2026 IL App (1st) 250567-U No. 1-25-0567 First Division June 30, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ___________________________________________________________________________
P-THREE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 2021 L 000011 THERM FLO, INC.; ZONATHERM ) PRODUCTS, INC.; N+2, LLC; NETRIX ) Honorable BUILDING, LLC; CYBER WORKPLACE ) Thomas More Donnelly, RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC; EMP ) Judge, Presiding. TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS, LLC; AOP ) INVESTMENTS, LLC; CYBER ) INNOVATION LABS, LLC; NETWORK AND MANAGED HOSTING SERVICES, ) LLC; NETWORK AND MANAGED ) HOSTING SERVICES-IL, LLC; CDGI NAP ) SERVICES, LLC; INFRASTRUCTURE ) STRATEGIES GROUP, LLC; 2005 AOP ) FAMILY TRUST; JOHN H. PRESSMAN ) a/k/a JACK PRESSMAN; and the ) “OMNIBUS PARTNERSHIP”; ) Defendants-Appellees, ) (Ravi K. Kadiyala, Intervenor-Appellant). ) ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment. No. 1-25-0567
ORDER
¶1 Held: Intervenor-appellant’s brief is hereby stricken, and the appeal is dismissed for failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341.
¶2 Intervenor-appellant Ravi K. Kadiyala sought to intervene in the underlying litigation
between P-Three Development, LLC (P-Three) and defendant-appellee Therm Flo, Inc., pursuant
to section 2-408(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(3) (West 2024)).
Kadiyala now appeals the circuit court’s denial of his request for intervention. For the reasons that
follow, Kadiyala’s brief is hereby stricken and the appeal dismissed.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Although we ultimately dismiss this appeal, we deem it necessary to set out in some detail
the course and substance of the proceedings in the lower court. The facts that follow have been
gathered from relevant portions of the 17 volumes and more than 15,000 pages which comprise
the common law record.
¶5 This litigation has as its genesis the purchase of equipment and materials from two
adjacent, but separate, data centers, one identified as the 1221 site and the other as the 1331 site,
located in Mount Prospect, Illinois. In 2011, Therm Flo, Inc., and Zonatherm Products, Inc.
(collectively, Therm Flo) entered into several contracts with Cyber Workplace Recovery Services
(CWRS), Emp Technology Holdings LLC (EMP), and related entities, controlled by John H.
Pressman, a/k/a John Pressman, and Anna Pressman (collectively, the Pressman defendants), for
services and equipment related to the 1221 data center. The Pressman defendants failed to make
the payments required under those agreements, and in October 2013, Therm Flo sued and won a
judgment against the Pressman defendants for, inter alia, breach of contract. The parties
subsequently negotiated a settlement whereby the Pressman defendants agreed to pay Therm Flo
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$1 million and additionally executed a $350,000 promissory note, secured by equipment located
at the centers. The terms of the agreement were detailed in the “Settlement Agreement” and the
“Secured Settlement Note” (Settlement Note), dated July 24, 2014. 1
¶6 In December 2015, P-Three purchased the data center located at the 1221 site. Notably,
Kadiyala was, at all times relevant, P-Three’s sole manager and sole employee. To finance the
acquisition, Kadiyala borrowed approximately $4.2 million from T2 Capital LLC (T2), secured by
a mortgage on the property and equipment. Kadiyala personally guaranteed the T2 mortgage.
¶7 As a part of the transaction, P-Three purchased from Therm Flo, and Therm Flo assigned
to P-Three, its rights under the $253,000 Settlement Note. Additionally, P-Three purchased certain
equipment from the Pressman defendants, as documented by a bill of sale, effective December 16,
2015. The bill of sale included a release (the Release), also dated December 16, 2015, whereby P-
Three, through Kadiyala as its authorized signatory, “irrevocably and unconditionally release[d]
and forever discharge[d]” the Pressman defendants from all claims “arising from, based upon, or
related to” the Settlement Note that arose under Therm Flo.
