Pacific Coral Shrimp v. Bryant Fisheries

844 F. Supp. 1546, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2508, 1994 WL 68670
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 17, 1994
Docket93-2048-CIV-KING
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 844 F. Supp. 1546 (Pacific Coral Shrimp v. Bryant Fisheries) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pacific Coral Shrimp v. Bryant Fisheries, 844 F. Supp. 1546, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2508, 1994 WL 68670 (S.D. Fla. 1994).

Opinion

FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes to this Court upon Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or Alternatively for Transfer of Venue and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (D.E. # 2), filed October 25, 1993. After obtaining a series of extensions of time, Plaintiff filed its Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition (D.E. # 15) on January 20, 1994. The Court then granted Defendant an extension of time in which to reply and Defendant subsequently filed its Reply on February 7, 1994.

Defendant seeks dismissal of this case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) on the basis that it lacks the requisite “minimum contacts” with the state of Florida to come within the state’s jurisdiction. Alternatively, Defendant argues that Florida is an inconvenient forum and therefore seeks a transfer of this case to the Southern District of Alabama.

/. BACKGROUND

Defendant is an Alabama corporation which placed an order in Alabama with a Florida seafood broker to purchase shrimp from Plaintiff, a Florida corporation. Under the purchasing agreement, Plaintiff was to supply shrimp and Defendant was to pay an agreed price for the shrimp within thirty (30) days of the invoice date. However, according to Plaintiff, since the parties had engaged in transactions prior to this sale, 1 Plaintiff granted Defendant credit based on their pri- or activities. Defendant thus made a promise of future payment. Upon delivery of the shrimp to an Alabama cold storage warehouse and inspection by Defendant, Defendant determined that the shrimp were “nonconforming” and rejected the shipment. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed suit in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County seeking recovery for account stated, breach of contract and goods sold in the amount of $99,684.50 plus costs. Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court on diversity grounds and filed the instant motion to dismiss.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

To determine the appropriateness of exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, a federal court sitting in diversity must determine (1) whether a defendant is amenable to service under the forum state’s long-arm statute, and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 n. 3 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted).

A. Does jurisdiction exist under Florida’s long-arm statute?

In this case, it is clear that Florida’s long-arm statute is sufficiently broad to reach out and obtain jurisdiction over Defendant. Florida’s statute provides that a person who “breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state” are subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts. Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1). Here, Defendant was required to make payment for the shrimp in Florida and Plaintiff has alleged that in rejecting the shrimp, Defendant breached the contract. Under Florida law, allegations by a plaintiff that a defendant breached a contract by not making payments in Florida, as required by contract, are sufficient to bring the defendant within Florida’s long-arm jur *1549 isdiction. Links Design, Inc. v. Lahr, 731 F.Supp. 1535 (M.D.Fla.1990); Laser Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. C.E.S. Industries, Inc., 573 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1991). Therefore, Defendant is subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of this state.

B. Does Defendant have sufficient “minimum contacts” with Florida to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process?

The more difficult question as to personal jurisdiction arises at step two of the analysis.

Defendant argues that it lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Florida to meet the constitutional requirement for personal jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendant states that it derived no benefit from the state of Florida and engaged in no business activities in Florida. Defendant claims that the only contact it had with Florida was through the independent third party broker who arranged the deal. According to Defendant, all negotiations and performance connected with the contract took place in Alabama. Defendant thus takes the position that it was Plaintiff that was “doing business” in Alabama rather than Defendant “doing business” in Florida.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that Defendant’s business records establish that Defendant has been “conducting business” within the state of Florida for at least the past three years. Specifically, Plaintiff points to the figures representing Defendant’s sales and purchases of goods in the state as evidence that Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy the constitutional requirement. Apparently, in the past three years, Defendant’s purchases from Florida companies totaled $733,477 and its sales to Florida companies totaled $564,246. 2

Despite these seemingly significant figures, the Court agrees with Defendant that the facts presented are insufficient to estab-Iish that Defendant has minimum contacts with the state of Florida to satisfy the due process requirements. Defendant is an Alabama corporation that entered into a purchase agreement in Alabama for a shipment of shrimp to be made to Alabama. Defendant conducts no business in Florida, owns no property in Florida, employs no employees in Florida and pays no taxes in the state. Defendant’s contact stems from a purchase order made to a seafood broker who sought out the Florida corporation that acted as the supplier.

“The existence of a contractual relationship between a nonresident defendant and a Florida resident is not sufficient in itself to meet the requirements of due process.” Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1113 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528) reh’g denied, en banc, 919 F.2d 742 (11th Cir.1990), and cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
844 F. Supp. 1546, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2508, 1994 WL 68670, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pacific-coral-shrimp-v-bryant-fisheries-flsd-1994.