24CA0957 Page v Dorsey 11-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0957 El Paso County District Court No. 20CV31332 Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge
Rebecca Page,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Ingeborg Dorsey,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Harris and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 6, 2025
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Laurence W. DeMuth, III, Megan M. Farooqui, Boulder, Colorado; Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Teresa Akkara, Anya L. Gersoff, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Spies, Powers & Robinson, P.C., Brendan O. Powers, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, Rebecca Page (Page), appeals the district court’s
orders denying her requests for (1) appointment of pro bono counsel
and (2) an extension of discovery deadlines. Because we reject
Page’s contentions and uphold the district court’s orders, we affirm
the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 In August 2019, Page and defendant, Ingeborg Dorsey
(Dorsey),1 were involved in a car accident when Dorsey’s vehicle
collided with Page’s vehicle. In July 2020, Page filed this lawsuit
asserting Dorsey was negligent and drove carelessly. Page alleged
numerous injuries as a result of the accident. Dorsey admitted
liability but denied that the accident caused Page’s injuries. At the
1 On June 26, 2024, defense counsel filed a notice of suggestion of
death regarding Dorsey, noting that Dorsey’s death certificate was attached as an exhibit, but it was not. The parties continued to litigate post-trial proceedings in the district court without defense counsel seeking to substitute the decedent’s estate as a party. In this court, defense counsel filed another notice of suggestion of death, noting Dorsey died on May 18, 2024. This court issued a one-judge order noting that, under C.A.R. 43(a)(1) and (3), Page “may proceed in this matter as though the death had not occurred, and if a personal representative [PR], once appointed, desires to be substituted as a party for appellee, that PR may file an appropriate motion to substitute under the rule.” As of the issuance of this opinion, defense counsel has not filed any notice substituting the decedent’s estate as the defendant.
1 outset of this case, Page was represented by counsel, but her
counsel eventually withdrew in August 2021. Page subsequently
proceeded pro se.
¶3 The parties’ litigation spanned four years, with three presiding
judges, five trial dates, and numerous discovery and disclosure
disputes. As to discovery, Page insisted that she had difficulty
meeting her pretrial obligations because she did not have an
attorney; she frequently indicated that she was working on hiring a
new attorney but faced challenges in doing so because her former
attorney had filed a lien against her. Page also asserted that she
faced difficulties because of her health and alleged injuries,
including a traumatic brain injury. The court expressed concerns
and encouraged Page to obtain an attorney to assist her.
¶4 In September 2023, a few weeks before the fourth trial setting,
the court continued the trial due to docket issues. Page requested
that the court extend the discovery deadlines and Dorsey objected.
The court denied the motion, reasoning that it had continued the
trial sua sponte, not because of discovery issues. Page asserts that
it was at this hearing she orally requested that the court help her
find an attorney.
2 ¶5 In March 2024, eleven days before the rescheduled trial, Page
filed a motion for appointment of pro bono counsel (the pro bono
motion) pursuant to the Fourth Judicial District’s Civil Pro Bono
Project (the Pro Bono Project). Dorsey objected and the court
denied Page’s request as untimely.
¶6 Following a jury trial, the jury awarded Page $5,000. The
court issued a final judgment, awarding Page pre- and post-
judgment interest, for a total judgment of $12,312.98.2
¶7 Page contends that the court erred by (1) denying her request
for pro bono counsel and (2) denying her request to extend the
discovery deadlines.
II. Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel
¶8 Page contends that the district court erred by denying her
request for pro bono counsel as untimely and failing to evaluate the
appropriate factors under the Pro Bono Project’s rules.
2 We take no position on Page’s collection efforts to satisfy her
judgment against Dorsey, as Dorsey’s estate has not been substituted as a party to this action.
3 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶9 We must first determine the appropriate standard of review
when a court declines to conditionally appoint counsel under the
Pro Bono Project.
¶ 10 Generally, a party does not have a constitutional or statutory
right to counsel in a civil case. Wycoff v. Grace Cmty. Church of
Assemblies of God, 251 P.3d 1260, 1269 (Colo. App. 2010); People v.
Cobb, 944 P.2d 574, 576 (Colo. App. 1996) (concluding that there
was no right to counsel “[b]ased upon the civil nature of this . . .
proceeding”). There are instances, however, where the General
Assembly has provided a party with a statutory right to counsel.
See, e.g., People in Interest of Uwayezuk, 2023 COA 69, ¶ 16 (noting
that respondents subject to involuntary medication proceedings are
entitled to counsel by statute).
