Palma v. Cheer Hall, LLC

Opinion

Palma v Cheer Hall, LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 04872

August 5, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Jose Figueroa Palma, et al., appellants,

v

Cheer Hall, LLC, respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2023-10915, (Index No. 30211/21)

Betsy Barros, J.P.

Valerie Brathwaite Nelson

Barry E. Warhit

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

Wingate, Russotti, Shapiro, Moses & Halperin, LLP (Chirico Law PLLC, Brooklyn, NY [Vincent Chirico], of counsel), for appellants.

Varvaro, Cotter & Bender (Kahana & Feld LLP, New York, NY [Sarah Pavlini and Christopher R. Theobalt], of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an amended order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Sherri L. Eisenpress, J.), dated October 27, 2023. The amended order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on those causes of action.

ORDERED that the amended order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On November 20, 2020, the plaintiff Jose Figueroa Palma (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly sustained injuries while performing work on property owned by the defendant in Rockland County. The injured plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries. The complaint asserted causes of action, among other things, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). The Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action was predicated, inter alia, upon a violation of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.24(b). The defendant subsequently moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action, arguing that it could not be held liable for violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) due to the exemption set forth in those statutes for owners of one- and two-family dwellings. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on those causes of action. In an amended order dated October 27, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion. The plaintiffs appeal.

Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) impose nondelegable duties upon property owners to comply with certain safety practices for the protection of workers engaged in certain activities. Both statutes exempt from liability "owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work" (id. §§ 240[1]; 241[6]). "This homeowner exemption does not apply to property owners who use their one or two-family premises entirely and solely for commercial purposes" (Manfredo v Marvin & Mario Constr., Inc., 216 AD3d 634, 634 [internal [*2]quotation marks omitted]; see Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 296; Pawelic v Siegel, 220 AD3d 883, 884). "Nonetheless, the homeowner exemption is applicable when an owner of a one- or two-family dwelling contracts for work that directly relates to the residential use of the home, even if the work also serves a commercial purpose" (Manfredo v Marvin & Mario Constr., Inc., 216 AD3d at 634-635 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cannon v Putnam, 76 NY2d 644, 650; Bartoo v Buell, 87 NY2d 362, 369).

Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the defendant's submissions in support of its motion were sufficient to establish, prima facie, that its use of the property was entirely for residential purposes (see Manfredo v Marvin & Mario Constr., Inc., 216 AD3d at 635; Parrino v Rauert, 208 AD3d 672, 674-675; Debennedetto v Chetrit, 190 AD3d 933, 935; Sandals v Shemtov, 138 AD3d 720, 720-721). In any event, those submissions further demonstrated, prima facie, that the construction work being performed by the injured plaintiff at the time of his accident directly related to the residential use of the property (see Khela v Neiger, 85 NY2d 333, 338; Manfredo v Marvin & Mario Constr., Inc., 216 AD3d at 635; Stejskal v Simons, 309 AD2d 853, 855). Moreover, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that it did not direct or control the method and manner of the injured plaintiff's work (see Bartoo v Buell, 87 NY2d at 369; Cadena v Kupferstein, 238 AD3d 973, 974; Campanello v Cinquemani, 179 AD3d 763, 764). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action and, for the same reasons, properly denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on those causes of action.

The parties' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.

BARROS, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court