¶8 Notwithstanding the 2015 Release, on January 4, 2021, P-Three filed its first four-count
complaint against the Pressman defendants, the Therm Flo defendants, Netrix Building, LLC, and
N+2, LLC (the Netrix defendants). As alleged in the complaint and attached as an exhibit, on
February 28, 2019, P-Three sent a notice of default and demand letter to the Pressman defendants
for payment on the $253,000 Settlement Note. The complaint also acknowledged that, in 2013, the
1 Although not entirely clear from the record, the equipment which served as security for the Settlement Note was located at both the 1221 and the 1331 data center sites.
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owner of the 1331 data center filed for bankruptcy, and its assets were purchased by the Netrix
defendants. 2
¶9 Between 2021 and 2022, P-Three filed a first, a second, and a third amended complaint.
Notably, on February 3, 2022, upon learning that P-Three had filed a legal malpractice suit against
it, Barber Law Offices, LLC, which had represented P-Three from the inception of this litigation,
moved for and was granted leave to withdraw its representation. On April 1, 2022, Seiden Law
Group entered its appearance on behalf of both P-Three and Kadiyala.
¶ 10 On March 15, 2023, P-Three filed its fourth amended complaint. Count I of the complaint
sought a confession of judgment against the Pressman defendants for nonpayment on the
Settlement Note. Count II alleged a breach of note, not only against the Pressman defendants, but
against all defendants on the theory that they had formed a de facto partnership or joint venture
rendering each liable on the note. Count III petitioned to pierce the corporate veil of those corporate
entities controlled by the Pressman defendants and to hold the Pressman principals personally
liable for the breach. Finally, count IV asserted a claim against the Netrix defendants for possession
of and/or money damages for equipment located at the 1331 data center site.
¶ 11 The trial court ordered all defendants to respond to P-Three’s fourth amended complaint
by April 12, 2023, and to issue discovery. Beginning in April 2023, defendants filed their answers
to the complaint, and each asserted therein the December 2015 Release as an affirmative defense.
A copy of the Release was attached as an exhibit.
2 In November 2013, Netrix acquired all of the equipment located at the 1331 data center site “free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and interests.” In re Cyber Development Group Int’l, LLC, No. 13-B-34214, (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2013).
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¶ 12 In response to defendants’ answers to the complaint, P-Three denied each defendant’s
affirmative defenses. Relying on Kadiyala’s affidavit, P-Three asserted that the Release provided
by defendants in support of their affirmative defenses was a forgery.
¶ 13 On September 15, 2023, following the close of discovery, the Therm Flo defendants filed
a motion for summary judgment on counts I, II and III of the complaint, arguing that P-Three had
released all claims against all defendants for payment on the note years before it had filed the
initial complaint. Attached as an exhibit to the motion was the executed Release, along with e-mail
correspondence showing that P-Three’s counsel had sent two copies of the Release to Kadiyala,
Kadiyala had signed and returned the Release, and Kadiyala had then transmitted the executed
Release to P-Three’s lender, T2, several days later. The Therm Flo defendants argued that P-
Three’s previously asserted forgery claim was baseless.
¶ 14 On September 25, 2023, the Pressman defendants also filed their motion for summary
judgment on counts I, II and III. Shortly thereafter, on September 29, 2023, the Netrix defendants
filed their motion, in which they joined the Therm Flo defendants’ motion for summary judgment
on count II of the complaint and independently sought summary judgment on count IV.
¶ 15 On October 19, 2023, P-Three filed its response to the motions. Therein, P-Three argued
that summary judgment on counts I, II, and III of the complaint was inappropriate because a ruling
on the motion would require the court to weigh conflicting evidence. P-Three asserted that
“[d]ocumentary evidence can be construed in a way that indicates that [Kadiyala] lied” in the
sworn statement in which he stated that he did not agree to the Release upon which the defendants
relied in support of summary judgment.
¶ 16 On November 8, 2023, the circuit court granted all defendants’ motions for summary
judgment on all counts, finding the Release to be binding and enforceable. On December 7, 2023,
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P-Three filed a motion for reconsideration, in which it argued that the Release should have been
found to be unenforceable as there had been no consideration to support it.