¶ 11 The Fourth Judicial District has implemented the Pro Bono
Project to help eligible parties in civil cases obtain pro bono
representation. Fourth Jud. Dist., Civil Pro Bono Project, § (1)(a),
(effective Jan. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/2MXW-ACPP (the Project
Rules).
4 ¶ 12 Only eligible unrepresented parties may be appointed pro bono
counsel. Id. § (1)(e)(1). An unrepresented party is considered
eligible for pro bono counsel when she has “been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis” or after she has demonstrated “limited
financial means.” Id. § (1)(e)(1)(A)-(B). “A judicial officer to whom a
civil matter is assigned may on motion by an eligible, unrepresented
party, or on his or her own initiative, enter an Appointment Order”
that authorizes “the conditional appointment of a Panel member to
represent the party and directing the Administrator to select the
next available Panel member with relevant subject matter
preference or expertise.” Id. § (1)(f)(1)(A).
¶ 13 In Pruitt v. Hess, 923 P.2d 325, 328 (Colo. App. 1996), a
division of this court analyzed whether a district court erred by not
appointing a prisoner counsel in a federal civil rights proceeding.
The prisoner pointed to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)), which stated that “[t]he court may
request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ
counsel.” Id. The division relied on Harbolt v. Alldredge, 464 F.2d
1243 (10th Cir. 1972) — a case also involving a party relying on 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) to obtain appointment of counsel in a civil case —
5 determining that any court decision to appoint counsel under that
statute would be discretionary. Pruitt, 923 P.2d at 328.
¶ 14 Given the permissive language in the Project Rules and how it
is similar to the statute at issue in Pruitt, we review the district
court’s denial of Page’s motion for an abuse of discretion. Id. A
court abuses its discretion when its ruling is “manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair” or when it misapplies the law. Jordan v.
Terumo BCT, Inc., 2024 CO 38, ¶ 26.
¶ 15 To the extent Page’s contention claims the court relied on
erroneous facts, we review a court’s factual findings for clear error.
Gagne v. Gagne, 2019 COA 42, ¶ 17. We will only reverse a court’s
factual findings if there is no evidentiary support for them in the
record. Id.
B. Analysis
¶ 16 We conclude that the court did not err by denying Page’s
motion.
¶ 17 Under the Project Rules, if an eligible unrepresented party files
a motion for appointment of counsel, a “judicial officer should
consider all relevant circumstances.” Project Rules § (1)(f)(1)(B).
The Project Rules also list four factors that should be included in
6 the court’s analysis: (1) “the nature and complexity of the action;”
(2) the merit of the unrepresented party’s claims or defenses; (3)
“the demonstrated inability of the unrepresented party to retain an
attorney by other means;” and (4) “the degree to which the interests
of justice, including the benefits to the court, will be served by
appointment of counsel.” Id. § (1)(f)(1)(B).
¶ 18 At a pretrial hearing for the fifth trial setting on March 22,
2024, the court addressed Page’s request for pro bono counsel. The
court reasoned that of the four factors, the “most important one
here is the interest of justice.” It pointed to the case’s history
having five trial dates and three presiding judges and to Page’s
attempt to obtain replacement counsel being “at the forefront of the
case for the last two-and-a-half years.” It also noted the Pro Bono
Project was a “scarce resource,” indicating that demand is higher
than the supply of attorneys. The court reasoned that, “even if it
was possible to get a counsel to accept appointment within” the
next ten days before trial, pro bono counsel would seek a
continuance and need “a substantial period of time to get up to
speed.” And given how old the case was and that Page made the
request days before the fifth trial setting, it said, “The Defendant
7 has a right to — to know that, at some point, a trial date means
something, and that the case will eventually go to trial.” As a
result, the court denied Page’s request as untimely.
¶ 19 Page raises three contentions arguing that the court abused
its discretion: (1) her request was timely; (2) the court failed to
provide her notice of the Pro Bono Project; and (3) the court failed to
weigh the Project Rules appropriately. We reject her contentions.
1. Timeliness of the Request
¶ 20 Page contends the court erred because its ruling is based on
the mistaken premise that her March 2024 written motion was the
first time she sought appointment of counsel. She points to a
September 24, 2023 hearing in which she told the court she had
“no ability to hire an attorney” and she “desperately” needs an
attorney.
¶ 21 But Page’s request at this hearing appeared to focus on her
desire to remove the $20,000 attorney lien her former counsel had
filed after that counsel had withdrawn in August 2021. When the
court asked Page what she wanted the court to do, she responded,
“Your Honor, I, I need an attorney desperately.” She indicated that
8 she would “like information on how to get the lien removed so that I
can get an attorney on this. That’s my main goal . . . .”
