Palani Karupaiyan v.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 14, 2024
• Docket: 23-3044
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

CLD-059 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-3044 ___________

IN RE: PALANI KARUPAIYAN, Petitioner ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 3:23-cv-02005) ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. January 18, 2024 Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 14, 2024) _________

OPINION * _________

PER CURIAM

In the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Palani

Karupaiyan, a frequent litigant, sought to file suit in forma pauperis (“IFP”) against

Wipro Limited (“Wipro”) and officials at that company (among others). The District

Court denied the IFP application without prejudice as inconsistent and incomplete. At

that time, the District Court screened Karupaiyan’s complaint and dismissed it, in part

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. with prejudice and in part without, with leave to amend if the District Court reopened the

matter on Karupaiyan’s submission of the filing fee or a proper and complete IFP

application. In the District Court, Karupaiyan filed a notice of appeal, which opened

C.A. No. 23-2424. He also filed a petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition in this

Court.

In his petition, which he has twice amended, Karupaiyan seeks several orders

against Wipro and its associated entities (including orders requiring the companies to pay

him 25 million dollars, requiring Wipro to transfer ownership of the companies to him,

and barring Wipro from obtaining visas for some of its employees). He complains of

Wipro’s outsourcing and other employment actions in ways that overlap somewhat with

the allegations that he raised in his District Court complaint.

Upon review, we will deny the petition. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, we have the

authority to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [our jurisdiction] and

agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Those writs include the drastic remedies

of writs of mandamus and prohibition in extraordinary cases. See In re Diet Drugs Prods.

Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). Traditionally, we issue such writs only

when a district court “has made an error of ‘jurisdictional’ dimension,” and we use them

“to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to

compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” See United States v.

Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 893 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Karupaiyan, who objects to the actions of Wipro and other private parties and

2 requests orders directed to them, not the District Court or District Judge, does not present

a situation in which such a writ is appropriate.

While our jurisdiction to issue the writs “lies in cases in which potential appellate

jurisdiction exists,” In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 779 (3d Cir. 2000), we do not have

potential jurisdiction, appellate or otherwise, over the claims against Wipro (and its

associated entities) presented for our consideration in the first instance. See O’Hanlon v.

Uber Techs., Inc., 990 F.3d 757, 763 n.3 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing the established principle

that the Court is “a court of review, not of first view”). And, to the extent that

Karupaiyan seeks, in his petition, review of the District Court’s ruling, that ruling is not

within “a carefully circumscribed and discrete category of district court orders” that we

can review in mandamus or prohibition. Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 76–77 (3d Cir.

1996), superseded in part by 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.1(c) (2011); see also United States v.

Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that the requirements are the same

for obtaining either writ). Mandamus or prohibition may not be used as a substitute for

appeal. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 2006).

For these reasons, we will deny Karupaiyan’s petition.