Palmer v. Rancho Sahuarita Management Company LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 9, 2024
• Docket: 4:23-cv-00566
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Landon Palmer, No. CV-23-00566-TUC-SHR

10 Plaintiff, Screening Order Dismissing Complaint

11 v.

12 Rancho Sahuarita Management Company LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Landon Palmer, who is representing himself, filed a complaint for 16 employment discrimination along with an Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 17 (“IFP”). (Docs. 1, 2.) For the follow reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff IFP status and 18 dismiss his Complaint without prejudice. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 In his Complaint, Plaintiff sues Rancho Sahuarita Management Company, LLC 21 (“Rancho Sahuarita”), Michelle Moreno, Fred Lewis, and Marissa Telles.1 (Doc. 1 at 2.) 22 Plaintiff asserts claims regarding Rancho Sahuarita’s failure to hire him based on unequal 23 terms and conditions of employment. (Id. at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Rancho 24 Sahuarita denied his religious accommodation and failed to hire him because of his 25 undisclosed religion. (Id. at 4–5.) According to Plaintiff, Rancho Sahuarita discriminated 26 against him because it only accepted “organized religions as having grounds for

27 1The Court will construe Plaintiff’s reference to “Respondent” as referring the place he sought employment from— Rancho Sahuarita. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Based on the identical 28 address and information provided in the Complaint, it appears Defendants Moreno, Lewis, and Telles are employees at Rancho Sahuarita. (Id. at 2–5.) 1 accommodation requests.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. (Id. at 6.) 2 Plaintiff alleges the following:2 3 On April 23, 2022, Plaintiff applied to Rancho Sahuarita for a “Swim Instructor 4 and/or Lifeguard” employment position. (Doc. 1 at 5.) On April 26, Plaintiff attended 5 Rancho Sahuarita’s skill demonstration meeting. (Id.) On May 16, Plaintiff requested a 6 religious accommodation to have the Covid-19 vaccination requirement waived. (Id.) On 7 May 20, Rancho Sahuarita advised Plaintiff he had to submit his request to Defendant 8 Lewis, but he alleges Rancho Sahuarita failed to provide him with the contact information 9 for Defendant Lewis. (Id.) On May 23, Rancho Sahuarita sent Plaintiff an email advising 10 him his religious accommodation paperwork was missing the required letter from his 11 religious leader. (Id.) On May 30, Plaintiff submitted his religious accommodation 12 paperwork to Defendant Moreno including a statement informing Rancho Sahuarita 13 Plaintiff did not have a religious leader. (Id.) 14 On June 8, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Moreno requesting an update on his 15 application. (Doc. 1 at 5.) That same day, Defendant Moreno replied and told him his 16 request was different than other applicants because he did not have a religious leader and 17 the request was being reviewed by Rancho Sahuarita’s consultants. (Id.) Rancho Sahuarita 18 never approved his religious request or hired Plaintiff. (Id.) 19 On December 12, 2022,3 Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment 20 Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regarding the alleged discriminatory conduct. (Doc. 21 1 at 5.) The Arizona Attorney General issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter on September 22 14, 2023, which included an EEOC number. (Id; Doc. 1-1 at 2 (listing an EEOC number).) 23 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 18, 2023. (Doc. 1 at 1.) 24 II. IFP APPLICATION 25 The Court may authorize the commencement and prosecution of a civil action IFP 26 “without prepayment of fees or security” if the plaintiff submits an affidavit including a 27 2Plaintiff alleges the dates are approximates. 28 3Plaintiff listed “12/12/2023” on his Complaint but that appears to be a typo based on the context of the Complaint. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 1 statement of all assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In IFP proceedings officers of the court 2 “shall issue and serve all process.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 3 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP application shows his expenses exceed his income. Therefore, 4 the Court will grant the application. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234–36 5 (9th Cir. 2015). 6 III. STATUTORY SCREENING 7 Because Plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer 8 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 9 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) screening applies to non- 10 prisoners proceeding IFP); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) 11 (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 12 portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised legally frivolous or malicious claims, failed to state 13 a claim upon which relief may be granted, or sought monetary relief from a defendant who 14 is immune from such relief. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. 15 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 16 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 17 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 18 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the 19 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 20 theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 22 showing that [the plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, a 23 complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 24 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 25 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Detailed factual allegations are not 26 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 27 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint suggesting the “mere possibility 28 of misconduct” or providing “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 1 accusation[s]” does not satisfy Iqbal’s plausibility standard. Id. at 678–79. Courts have a 2 duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police 3 Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 4 IV. ANALYSIS 5 A. Exhausting Administrative Remedies 6 To establish subject-matter jurisdiction over a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must 7 exhaust his administrative remedies. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 8 (9th Cir. 2002). “Under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust [his] administrative remedies 9 by filing a timely charge with the EEOC, or the appropriate state agency, thereby affording 10 the agency an opportunity to investigate the charge.” Id. at 1099 (citing § 2000e-5(b)). 