¶ 22 We do not interpret Page’s words as a request for the
appointment of pro bono counsel. Our interpretation of her
statement as one in which she wanted help to remove the lien to
boost her search for new counsel is supported by a short colloquy
at the end of the same hearing: In response to Page indicating that
she wanted to freeze Dorsey’s assets, the court stated that if Page
would like to make such a request with legal authority, she should
file a motion, to which Page responded, “As soon as I can get an
attorney, I’d love to do that.”
¶ 23 The record reflects that Page repeatedly represented to the
court before this hearing that she was attempting to hire new
counsel. Even after the September 2023 hearing, she told the court
in February 2024, “I’ve been trying to hire [an attorney] . . . .”
Therefore, we do not view Page’s statement from the September
2023 hearing to be a formal or informal request for the appointment
of pro bono counsel under the Pro Bono Project.
¶ 24 Page also argues that the court should have known she
needed counsel because she told the court many times before
9 March 2024 about her inability to read and that her traumatic
brain injury made it difficult for her to represent herself. But we do
not fault the district court for relying on Page’s assertions that she
was attempting to secure counsel, rather than assuming that she
wanted appointment of pro bono counsel.
¶ 25 Therefore, based on this record, the court’s factual finding that
Page’s request was untimely does not constitute clear error. Gagne,
¶ 17.
2. Duty to Inform Page of the Pro Bono Project
¶ 26 Next, we conclude that the district court had no duty to inform
Page of the Pro Bono Project. Although the Project Rules note that
a court “may” sua sponte appoint counsel, this is not equivalent to
the rule mandating a court to inform a party of a right to counsel.
See Cagle v. Mathers Fam. Tr., 2013 CO 7, ¶ 31 (in legislation, we
generally view the word “may” to mean permissive or discretionary).
¶ 27 Page’s reliance on cases holding that a district court errs when
it fails to inform a party that she might be entitled to counsel is
misplaced. All of those cases dealt with a statutory right to
counsel, a right that Page concedes the Pro Bono Project does not
confer. See In re R.A.M., 2014 COA 68, ¶ 29 (holding that “[t]he
10 court must advise parents of their right to counsel, both at their
first appearance and when a termination motion” regarding
parental rights is filed); In re Adoption of J.D.F., 761 N.W.2d 582,
587–88 (N.D. 2009) (holding that “a district court must advise
parents that they are entitled to representation by counsel” in
proceedings regarding termination of parental rights). Therefore,
the court did not err by failing to inform Page of the Pro Bono
Project.
3. Project Rules
¶ 28 Finally, for three reasons, we discern no error in how the court
weighed the Project Rules factors.
¶ 29 First, we reject Page’s contention that the court had to
consider all four factors. The Project Rules indicate the court
“should consider all relevant circumstances,” and then they provide
four nonexhaustive factors. Project Rules § (1)(f)(1)(B). Looking at
the Project Rules as a whole, some of the rules say “should” (like
the four factors), while others use the word “shall.” As a result, we
interpret the Project Rules’ use of the word “should” to reflect a
recommendation, not a mandate, that the court analyze all four
factors. Compare id. § (1)(f)(1)(B) (“the judicial officer should
11 consider”), with id. § (1)(d)(2) (“application shall include the
following”), and id. § (1)(f)(2)(B)-(E) (“the Administrator shall”), and
id. § (1)(g)(2) (“the attorney shall file”), and id. § (1)(g)(5) (“[a]n
attorney appointed under this rule shall”). Thus, the court was not
required to consider all the Project Rules’ factors.
¶ 30 Second, the record supports that the court considered all
relevant circumstances, which it reasoned turned on the untimely
nature of Page’s request. As already discussed above, Page’s
request was made eleven days before the fifth trial setting. The trial
record supports that Dorsey was ninety-three years old, she lived in
a nursing home with dementia, and her health was ailing, so much
so that she died about a month and a half after trial. Therefore, we
cannot say the court’s concern for Dorsey obtaining a definitive trial
date as grounds to support its denial of the motion constituted an
abuse of discretion. See Todd v. Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980
P.2d 973, 976 (Colo. 1999) (“We note that credible trial dates are a
vital component of our civil justice system. . . . Delay resulting from
continuances creates a host of problems for the parties and for the
justice system as a whole.”).