¶ 17 On January 16, 2024, defendants filed a motion for Rule 137 sanctions against P-Three on
the basis that Kadiyala’s sworn forgery verifications were false.
¶ 18 On May 3, 2024, the circuit court denied P-Three’s motion for reconsideration and granted
defendants’ motions for Rule 137 sanctions. In so doing, the court found that Kadiyala’s forgery
verifications were false and that discovery showed it had in fact signed and transmitted the Release.
Shortly thereafter, Seiden Law Group, P.C., citing irreconcilable differences, withdrew its
representation of both Kadiyala and P-Three.
¶ 19 P-Three appealed neither the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the denial of its
motion for reconsideration, nor the sanctions award. However, on July 19, 2024, Kadiyala,
proceeding pro se, filed a memorandum styled as a “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion
to Reconsider Sanctions.” Defendants objected on the basis that Kadiyala was impermissibly
attempting to represent P-Three, a corporate entity that was no longer represented by legal counsel.
On August 8, 2024, the circuit court declined to hear Kadiyala’s motion “because [Kadiyala was]
not a proper party to this case and [had] not filed a petition to intervene.”
¶ 20 On September 19, 2024, Kadiyala, then proceeding “as an individual,” filed a formal
“Request for Intervention” under section 2-408(a)(3) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(3) (West
2024)). 3 In his request, Kadiyala asserted that he is the “sole manager for P-Three[,]” its “chief
executive officer[,]” its “sole authorized representative[,]” and its “100% member[,]” and
3 Although intervention is typically permitted only before judgment is entered, it may be granted postjudgment when necessary to protect the rights of the intervenor. Anundson v. City of Chicago, 44 Ill. 2d 491, 497 (1970); People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Protestant Children’s Home, Inc., 95 Ill. App. 3d 552, 558 (1981).
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therefore, he was entitled to intervene. As a basis for intervention, Kadiyala asserted that he would
be “adversely affected by any judgment against [P-Three].”
¶ 21 On October 24, 2024, following argument by the parties, the circuit court denied
Kadiyala’s request for intervention. In its oral ruling, the court stated that “[i]ntervention as of
right, if the application is timely and meets the criteria for inadequate representation intervention,
and I think that’s the one being evoked here, an applicant can intervene as of right by meeting the
interest requirement, the benefit/suffer requirement, and the inadequate representation
requirement.” The court then ruled that Kadiyala had met none of the statutory requirements, and,
as relevant here, that Kadiyala had not shown that he would benefit or suffer from the outcome of
the litigation. Additionally, the court stated that Kadiyala did not meet any of the requirements for
intervention as of right and that his position as guarantor on an unrelated mortgage was an
insufficient basis to permit intervention.
¶ 22 On December 6, 2024, Kadiyala filed a motion for reconsideration. In the motion, Kadiyala
argued that the court had (1) incorrectly applied the intervention by right statute as pursuant to
section 2-408(a)(3), and (2) failed to execute its mandated obligations under the Illinois Code of
Judicial Conduct.
¶ 23 On February 28, 2025, the circuit court denied the motion. In its “Corrected Opinion and
Order,” the court stated that it had considered Kadiyala’s petition under all three sections of 2-
408(a) and that the grant of summary judgment did not “dispose of any of P-Three’s property” or
“create any new debts, liabilities, or obligations for P-Three.”
¶ 24 This appeal followed.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 26 In his notice of appeal, Kadiyala indicates that he is appealing the circuit court’s order
entered on February 28, 2025. The court’s February 28, 2025, order, captioned “Corrected Opinion
and Order,” denied Kadiyala’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s denial of his intervention
request.
