Palmer v. State

Indiana Supreme Court

Palmer v. State

573 N.E.2d 880, 1991 Ind. LEXIS 116, 1991 WL 108783

CourtIndiana Supreme Court

DecidedJune 18, 1991

Docket49S02-9012-PC-783

StatusPublished

Cited by20 cases

This text of 573 N.E.2d 880 (Palmer v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Palmer v. State, 573 N.E.2d 880, 1991 Ind. LEXIS 116, 1991 WL 108783 (Ind. 1991).

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Opinions

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

KRAHULIK, Judge.

Appellant-Petitioner, Michael D. Palmer, asks for rehearing from our decision, Palmer v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 601, vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals, Palmer v. State (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 1256, and affirming the trial court's denial of his petition for post-convietion relief. Palmer, in his petition to transfer, had raised several issues which we decided adversely to him. After a reconsideration of the issue of whether his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to object to and appeal from a jury instruction which incorrectly set forth the elements of voluntary manslaughter, we grant rehearing and summarily affirm the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals.

At the conclusion of Palmer's trial on the charge of murder, the trial court, without objection, instructed the jury that "the essential elements" of the crime of voluntary manslaughter were (1) the voluntary killing of a human being, (2) without malice, and (3) in sudden heat. All agree that this instruction was an erroneous statement of the law because neither lack of malice nor sudden heat were elements of voluntary manslaughter. Lack of malice was discarded as a required element and sudden heat was rendered a mitigating factor by the legislature's definition of voluntary manslaughter in 1977. Inp.Cop® Ann. § 35-42-1-3 (Burns 1986).

On rehearing, we agree with the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals that Palmer's counsel's failure to object to and appeal from this incorrect instruction rendered their assistance ineffective. Palmer was entitled to have the jury instructed correctly on such an essential rule of law. We, therefore, grant Palmer's petition for rehearing and summarily affirm the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court and remanding with instructions to grant Palmer's petition for post-conviction relief.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER and DICKSON, JJ., concur. GIVAN, J., dissents with opinion.

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ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

KRAHULIK, Judge.

Appellant-Petitioner, Michael D. Palmer, asks for rehearing from our decision, Palmer v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 601, vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals, Palmer v. State (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 1256, and affirming the trial court's denial of his petition for post-convietion relief. Palmer, in his petition to transfer, had raised several issues which we decided adversely to him. After a reconsideration of the issue of whether his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to object to and appeal from a jury instruction which incorrectly set forth the elements of voluntary manslaughter, we grant rehearing and summarily affirm the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals.

At the conclusion of Palmer's trial on the charge of murder, the trial court, without objection, instructed the jury that "the essential elements" of the crime of voluntary manslaughter were (1) the voluntary killing of a human being, (2) without malice, and (3) in sudden heat. All agree that this instruction was an erroneous statement of the law because neither lack of malice nor sudden heat were elements of voluntary manslaughter. Lack of malice was discarded as a required element and sudden heat was rendered a mitigating factor by the legislature's definition of voluntary manslaughter in 1977. Inp.Cop® Ann. § 35-42-1-3 (Burns 1986).

On rehearing, we agree with the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals that Palmer's counsel's failure to object to and appeal from this incorrect instruction rendered their assistance ineffective. Palmer was entitled to have the jury instructed correctly on such an essential rule of law. We, therefore, grant Palmer's petition for rehearing and summarily affirm the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court and remanding with instructions to grant Palmer's petition for post-conviction relief.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER and DICKSON, JJ., concur. GIVAN, J., dissents with opinion.

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Bluebook (online)

573 N.E.2d 880, 1991 Ind. LEXIS 116, 1991 WL 108783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/palmer-v-state-ind-1991.

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