12 ¶ 31 Finally, the court made implied findings about the potential
merit of Page’s claims. In looking at Page’s indigent status, the
court noted that most personal injury cases are handled on a
contingency fee basis due to a plaintiff’s lack of financial resources
to obtain counsel. Because of this arrangement, the court said,
“the free market and the personal injury counsel get a chance to
evaluate it and take the case, if they think it’s worth the cost.” The
court concluded, “[I]t would be an unusual [personal injury] case”
in which it would grant a motion to appoint counsel.
¶ 32 In other words, given that Page had failed to secure counsel in
two and a half years, the court impliedly found that her claims were
not as meritorious as she believed them to be. See Foster v. Phillips,
6 P.3d 791, 796 (Colo. App. 1999) (recognizing that findings may be
implied in a district court’s ruling so long as the ruling “is sufficient
to determine its basis”). And Page’s belief that the attorney lien
prevented her from obtaining counsel was not necessarily a barrier;
if new counsel believed Page’s injuries and success at trial would
likely result in a substantial monetary judgment, a $20,000 lien
was not an insurmountable obstacle.
13 ¶ 33 Therefore, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Page’s motion for pro bono counsel.
III. Discovery Deadlines
¶ 34 Page contends that the court erred by denying her request to
extend the discovery deadlines. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 35 We review a court’s decision whether to extend discovery
deadlines for an abuse of discretion. In re People in Interest of J.P.,
2023 CO 57, ¶ 17. As noted above, a court abuses its discretion
when it misapplies the law or when its ruling is “manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Jordan, ¶ 26 (citation omitted).
¶ 36 The record supports the district court’s decision to deny Page’s
request to extend discovery deadlines for two reasons.
¶ 37 First, the court is under no obligation to extend discovery
deadlines when trial is continued for reasons unrelated to
discovery. Todd, 980 P.2d at 977. While courts must afford parties
the opportunity to have their “day in court” and to present evidence,
“the trial court must be careful not to reward a party who fails to
make timely disclosures by granting a continuance, since this
14 practice invites abuse.” Id. at 979. Where a discovery deadline has
passed and a party fails to timely disclose evidence, the party will
not be allowed “to introduce that evidence at trial unless the failure
to timely disclose was substantially justified or harmless to the
opposing party.” Leaf v. Beihoffer, 2014 COA 117, ¶ 49. If a party
makes a late disclosure, they have the burden of proving “either
substantial justification or harmlessness.” Id.
¶ 38 Discovery closed in December 2022, and trial had at one point
been scheduled in September 2023. Page had over eight months to
request an extension of discovery during this time, but she did not
do so until the court sua sponte continued the September 2023
trial. The parties conducted discovery for over two years.
Therefore, based on this record, we discern no error when the court
indicated that “under all the circumstances . . . it [was] not
appropriate to reopen [discovery]” when it continued the trial.
¶ 39 Second, the court provided Page with considerable latitude to
comply with discovery and disclosure deadlines, even after missing
them, and she received assistance from defense counsel. For
example, the court directed defense counsel to email Page copies of
court filings to ensure that she was aware of important deadlines.
15 And defense counsel on their own paid for the costs to obtain some
of Page’s medical records and then shared copies of those records
with her.
¶ 40 Page missed the deadlines to submit her witness list, exhibit
list, and disclosure of damages, but still sent to defense counsel a
list of twelve witnesses — most of whom had not been previously
disclosed — well after the deadline. Even so, the court gave Page
the opportunity to explain why it should allow her to present late
disclosed witnesses at trial by filing a response to Dorsey’s
objections. But Page did not file a response or provide an
explanation for her late disclosures.
¶ 41 Despite all this, the court ruled that she had the opportunity
to present three medical providers and a lay witness at trial, though
she ended up calling only the lay witness. The court also allowed
Page to “present evidence of damages suffered . . . to the extent the
medical records have been disclosed” even though Page had not
submitted an updated formal disclosure of damages. Despite this,
as defense counsel points out, Page had not provided any other
itemization of damages beyond $23,674.66 in past medical
expenses. Finally, the court had an Americans with Disabilities Act
16 Advocate assist Page at trial and allowed her to leave the courtroom
to obtain additional evidence from her car for rebuttal.
¶ 42 Despite the court’s leeway, Page fails on appeal to explain how
the court’s refusal to extend discovery prejudiced her. For example,
she fails to identify any witnesses or documents she disclosed
during the extended discovery period that would have supported
her theory of damages or changed the jury’s award.
¶ 43 As a result, we conclude the district court did not err by
denying Page’s request to extend discovery deadlines.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 44 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.