¶ 27 Consistent with the argument presented in his motion for reconsideration, here on appeal,
Kadiyala first contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law by treating his motion to
intervene as if it had been brought under section 2-408(a)(2) of the Code and applying an “adequate
representation” standard, as opposed to analyzing the motion under section 2-408(a)(3), which
does not impose that requirement. Secondly, he asserts that as a 100% owner, creditor, and
guarantor of P-Three, [he] demonstrated a direct legal and financial interest sufficient to satisfy
the mandatory intervention standard of [section] 2-408(a)(3).” As his third and final contention,
Kadiyala argues that the trial court erred by failing to address credible and unrebutted allegations
of ethical misconduct and discovery abuse raised in the motion to intervene, including forged
filings and a request for sanctions and referral under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 and Canon
2.15(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
¶ 28 A. Standard of Review
¶ 29 Initially, we note that the parties disagree on the applicable standard of review. Kadiyala
asserts that where the trial court’s denial of intervention rests on statutory interpretation or legal
misapplication, review is de novo. He maintains that, in this case, because the trial court
erroneously based its denial on section 2-408(a)(2)’s “adequate representation” requirement, as
opposed to section 2-408(a)(3)’s “adversely affected” requirement, the court misapplied the law.
Thus, the standard of review, according to Kadiyala, is de novo. Defendants assert that the correct
standard of review is abuse of discretion.
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¶ 30 We have reviewed the court’s initial oral ruling on Kadiyala’s request to intervene, as well
as its written order upon denial of Kadiyala’s motion for reconsideration. In its initial ruling, the
court first acknowledged that the statute permits intervention either as a matter of right or
permissively. With respect to intervention as a matter of right, the court first, erroneously, stated
that Kadiyala sought intervention based on inadequate representation but then proceeded to note
that he had not satisfied any of the statutory requirements. Upon denial of Kadiyala’s motion for
reconsideration, the court expressly stated that it had considered Kadiyala’s request for
intervention under all three sections of paragraph 2-408(a) of the intervention statute.
¶ 31 Kadiyala is correct that de novo review applies either where the trial court misconstrues a
statute (Accettura v. Vacationland, Inc., 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11 (“[t]he standard of review for
questions of statutory construction is de novo review”); Taylor v. Pekin Insurance Co., 231 Ill. 2d
390, 395 (2008)) or misapplies a statute (Graves v. Cook County Republican Party, 2020 IL App
(1st) 181516, ¶ 36) (review of a motion to reconsider based on the trial court’s alleged
misapplication of existing law is de novo)). However, Kadiyala’s claims that the court either
misconstrued or misapplied the statute is belied by the record. Here, the court merely determined
that based on the facts of the case, Kadiyala failed to show either inadequate representation under
section 2-408(a)(2) or an adverse effect under section 2-408(a)(3).
¶ 32 “The decision to allow or deny intervention, whether permissively or as of right, is a matter
of sound judicial discretion that will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” People ex
rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 58 (2002); Pate v. Wiseman, 2019 IL App (1st)
190449, ¶ 16. As defendants correctly assert, the proper standard of review in this matter is abuse
of discretion.
¶ 33 B. Discussion
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¶ 34 Before proceeding to an analysis of the substantive issues, we must first address significant
compliance issues that we observe to be present in Kadiyala’s brief. Illinois Supreme Court Rule
341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) governs the form and content of appellate briefs. McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL
App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12; Voris v. Voris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103814, ¶ 8. The rule requires an
appellant’s brief to set forth the appellant’s arguments, the reasoning supporting those arguments,
and citations to the relevant authorities and portions of the record. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct.
1, 2020). Compliance with supreme court rules is mandatory. In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th)
241427, ¶ 57. Those rules carry the force of law and are interpreted under the same principles that
govern statutory construction. Id.
¶ 35 A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and cohesive arguments presented; “it is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the
burden of argument and research.” Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 683 (1993). Nor is it this
court’s role or duty to serve as an advocate for a party or to comb the record in search of error. Id.
“Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal and may
be rejected by this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App
(1st) 141272, ¶ 43.