11 “The administrative charge requirement serves the important purposes of giving the 12 charged party notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for prompt adjudication and 13 decision.” Id. (cleaned up). The EEOC complaint must be filed within 180 days of the 14 alleged unlawful employment practice, or, if the person initially instituted proceedings with 15 the state or local administrative agency, within 300 days of the alleged unlawful 16 employment practice. § 2000e-5(e)(1). If the EEOC does not bring suit based on the 17 charge, the EEOC will issue a “right to sue letter.” § 2000e-5(f)(1). Once a person receives 18 this letter, he has 90 days to file suit. Id. Similarly, under the Arizona Civil Rights Act 19 (“ACRA”), A.R.S. §§ 41-1401 to 1493.02, an applicant must file a charge within 180 “days 20 after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” A.R.S. § 41-1481(A). Then, a 21 lawsuit must be filed in court no later than one year after the employment discrimination 22 charge was filed. A.R.S. § 41-1481(D). 23 Here, Plaintiff alleges the discrimination occurred between “May 30, 2022-June 8, 24 2022.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges he filed charges with the EEOC and the State of 25 Arizona Attorney General’s Office on December 12, 2022. (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 1-1 at 2.) 26 Assuming Plaintiff “initially instituted proceedings with the state or local administrative 27 agency,” his Title VII claim is not time-barred because it falls within the 300 days of the 28 alleged discrimination. However, his claim is time barred under Arizona law because it 1 was not filed within 180 days of when the discrimination is alleged to have occurred and 2 there are not enough facts in the complaint to determine if equitable tolling applies. See 3 A.R.S. § 41-1481(A); Kyles v. Contractors/Eng'rs Supply, Inc., 949 P.2d 63, 65 (Ariz. Ct. 4 App. 1997) (“Equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is excusably ignorant of the 5 limitations period and the defendant would not be prejudiced by the late filing.”); Cox v. 6 Glob. Tool Supply LLC, No. CV-20-00152-PHX-GMS, 2020 WL 4464384, at *2 (D. Ariz. 7 Aug. 4, 2020) (“[T]he facts necessary to support equitable tolling must be alleged in the 8 complaint.”). 9 Moreover, the Arizona Attorney General’s Office emailed and mailed Plaintiff’s 10 father a Notice of Right to Sue Letter on September 14, 2023.4 (Id.) At this early stage in 11 the proceedings, the Court will presume Plaintiff’s Complaint is within the 90-day 12 requirement because it is dated December 12, 2023 and Plaintiff indicates he mailed the 13 Complaint to the Court on that date. 14 B. Title VII 15 Title VII prohibits employers from refusing to hire or discriminating against 16 individuals with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 17 because of such individual’s” religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 18 To state a prima facie case for discrimination based on a failure to hire, a plaintiff 19 must state: “(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for 20 the position she was denied; (3) she was rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) the 21 employer filled the position with an employee not of plaintiff’s class, or continued to 22 consider other applicants whose qualifications were comparable to plaintiff’s after 23 rejecting plaintiff.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th 24 Cir. 2005) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). 25 Having liberally construed the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a 26 discriminatory failure-to-hire claim under Title VII. Plaintiff alleges he is a member of a 27 4It appears Plaintiff’s father received the letter on behalf of Plaintiff. (Doc. 1-1 at 28 2.) This might be because Plaintiff was a minor at the time of the alleged discrimination and up until July 2023. (See Doc. 1-1 at 1.) 1 protected class based on his undisclosed unorganized religion and he applied for and would 2 have received the position but for his failure to obtain a letter from a religious leader in 3 support of his religious vaccination exemption.5 However, Plaintiff does not allege the 4 position he applied for was filled by an employee not of Plaintiff’s class or that Rancho 5 Sahuarita continued to consider other applicants whose qualifications were comparable to 6 Plaintiff’s after rejecting him. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Complaint. 7 C. Individual Defendants 8 While Title VII allows persons to sue an employer for religious discrimination, 9 individuals may not be held personally liable under its framework. See Miller v. Maxwell’s 10 Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding previous holding “that individual 11 defendants cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII is good law”). Therefore, 12 Plaintiff’s claims against Moreno, Lewis, and Telles will be dismissed with prejudice. 13 D. Leave to Amend 14 A district court should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the 15 plaintiff can correct the defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted) 16 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988)). 17 Here, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his claim with respect to Title VII 18 claim against Defendant Rancho Sahuarita only. Plaintiff may also provide additional facts 19 to support an equitable tolling claim for his ACRA claim if he believes this applies. 20 Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document it is the “First Amended 21 Complaint.” The First Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety and 22 may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. The First Amended 23 Complaint supersedes the original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 24 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 25 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat the original Complaint as nonexistent. 26 Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action raised in the original Complaint and

27 5The Court questions the viability of any complaint alleging religious discrimination where no religion is set forth; however, that issue will not addressed at this time since 28 Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim on another element, and Plaintiff is given leave to amend his Complaint. See infra IV(D). 1 || voluntarily dismissed or dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a first 2|| amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 4 V. WARNINGS 5 A. Address Changes 6 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 7|| 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other 8 || relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action. 10 B. Possible Dismissal 11 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these || warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 13 || 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure || to comply with any order of the Court). 15 Accordingly, 16 IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff's IFP Application (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff is permitted to maintain the action to 18 || conclusion without necessity of prepayment of any additional fees, costs, or security. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendants Moreno, Lewis, and Telles are || DISMISSED with prejudice. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT 22 || PREJUDICE. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint in compliance with this 23 || Order, he must do so no later than Wednesday May 8, 2024, or his case shall be dismissed. 24 Dated this 8th day of April, 2024. 25

27 Honorable Scott H. Rash _/ United States District Judge 28

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