Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovich

235 S.W. 929, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 1265
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 26, 1917
DocketNo. 7338.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 235 S.W. 929 (Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovich, 235 S.W. 929, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 1265 (Tex. Ct. App. 1917).

Opinions

This was a suit to recover on a tornado policy for the alleged destruction in the storm of August, 1915, at Galveston, of a building occupied by the plaintiff as a dwelling. The company defended on the ground that the loss or damage resulted from causes excepted from the policy, which provided that the company should not be liable for any loss or damage occasioned directly or indirectly by any tidal wave, high water, overflow, or cloudburst, or for any loss or damage caused by water or rain, whether driven by wind or not, unless the building insured should first sustain an actual damage to the roof or walls of same by the direct force of the wind, and that the company should then be liable only for such damage to the interior as might be caused by water or lain entering through openings first made by the direct action of the wind.

The case was tried before the court, and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff for $1,000, the amount of the policy, with interest from date of judgment, and costs of suit. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, which having been overruled, this writ of error was properly sued out, and assignments of error duly filed.

The court, at the request of the defendant, tiled findings of fact and conclusions of law; the material ones, for the purposes of this opinion, being as follows:

"(b) While said policy was in full force and effect, on the 16th and 17th days of August, A.D. 1915, as a direct result of a tornado, windstorm, and cyclone of terrific violence, the insured property was totally demolished, destroyed, blown away, and was a total loss to plaintiff."

"(d) * * * I specially find that east wall of the house was blown out at time wind reached its highest velocity, and immediately after this wall was blown out the rest of the house went to pieces in the hurricane and by it."

"(f) The loss and damage suffered by plaintiff does not come within any of the exceptions in the policy relieving defendant from liability; and in this connection I find that the loss and damage was not due directly or indirectly to high water or a tidal wave."

The promise of the company, as printed on the face of the policy, is, so far as material, as follows:

"The Palatine Insurance Company, Limited, of London, England, * * * does insure Steve Petrovich * * * against all direct loss or damage by tornado, windstorm, or cyclone, except as hereinafter provided, to an amount not exceeding one thousand dollars to the following described property. * * * The policy is made and accepted * * * subject to the following stipulations and conditions printed on back hereof, which are hereby specially referred to and made a part of this policy."

On the back of the policy are provisions as follows:

"This company shall not be liable for any loss or damage caused by hail, whether driven by wind or not. * * * nor for loss or damage occasioned directly or indirectly by or through any * * * tidal wave, high water, overflow, cloudburst. * * * This company shall not be liable for any loss or damage caused by water or rain, whether driven by wind or not, unless the building insured, or containing the property insured, shall first sustain an actual damage to the roof or walls of same by the direct force of the wind, and shall then be liable only for such damage to the interior of the building or the insured property therein as may be caused by water or rain entering the building through openings in the roof or walls made by the direct action of the wind."

The exception referred to in the last paragraph in the preceding quotation from the policy is inapplicable. The suit in the present case was not for damage to the interior of the insured dwelling, but for the total loss of the same; the whole structure having been demolished, and the ground left bare.

There are only two assignments presented; the first challenging the correctness of the trial court's judgment on the ground that the loss sustained was not covered by the terms and provisions of the policy, but was expressly excepted out of them, and the second on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding that the destruction of the property, and the consequent loss, was caused by the direct action of the wind alone, and was not caused or occasioned directly or indirectly by high water or a tidal wave.

We think the contentions under both assignments must be upheld, and that the policy by its terms was essentially and plainly a wind damage policy. In making the contract with the insured therein contained it was very evidently intended by the insurance company not to insure him against the very kind of a loss he here sustained; that is, one caused either directly or indirectly by water.

Without refining upon the degree of causation by the high water necessary, we think it is sufficient to say that, to our minds, it is quite clear that the water was at least a contributing cause of the loss suffered, and that is enough, under our interpretation of the contract of insurance as made, to bring it within the exceptions. The obligation, as undertaken by the insurance company, was not a divisible one, under which it might be held liable for any part of the loss or damage shown to have been proximately caused by or through the high water, although the other part was due to the direct action of the wind alone. If such had been the legal effect of the contract, it would have been necessary for the court and jury to distinguish between these two recoverable elements *Page 931 of damage, and, however difficult it may have proven, to both find and apportion to each its proper and proportionate amount of the actual loss. Warmcastle v. Scottish U. N. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 302, 50 A. 941.

But the contract here does not so read. It is an insurance against wind alone, and not against loss occasioned partly by wind and partly by high water. The physical conditions surrounding the property at the time, which both parties must be held to have had in contemplation in making the contract, leave no doubt of their intention to except from the policy just such a loss as the present one.

Galveston Island, on which the insured building stood, has no lakes, streams, or rivulets. The building itself was on dry land, several feet above the sea level, and entirely secure, save in extraordinary winds, from water damage. The exceptions in this wind damage policy could have had reference only to the water damage occurring during, or as a result of, such extraordinary winds. Without further discussion, we quote with approval, as applying the principle ruling our stated conclusion in this case, from the opinion in National Fire Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield,160 Ky. 802, 170 S.W. 187, L.R.A. 1915B, 1094, by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, involving the construction of a tornado policy practically identical in its provisions with those of the policy here, as follows:

"It is therefore perfectly apparent that neither the wind, acting independently of the flood, nor the action of the flood, apart from the high wind, would have caused the damage, and the question is: Under the terms of the contract above quoted, were the appellants liable? The contract was to insure appellee `against all direct loss or damage by tornado, windstorm, or cyclone' except `for loss or damage occasioned directly or indirectly by or through * * * high water [or] overflow.' Can it be said, under the facts of this case, that the injury was not at least indirectly occasioned by the high water? The evidence is conclusive that, except for the existence of the flood at the time of the windstorm, there would have been no damage.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
235 S.W. 929, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 1265, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/palatine-ins-co-v-petrovich-texapp-1917.