¶ 36 Further, Kadiyala’s pro se status does not excuse his noncompliance with supreme court
rules. Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110387, ¶ 78. A litigant’s decision to proceed pro
se carries with it the presumption that he is aware of and will comply with the applicable court
rules and procedures. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 517 (2001). A party’s pro se
status does not entitle them to more leeway. Holzrichter, 2013 IL App (1st) 110387, ¶ 78. As for
appellate briefing, a pro se litigant is not entitled to more lenient treatment than a practicing
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attorney. Id. Where a litigant fails to comply with the rules governing appeals, we have discretion
to strike the brief and dismiss the appeal. Id. ¶ 77.
¶ 37 Initially, we note that Kadiyala misquotes the very statutory language of section 2-
408(a)(3) on which his petition is based, substituting phrases that appear nowhere in the statute.
Although we might be inclined to excuse the misquote as unintentional, our further review of
Kadiyala’s brief suggests otherwise. Even more concerning than Kadiyala’s misquote of the
applicable statute, several of Kadiyala’s cited cases do not support the legal principles for which
he cites them. Kadiyala attributes fabricated quotations and holdings to opinions that have nothing
to do with intervention or section 2-408 of the Code. Additionally, a number of the cases to which
Kadiyala cites appear not to exist at all. Set forth below are various features of Kadiyala’s brief
which we find untenable and which form the basis of our disposition of this appeal.
¶ 38 Kadiyala cites four cases in his brief that, based upon our research, do not exist, or in the
vernacular of AI appear to be “hallucinated.” We address each in turn. He first cites “Greer v.
Illinois Housing Development Auth., 122 Ill. App. 3d 739, 744 (1st Dist. 1984)” and quotes the
trial court as purportedly holding “that intervention must be granted when the judgment may
impair the applicant’s legally protected interest and no party adequately represents that interest.”
Notwithstanding that Greer does not actually exist, Kadiyala nonetheless maintains that, under
Greer, the circuit court’s refusal to investigate alleged misconduct by defendants after holding a
full hearing on unsubstantiated accusations undermined the fairness of the proceedings and
supports reversal. Kadiyala also contends that Greer supports the proposition that Illinois courts
have repeatedly held that a trial court’s failure to permit intervention under section 2-408(a)(3) is
reversible when it results in procedural unfairness or impairs a party’s ability to protect a legally
cognizable interest. Despite our best efforts, we are unable to locate Greer as cited by Kadiyala.
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¶ 39 Second, Kadiyala cites “S.I.T.E. v. Board of Education of Township High School District
No. 211, 2020 IL App (1st) 191790, ¶ 19,” another fictitious case, alleging that “the First District
reversed a denial of intervention where the intervenor had enforceable obligations arising from a
related contract, even though it was not a direct signatory to the agreement in dispute.” According
to Kadiyala, the court in S.I.T.E. found those obligations sufficient to establish a direct and legally
protectable interest under § 2-408(a)(3). Kadiyala attempts to argue that the same result is
warranted here because he is sitting in a much stronger “guarantor position.”
¶ 40 Kadiyala additionally cites us to “People ex rel. Hartigan v. St. James Dormitory Corp.,
150 Ill. App. 3d 164, 171 (1st Dist. 1986),” yet another fictitious case. He then argues that the case
stands for the proposition that “Illinois courts have long held that timeliness is not determined
solely by the procedural stage of the case, but by whether intervention would prejudice the existing
parties or unduly disrupt the litigation.” Kadiyala claims that, in Hartigan, “the trial court
permitted intervention more than two years after judgment, and held that where an intervenors
interest ‘would be adversely affected by the judgment,’ intervention remained appropriate and that
the trial court emphasized that ‘[t]imeliness must be determined from all the circumstances,’
including whether ‘existing parties would be prejudiced.’ ” Regrettably, our research reveals, yet
again, that no such case exists.
¶ 41 Finally, Kadiyala includes in his table of points and authorities “People v. Ortega, 2018 IL
App (1st) 162760, ¶ 36,” which is also fictitious. Then, in the body of his brief, he cites “People
v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (2004),” for the proposition that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs
where the ruling is ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” Although Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354 (2004) is an actual case
and the proposition Kadiyala asserts with regard to an abuse of discretion is accurate, because he
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fails to accurately quote the language in that case and fails to cite to an actual case in his table of
points and authorities, we again find that he has failed to comply with Rule 341.
