Pajak v. Under Armour, Inc.

District Court, N.D. West Virginia·Decided September 15, 2021·No. 1:19-cv-00160·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CLARKSBURG

CYNTHIA D. PAJAK,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:19-CV-160 (JUDGE KEELEY) UNDER ARMOUR, INC., UNDER ARMOUR RETAIL, INC., AND BRIAN BOUCHER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, AFTER REMAND, RESULTING FROM FURTHER REVIEW OF UNDER ARMOUR’S PRIVILEGE LOG AND DOCUMENTS SUMMARIZED THEREIN, AND FINDING THAT UNDER ARMOUR NEED NOT DISCLOSE ITEMS LISTED

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 10, 2021, Senior United States District Judge Irene M. Keeley conducted a hearing to address a number of pending issues herein. One item which Judge Keeley addressed is Plaintiff’s objections [ECF No. 425] to a Memorandum Opinion and Order [ECF No. 403] issued by the undersigned Magistrate Judge on May 21, 2021. The undersigned’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of May 21, 2021 addressed issues raised in Plaintiff’s motion to compel [ECF No. 369] Under Armour to respond to certain discovery requests related to Plaintiff’s claims of intentional spoliation. One such contention in Plaintiff’s motion [ECF No. 369] was that Under Armour had not produced a privilege log with respect to a number of communications and documents which Under Armour had withheld on the basis of privilege. In the undersigned’s prior Memorandum Opinion and Order [ECF No. 403], Under Armour was ordered to produce such a privilege log by May 28, 2021. It appears that Under Armour produced such a privilege log as directed. However, in the proceeding before Judge Keeley on August 10, 2021, Plaintiff noted that there had been no further Court review of the privilege log. Thus, Judge Keeley in her resulting Order [ECF No. 492] remanded this issue and directed that the undersigned further review it. Then, by Order dated August 13, 2021, the undersigned ordered Under Armour to produce

the privilege log in question [ECF No. 496]. Under Armour produced the privilege log that same day. Under Armour actually provided the original privilege log created pursuant to the above- noted Order of May 21, 2021 (and produced by Under Armour on May 28, 2021) as well as the Third Amended Privilege Log, which was provided to the Court on July 28, 2021.1 The Third Amended Privilege Log contains the information from the original privilege log, but also includes updated information concerning later-generated communications. Thereafter, the undersigned entered an Order [ECF No. 499] on August 16, 2021 directing Under Armour to provide to the Court the communications listed on the Third Amended Privilege Log for an in camera review. Under Armour timely provided these materials to the Court.2 By this

same Order, the Court permitted Plaintiff to lodge specific objections to the privilege log. Plaintiff filed her objections on August 23, 2021, which include both narrative argument [ECF No. 502] and a version of the Third Amended Privilege Log to which Plaintiff added annotations with objections to particular entries. [ECF No. 502-1]. Under Armour filed its response to Plaintiff’s objections on September 7, 2021. [ECF No. 514].3

1 These versions of the privilege log are filed in this matter on the Court’s CM/ECF system for access by Court staff only. [See ECF No. 522 and attachments thereto]. These materials are not confidential, and have been provided to Plaintiff, but nonetheless are restricted on the CM/ECF system out of an abundance of caution. 2 These materials are filed in this matter on the Court’s CM/ECF system for access by Court staff only. [See ECF No. 525 and attachments thereto]. II. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS A. Discovery Process and Assertion of Privilege Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to the relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs the likely benefit.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). As the undersigned as summarized in the context of other discovery issues in this matter, in civil actions such as this one where the Court’s jurisdiction is based upon the parties’ diversity of citizenship, the federal common law governs the applicability of the work product doctrine, while state law governs the applicability of the attorney- client privilege. Nicholas v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 235 F.R.D. 325, 329 n. 2 (N.D.W.V. 2006). As for the attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court of the United States has explained: The attorney–client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citation omitted). Moreover, under West Virginia caselaw: In order to assert an attorney-client privilege, three main elements must be present: (1) both parties must contemplate that the attorney-client relationship does or will exist; (2) the advice must be sought by the client from that attorney in his capacity as a legal adviser; (3) the communication between the attorney and client must be identified to be confidential.

State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 W. Va. 431, 442, 460 S.E.2d 677, 688 (1995) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Burton, 163 W. Va. 40, 254 S.E.2 129 (1979)). Of course, the work product doctrine is long established. “[W]hile the protection of opinion work product is not absolute, only extraordinary circumstances requiring disclosure permit piercing the work product doctrine. We acknowledge that the opinion work product rule should be jealously guarded . . .” In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981). Our Fourth Circuit has explained that there are two kinds of work product: (1) that which is “absolutely” immune, being

“the pure work product of an attorney insofar as it involves mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories ... concerning the litigation” and which “is immune to the same extent as an attorney-client communication” and (2) that which is “qualifiedly immune, being “[a]ll other documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial may be discovered, but only on a showing of ‘substantial need.’” Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992) (quotations and citations omitted). “[O]ur adversary system depends on the effective assistance of lawyers, fostered by the privacy of communications between lawyer and client and the privacy in development of legal theories, opinions, and strategies for the client.” Id. at 983.

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Related

Upjohn Co. v. United States
449 U.S. 383 (Supreme Court, 1981)
State v. Burton
254 S.E.2d 129 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1979)
State Ex Rel. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Canady
460 S.E.2d 677 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1995)
In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena v.
415 F.3d 333 (Fourth Circuit, 2005)
Nicholas v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.
235 F.R.D. 325 (N.D. West Virginia, 2006)