Paloma v. New York City Department of Corrections

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 10, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-02133·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MIRIAHM PALOMA, Plaintiff, 20-CV-2133 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and EASTERLING, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently detained in the Rose M. Singer Center, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Easterling, using her flash light every 15 minutes, violated Plaintiff’s rights by observing her as she walked back and forth to the bathroom. By order dated June 29, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Miriahm Paloma (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendants the New York City Department of Correction (DOC) and Correction Officer Easterling (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that in February 2020, Defendants violated her rights through “unconstitutional observation.” (ECF No. 2 at 4.) The following facts are taken from the complaint. On February 13, 2020, Officer Easterling “sat by dorm window facing [Plaintiff’s bed] for unconstitutional observation.” Id.

Easterling, who “was talking to herself, [and] using her flashlight every 15 minutes,” watched Plaintiff “walk back and forth to the bathroom.” (Id.) Easterling was not supposed to watch Plaintiff, who is not on suicide watch. (Id.) Plaintiff suffered “trouble sleeping [and] blurred vision.” (Id. at 5.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks “$122, 525, 018.12 USD” and “order of corrections affects mental hygiene and does not close arrears.” (Id.) DISCUSSION A. New York City Department of Correction Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17 § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the

name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins vs. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of N.Y., 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC. B. Conditions-of-Confinement Claim The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting a conditions-of-confinement claim. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, governs a pretrial detainee’s claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” Id. at 535. If the conditions are not deemed punitive, then the plaintiff’s allegations are evaluated under a standard of deliberate indifference. Abreu v. Schriro, No. 1:14-CV-6418, 2016 WL 3647958, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2016).

Punitive Conditions “If a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Thus, if a condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective or is “arbitrary or purposeless,” then it “may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees.” Id. “[W]hen an institutional restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee . . . the practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional security.” Id. at 547 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977)); see e.g. Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F. Supp. 2d 317, 368 (N.D.N.Y.

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Paloma v. New York City Department of Corrections, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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