¶ 42 Beyond Kadiyala’s citation to apparent fictitious cases, Kadiyala cites to real cases but
recites nonexistent quotes and holdings from those cases. For example, Kadiyala cites People ex
rel. Hartigan v. E&E Hauling, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 473, 496 (1992), multiple times and states that it
stands for the proposition that “the right to intervene is absolute where the statutory requirements
are met,” that “Illinois courts recognize intervention by personal guarantors and insiders when
their rights may be impaired by a judgment based on fraud or misrepresentation,” and that “a trial
court’s failure to permit intervention under § 2-408(a)(3) is reversible when it results in procedural
unfairness or impairs a party’s ability to protect a legally cognizable interest.” However, Hartigan
involves neither intervention, section 2-408, nor any of the subjects for which Kadiyala cites it.
Instead, Hartigan involves an action brought by the Illinois Attorney General against public
construction contractors alleging fraud and violations of the Consumer Fraud Act arising from the
contractors’ misrepresentations regarding compliance with minority and women business
enterprise requirements in their construction contracts. Id. at 480. The quotes and propositions
Kadiyala attributes to this case do not exist within it and were wholly fabricated.
¶ 43 Kadiyala next cites In re Estate of Zivin, 2015 IL App (1st) 150606, asserting as its holding
that “an erroneous intervention denial is not harmless where it prevents the intervenor from
correcting material inaccuracies or supplementing the record to avoid prejudice,” and “intervention
may be granted even after judgment where needed to ‘protect a direct interest that arose during
litigation.’ ” Our review of Zivin reveals that intervention is nowhere addressed by the court in that
case. Instead, Zivin involved a will contest in which this court considered whether Hebrew
University of Jerusalem had standing to bring a breach of contract claim against a decedent’s
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estate. Zivin, 2015 IL App (1st) 150606, ¶¶ 1-2. The quotations and holdings Kadiyala attributed
to this case do not exist within it and were clearly created out of whole cloth.
¶ 44 Kadiyala also cites Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230 (1988), for the
following propositions: (1) “the trial court’s refusal to investigate or even acknowledge this
substantiated misconduct, after holding a full hearing on unsubstantiated accusations against the
opposing side, reflects a structural imbalance that undermined the fairness of the proceedings and
supports reversal”; (2) “the trial court’s denial of intervention is immediately appealable as a final
judgment affecting a substantial right in a collateral proceeding, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
301”; and (3) “a party ‘has a right to intervene if he meets the requirements of section 2-408,’ and
that a Circuit Court’s determination is reversible if it ‘has applied impermissible legal criteria.’ ”
Bilyk contains no such holdings or quotes. Instead, Bilyk concerned the constitutionality of section
27 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, which immunized the Chicago Transit Authority
from tort liability for failing to protect passengers from criminal acts of third parties. Id. at 234.
The case discusses neither intervention, section 2-408, Rule 301, trial court misconduct, nor any
of the other subjects for which Kadiyala cites it.
¶ 45 Kadiyala’s citation to People v. Smith, 406 Ill. App. 3d 747 (2010), suffers from the same
infirmities as do his citations to Hartigan, Zivin, and Bilyk. Supposedly quoting from Smith,
Kadiyala states that “an appellate court cannot affirm on a ground not relied upon by the trial
court.” Not only does the purported quote not appear in the Smith opinion or carry a holding of
equal effect, but it also misstates an established principle. Correctly stated, our court can affirm
the trial court on any basis that appears in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied
upon such grounds. Clanton v. Oakbrook Healthcare Centre, Ltd., 2022 IL App (1st) 210984, ¶
54. Further, Smith is a criminal case concerning the admissibility of other crimes evidence in a
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prosecution for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a minor. Smith, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 748. It does
not involve any issue relevant to this appeal.
