and upon the list thus completed the money was paid out per capita. The number to whom distribution was made, being all included in the completed list or roll, was 272. This distribution was made during the month of November, 1896, according to the statement of Chief Justice Nott, in delivering the opinion of the court, although there is no. specific finding to that effect. The report of the second agent was dated March 14,1896. No action appears to have begin taken by the petitioners intermediate this report in March, and the distribution in November; none indeed until the filing of this petition on April 22, 1899, more than three years after the report.

The fourth finding, in the present suit contains this statement:

“ None of the Indians, parties in or represented by the present suit, were paid as aforesaid. A large number of them, to wit, 272, whose names are set forth in Schedule A annexed to claimants’ request for findings, were descended from Indians whose names were enrolled on the rolls of Indians in Michigan in the years 1843, 1844, and 1866.”

But in respect to this finding it was stated by Chief Justice Nott:

“The evidence now produced to establish the fact that 272 of the present claimants are direct descendants of the Indians who were upon the rolls in 1843 and 1844 is not altogether satisfactory to the court, but in the absence of countervailing testimony it may be said to present a prima facie case.”

So the case .stands thus: Congress having referred to the Court of Claims an inquiry whether anything was due to “ the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana” by reason of treaty stipulations, nearly fifteen hundred individuals appeared in two suits, subsequently consolidated, claiming that there was a large.amount due under those stipulations, and representing that they were the parties entitled to the benefit thereof. The result of that litigation was to determine that a certain amount was due to those Indians, but there being no evidence to identify the individuals who came within the description and were^entitled to share in the amount found due, the judgment was simply for a recovery of such amount, and it was specially directed that the identification of the individuals entitled thereto should be left to the officers of- the Indian department. After two years had passed without any evidence being furnished by individuals of their right to participate in the fund, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to appoint an agent to examine into the matter and prepare a proper roll or list. While such agent was acting a protest was made by the counsel in one of those suits against the basis upon which he was preparing the roll. Although that agent had finished his work the Secretary of the Interior accepted the suggestion of counsel, and directed a new. agent to examine and report any names which upon the basis suggested by counsel should be added to the roll already prepared. As the result of the reports of these two agents a roll was prepared containing the names of ,272 persons, and the fund was distributed among them.

There is nothing in the record in the way of finding, report or letter tending to show what efforts .the first agent made in respect to the matter of identification, what course he pursued or what steps he took, and in respect to the second agent all that is disclosed is that which appears in his report, which details at some length his various efforts to secure evidences of identification of different individuals. In short, it must be assumed, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that the officers of the government acted reasonably, fairly and with all needed diligence in discharging the duty imposed upon them. While from the present findings it appears that they made a mistake, and did not include all who ought to have been included as beneficiaries, yet their instructions conformed to the suggestions of counsel for petitioners, and there is nothing to show that they did not make a full and honest effort to carry out those instructions. Complaint, therefore, must be upon one of two grounds: Either that the proper course to pursue in the way of identification was not taken, but that objection comes too late, for it was concluded by the prior decision; or that a mistake having been made in the matter of identification the government must assume all the burden of the mistake and pay a second time that which it has once paid in pursuance of the directions of the court. That is really the contention of the petitioners.

They were petitioners in one of the original suits, and contend that they were entitled to share in the fund, and that as the full amount awarded by the court and appropriated by Congress has already been paid to others, they are entitled to a judgment against the government for that which ought to have been paid to them out of the prior appropriation. The Court of Claims finds that of these petitioners 272 ought to have been placed upon the census roll, and were entitled to a share in the fund. The failure to receive their share may be a hardship to these petitioners, but it must be' remembered that the method of ascertaining those entitled was prescribed by the court and pursued by the government. Having been so pursued that fund must be considered as properly distributed.

This is not an ordinary judgment at law in which the plaintiff entitled to receive and the defendant bound to pay are both named, and in which the absolute duty is cast upon the defendant to see that the right party is paid, but a case in which the amount of a fund for distribution was determined, and directions made for .ascertaining the beneficiaries of that fund. The debtor and the beneficiaries were each interested in the question of identification, and both bound by the conclusion reached in respect thereto if the directions were fully complied with.

. To what would any other ruling result ? The finding which, evidently, from the opinion of Chief Justice Not't was not very clearly established, that 272, in addition to those already paid, were entitled to a part of-the fund, does not conclude other claimants, and if these petitioners should .obtain a judgment against the United States, other petitioners might come forward with like claim, and so the government be compelled to pgy over and over again, although it had made one payment in compliance with the directions of the court. Further, if there were' really more beneficiaries entitled to share in this fund than those who actually received payment, those who were paid received each too much and should return the overplus; and the amount of that overplus would be constantly increased as in successive actions there were added further beneficiaries, for the distribution was, as stated, per capita — a mode of distribution contended, for by the petitioners. Petitioners seem to assume that, although the government took the course prescribed by the court in ascertaining the individuals entitled to share in that fund, it assumed all the risk of mistake, however made; and that they could wait until after the government had acted and made the distribution, and that no responsibility rested upon them to furnish evidences of their title. For reasons stated we cannot assent to this view. Where a fund has been created and the mode of distribution prescribed by the court which established the amount of the fund, its disposition in accordance with the course prescribed by the court must be held a finality, and in the case at .bar any further relief must be obtained from Congress and cannot be given by the courts. •

