Paines Gdn. v. Calor Oil & Gas Co.

103 S.W. 309, 133 Ky. 614, 1907 Ky. LEXIS 345
Court of Appeals of Kentucky·Decided June 26, 1907·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Chief Justice O’Rear

Reversing.

The fiscal cour-t of Jefferson county granted to appellee the right to lay its pipe lines for conveying natural gas from its field in Meade county to Louisville, Ky., under a certain public highway in the county. The county owned only the easement for the public travel in the. highway. The fee wias owned, as to particular parts of it,-by appellants, the abutting owners. The question for decision in this case is whether the use of the highway by appellee’s gas line is an additional servitude upon appellants’ estate, land argument is made that it is not, because appellee is a public service corporation, whose business it is to bring natural gas to the metropolis of the State., to be sold there for illmninating and heating purposes; that, as the public has acquired the highway for one public purpose, it may be used for all public purposes of a kindred land similar kind. As tending to sustain the doctrine, it is cited that a steam railroad on a public highway is not an additional servitude (Lexington & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 289, 33 Am. Dec. 497); that (an electric street railway is not an additional servitude upon a city street (Louisville Bagging Manufacturing Co. v. Central Passenger Railway, 95 Ky. 50, 23 S. W. 592, 15 R. 417, 44 Am. St. Rep. 203); that an electricrailwayis not an additional servitude uponacoun[616] ty highway (Georgetown & Lexington Traction Co. v. Mulholland, 76 S. W. 148, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 578); and that a telephone line is not an additional servitude upon a county highway (Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Avritt, 85 S. W. 204, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 394). Some point is made in argument that the 'doctrine of additional servitude upon rural public highways is, in some jurisdictions, different from that of additional servitude upon urban highways; but we do not deem a consideration of that question necessary in this ease. In all the cases above cited, the fundamental fact was that the additional servitude was of the same kind in effect as the original servitude. In each instance, travel by the public was the main fact. It wtas pointed out that, as the original easement was obtained to accommodate travel 'by the general public, new means of travel, as by the adoption of vehicles not known or in use when the easement was first granted, were included as much as were those then known. In any event, the public was being served in the matter to the extent originally contemplated. Whether the public wenit afoot, traveled upon horseback, or in chaises, or in stages, or cars propelled by steam or electricity, was all one. The public was traveling over the route dedicated, and wa's in the use of the easement granted to it. The analogy of telephone and telegraph lines to such travel is not so clear, as is evidenced by the different conclusions on the subject reached by the courts of different jurisdictions. Still it is ascertained that the analogy exists. As was pointed out by this court in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Avritt, supra: “The telephone takes the place of the private messenger. The transmission of messages by telephone as a business of a public character, which is conducted under public con[617] trol in the same manner as the carriage of persons or property. ” .

The question is not made to turn at all upon the character of the person using the new means, but upon the quality of the use. Appellee is incorporated to do the business of furnishing gas for illuminating and heating purposes in the city of Louisville. It either manufactures g-as, or gathers it from the subterranean deposits of natural gas. In either event, it must be confined, as well as conducted to the places of consumption. Appellee serves the public in such matters, but in no different sense from the butcher or coal dealer, for gas is no more essential to the public than meat or coal. Could it be truly asserted that the coal dealer might build a tramroad along and upon a public highway to enable him to haul his coal to the public market from his mine, so that thereby he might serve the public? If he were building and operating a tramroad on which the coal of all shippers who desired to use it would be transported, the case would seem to come within the line of authorities noted above. In the case ¡at bar, appellee is not a common carrier. It does not propose to carry gas for everybody — the owners of all wells along- its line — but it proposes to carry its own gas alone to the market. The carrying of its gas is a private enterprise, just as would be the coal dealer carrying his coal to market. The analogy is attempted to be extended by the argument that, if the coal dealer was entitled to haul his coal by wagons, or, if practicable, if appellee hauled its gas in transportable retorts, there would be no question of their right to use the highway for such purposes; and as the means adopted is an improved one, and really [618] imposes a less burden upon the highway, and therefore upon the fee, it ought not to be excluded from the easement. But it is not true that, because a man has a right to- haul his wares over a highway, he may erect thereon permanent means of transporting them. A logger would not be allowed, for example, to erect skids along the highway to more easily draw numerous logs over it, instead of hauling them in wagons; nor do we apprehend that a coal miner, or any manufacturer, would be permitted to build a tramway upon and along the highway to expedite and cheapen the transportation of his product, although to do so would tend to relieve the highw'ay of a different and lawful means of travel by him for its movement. That is more than its use. It is the perpetual occupancy; not to the exclusion, or even hindrance, of the public, it may be true, but, nevertheless, it is the taking possession of the land, to the exclusion, to that extent, of the owner and all others for any purpose whatever. As pointed out, it is not for use by the public, as are electric and steiam railways, or even telephone and telegraph lines; but it is the exclusive use of the part ’actually occupied by the individual for his own convenience. That he is engaged in serving the public in the sale of his wares does not affect the question. The test in-these matters is this: Is he serving the public by carrying the public, or carrying his wares, in his contrivance which he is setting up on the public highwlay under the guise that it is a part of the public easement?

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Paines Gdn. v. Calor Oil & Gas Co., 103 S.W. 309, 133 Ky. 614, 1907 Ky. LEXIS 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907).

103 S.W. 309 (Paines Gdn. v. Calor Oil & Gas Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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