¶ 46 Lastly, Kadiyala cites and quotes In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 541 (1988), for the
following proposition: “Canon 2.15(c) obligates a judge to take ‘appropriate action’ upon receiving
credible information that a lawyer has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Illinois courts
have held that ‘appropriate action’ includes ensuring that knowingly false filings are addressed,
particularly when a party continues to benefit from them.” However, Himmel does not address
Canon 2.15(c) or contain any such quotes. Rather, Himmel involved a disciplinary proceeding
against an attorney who failed to report misconduct of a former attorney who had converted his
client’s settlement funds. Id. at 534.
¶ 47 In Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, the appellate court found that the attorney
“willfully” failed to comply with the supreme court rules by carelessly using AI to generate an
appellate brief that cited eight nonexistent cases, rendering his conduct sanctionable. Id. ¶¶ 115,
129-130, 132. Notably, in Baby Boy, the non-compliant attorney openly admitted to using AI.
Although not acknowledged by him, certain features in Kadiyala’s brief, particularly citation to
fictitious cases and irrelevant principles of law and misquoted text and quotations, give us reason
to believe that he too may have relied on drafting tools, such as generative AI, that ultimately
produced a non-compliant brief. Thus, we join our sister court in the Fourth District in offering the
following admonishment:
“[T]he Illinois Supreme Court AI policy explicitly permits the use of AI. However,
attorneys must use AI tools wisely. We reiterate the supreme court’s reminder that ‘[a]ll
users must thoroughly review AI-generated content before submitting it in any court
proceeding to ensure accuracy and compliance with legal and ethical obligations.’ [Ill. Sup.
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Ct., Illinois Supreme Court Policy on Artificial Intelligence (Jan. 1, 2025),
https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/e43964ab-8874-
4b7a-be4e-63af019cb6f7/Illinois% 20Supreme% 20Court% 20AI% 20Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WCE6-WZE5]]. Flagrant and unprincipled use of AI without ensuring
the accuracy of the generated response ‘is an abuse of the adversary system’ (Mata [v.
Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)]), as it wastes court resources
that would be better spent elsewhere.” Id. ¶ 131.
¶ 48 Defendants, in their apparent attempt to respond to arguments presented in Kadiyala’s
brief, note that throughout Kadiyala’s brief, “no fewer than three [cases cited by Kadiyala] stand
for the propositions that he claims they do, and two of his cited cases do not exist at all, to say
nothing of his brazen misquotation of the very statutory language of [s]ection 2-408(a)(3).”
Defendants assert that Kadiyala’s “fictitious, hallucinated citations” warrant sanctions under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375.
¶ 49 Ordinarily, and particularly where the appellant’s noncompliance has not substantially
hindered our review, we have been inclined to proceed with a substantive review of the issues and
to render a disposition on the merits. Ironically, in such cases, the appellant has either failed to cite
to any authority or the authority to which he cites is distinguishable. Here, Kadiyala cites to
authority, much of it fictitious, and still more of it immaterial. This court has a reasonable
expectation that every litigant, pro se or otherwise, exercises due diligence in reviewing their briefs
before submitting them to ensure that the arguments asserted therein have merit and the
accompanying citations are accurate and reliable. Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 119.
¶ 50 Even accepting that Kadiyala’s several and repeated missteps were unintentional, we find
the violations too egregious to overlook. His conduct, not simply here in the appellate court, but
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also over the long course of the trial court proceedings, is a clear abuse of the judicial system. In
light of Kadiyala’s failings, we are compelled to exercise the authority vested in this court pursuant
to Rule 341 and strike Kadiyala’s brief and dismiss this appeal. See McCann, 2015 IL App (1st)
141291, ¶ 20 (where the appellant failed to comply with Rule 341, the court, in the exercise of its
discretion, struck the brief and dismissed the appeal).
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the reasons stated, and in the exercise of our discretion, we strike intervenor-appellant’s
brief and dismiss the appeal. See Pletcher v. Village of Libertyville Police Pension Board, 2025
IL App (2d) 240416-U (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (finding that striking
the appellant’s brief and dismissing the appeal was warranted where the pro se appellant cited
nonexistent cases).
¶ 52 Appeal dismissed.
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