Paloma v. New York City Department Of Corrections

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 23, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-00637·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MIRIAHM PALOMA, Plaintiff, 20-CV-0637 (LLS) -against- ORDERTO AMEND NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; CAPTAIN DANIELS, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated in the Rose M. Singer Center (RMSC) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that Defendants violated her rights.By order datedMarch 6, 2020,the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b);see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis.See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007).The court must also dismiss a complaint ifthe court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against the New York City Department of Correction and Captain Daniels. The following facts are taken from the complaint. Plaintiff’s housing area has ongoing “weird” odors coming from the ceiling vents that smelled like “fecal matter, dirty diaper [,] vomit, industry signals burned/burning rubber, [and] male body odor.” (ECF No. 2, 4.) Plaintiff submitted grievances to correction officials about theissue but the smells continue. In addition, on an unspecified date, Captain Danielsconducted an unconstitutional search of Plaintiff and caused the loss of her personal property. Plaintiff asserts that the search was unconstitutional because it occurred while she was using the bathroom, but it “did not include the

Boss chair.”(Id.) Captain Daniels also failed to direct that her personal property be secured, causing the loss of her commissary and clothing. He also failed to “honor” Plaintiff’s correct housing assignment, resulting in her having to be rehoused several times.(Id.) Plaintiff asserts that she suffered the following injuries: a bruise on her left hand from handcuffs, and “minor hair loss due to stress from industry signal (behind left ear).” (Id. at 5.) She seeks reimbursement for the loss of her property, and “compensation for injuries and emotional distress from harassment during searches/rehousing procedures.” (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Claims against the New York City Department of Correction Plaintiff’s claims against the New York City Department of Correction must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.N.Y. City Charter

ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). B. Claims against Captain Daniels and other Correction Officials Odors in Housing Area The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the “weird” odors in her housing area as asserting claims that correction officers were deliberately indifferent to conditions during her confinement that posed a serious threat to herhealth or safety.As Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the events giving rise to herclaims, the claims arise under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). To state a conditions-of-confinement claim, Plaintiff must satisfy two elements: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged conditions are sufficiently serious, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that a correction officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions. Id. The objective element requires a showing that “the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [her] health” or safety, which “includes the risk of serious damage to ‘physical and mental soundness.’” Id.at 30 (quoting LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)). The mental element requires a showing “that the defendant-official acted intentionally to

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Paloma v. New York City Department Of Corrections, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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