It is suggested, though not by counsel, that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction to entertain this action, and that therefore our order should be to reverse the judgment and remand' the case with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The basis of this suggestion is the contention that the act of Inarch 19,1890, simply gave to the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine the sum due the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, without the power to identify the particular individuals entitled to share in the amount found due, and it is said that this was so decided in the prior case. We do not so understand that decision. The act, so far as material, reads as follows:

“ Whereas representatives of the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, in behalf of all the Pottawatomie Indians of said States, make claim against the United States on account of various treaty provisions which, it is alleged, have hot been complied with : Therefore,

“ Be 'it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Court of Claims is hereby authorized to take jurisdiction of and try all questions of difference arising out of treaty stipulations with the said Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan ■ and Indiana, and to' render judgment thereon; power is hereby granted the said court to review the entire question of difference de novo, and it shall not be estopped by the joint resolution of Congress approved twenty-eighth July, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled ‘ Joint [Resolution for the relief of certain Chippewa, Ottawa, and Pottawatomie Indians,’ nor by the receipt in full given by said Pottawatomies under the provisions of said resolution, nor shall said receipt be evidence of any fact except of payment of the amount of money mentioned in it.”

Two suits were commenced in the Court of Claims, as heretofore stated, and by that court consolidated. In one a certain number of individuals were named as petitioners. In the other it was admitted that ninety-one persons were represented by their authorized attorney, as appeared by agreement between the attorney and their business committee. The court, after consolidating the two actions, proceeded to determine the amount due, and made no finding as to the individuals entitled •to share in such amount. But such identification was for want of sufficient evidence to enable the court to determine the question.. This is apparent from the opinion of that court in the present case, for it is said by Chief Justice Nott, in delivering that opinion, “ It is unfortunate for some of the claimants in the present suit that the evidence upon which they now rely was not before the court then. . . . The court deemed itself bound by the action of the government in recognizing the parties represented by the former suit (that is, one of the two suits consolidated), and accordingly rendered judgment for them; but the court did not undertake to determine who the then existing individual claimants were who were entitled to participate in the distribution.”

Again, after quoting from the opinion of this court, he said : “ At this point, if the. former case had been a similar suit in’ chancery between ordinary litigants, it would have been referred to a master or referee to ascertain and report as to the individual claimants entitled to recover, and'the final decree would riot have been entered until a coming in and confirmation or correction of the master’s report. The Secretary of the Interior, however, seems to have inferred from language in the opinions of the two courts that he was authorized to proceed and ascertain who those Indians were, and to prescribe the methods for so ascertaining and determining the amount to be distributed to each individual claimant.” And after referring to a plea in behalf of these individual claimants on account of their ignorance, added, “ but the former case, in which the court might have' exercised the discretion of a court of equity and allowed parties to come in even after the decree and assert their rights, is closed; the- judgment therein has been satisfied; the claimants stand directly upon their legal rights, and there can not be one law for the intelligent and another for the ignorant.”

And. this court, in its opinion, used the -language quoted in the preliminary statement of fact. It is obvious from these quotations from the opinions that both the Court of Claims and this court understood that the act gave jurisdiction not only to ascertain the amount, due, but also to identify the individuals entitled to share therein, and that the failure to find the latter •resulted from a lack of evidence — a lack-the plaintiffs endeavor in this action to supply.

But even if the language of the prior opinions of the Court of Claims and this court can be tortured into a different construction, still there can be no question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over the present action. The jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the mere entry of a judgment. It always has power to inquire whether that judgment has been executed, and the contention here is — and it is the basis of .this suit — that the judgment which was rendered in the prior suit has not been executed. It would be an anomaly to hold that a court having jurisdiction of a controversy and which renders a judgment in favor of A against B had no power to inquire whether that judgment has been rightly executed by a payment from B to C. If the Court of Claims had no authority to inquire into the execution of- its judgment it was shorn of a part of the ordinary jurisdiction of a court. The question what is essential in order to- confer jurisdiction in this court over the judgments of the Court of Claims was: exhaustively examined by Chief Justice Taney in Gordon v. United States, reported in 117 U. S. 697, and that judgment has been more' than once referred to by this court as conclusive of the questions therein-considered: District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U. S. 62; District of Columbia v. Barnes, p. , post. In that opinion he said (p. 702):

“The inferior court, therefore, from which the appeal is taken, must be a judicial tribunal authorized to render a judgment which will bind the rights of the parties litigating, before it, unless appealed from, and upon which the appropriate process of execution may be issued by the court to carry it into effect. And Congress cannot extend the appellate power of this court beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution, and can neither confer nor impose on it the authority or duty of hearing and determining an appeal from a commissioner or auditor, or any other tribunal exercising only special powers under an act of Congress; nor can. Congress authorize or require this court to express an opinion on a case where its. judicial power could not be exercised, and where its judgment would not be final' and conclusive upon the rights of the parties, and process of execution awarded to carry it into effect.

“The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment,'in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative and • nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at' some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction: yet it is the whole power that the court is allowed to ¿xercise under this act' of Congress.”

It follows from these considerations that the Court of Claims not only had jurisdiction to find the amount due from the United States to the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana and render judgment therefor, but also to inquire into the question whether .that judgment had been duly and properly executed.

The judgment is

Affirmed,