OPINION
Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and BURKE, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.
RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice.
We are called upon to decide whether two statutes, AS 08.54.040(a)(7) & .195, comport with article VIII, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution. These statutes autho
rize the Guide Licensing and Control Board to grant hunting guides “exclusive guide areas,” geographic areas in which only the designated guide may lead hunts and from which all other guides are excluded. Licensed hunters, including other guides, may hunt recreationally in these areas, but only the holder of the exclusive guide area may lead hunts professionally.
I.
In 1973 the legislature created the Guide Licensing and Control Board (“GLCB” or “the Board”). Ch. 17, § 1, SLA 1973. This act set forth the composition, powers and duties of the Board, established guidelines for different classes of guide licenses, defined unlawful acts, and provided for the disciplining of guides.
Id.
It also authorized the Board generally to “regulate activity” of guides, AS 08.54.040(a)(3), and to adopt regulations “required by this chapter or reasonably necessary for its administration.”
Id.
at 08.54.050. The legislative history reveals that the purposes of the act were “to protect fish and game management” and “to get competent people as guides in Alaska.” Alaska Legislative Committee Minutes Microfiche No. 37, House Judiciary Committee, H.B. 1, at 20 (Feb. 2, 1973).
One of the first activities of the Board was to establish a scheme of “exclusive guide areas” (EGAs) and “joint use areas.” Under this system, a guide would be able to register his camp and be entitled to exclusive guiding privileges in a designated area surrounding it. “Joint use areas” would be assigned where the areas used by two or more guides overlapped.
The Board first voted in April 1974 to implement this scheme for Game Management Units 16 and 20.
Shortly thereafter, in July 1974, the Board voted to extend the program to Unit 8 (Kodiak Island).
For the following year, the Board considered applications for EGAs but took no action. In July 1975, the Board granted dozens of exclusive and joint use areas in the three Units for which the regulation was passed. The Board further resolved at that time to extend the program to eleven more Units, including Unit 19. In January 1976, the Board voted to grant EGAs to qualified guides anywhere in the state. Applications were to be based on “occupancy, use, financial value, and such other qualifications as the Board may prescribe.” The Board set a deadline of November 1, 1976, for receipt of applications for EGAs. The Board began granting EGAs in Units other than 8, 16 and 20 in December 1976, starting with Units 23-26. EGAs for other Units were granted gradually over the following months.
The Board conducted all of this activity without specific statutory authorization, relying only on the general grant of regulatory power in the 1973 legislation. In 1976 the legislature enacted AS 08.54.040(a)(8) (now AS 08.54.040(a)(7)), which authorized the Board to:
establish a quota of licensed operating guides who may operate within designated geographical game units or subunits of the state and provide for an equitable and reasonable procedure for limiting the number of guides to that quota; preference shall be given to qualified available and willing licensed guides who reside within the designated game unit or subunit.
Ch. 133, § 1, SLA 1976. This provision took effect January 1, 1977.
Id.
at § 5. The legislative history reveals that the intent of this section was to ratify the
Board’s EGA program. Transcript of Senate Resources Committee Hearing on S.B. 661, at 1, 14-15 (March 12, 1976); Transcript of House Resource Committee Hearing on S.B. 661, at 33-34 (April 27, 1976).
Finally, in 1986 the legislature enacted AS 08.54.195.
This statute for the first time imposed procedures and criteria on the Board with respect to the EGA program. This reform was enacted in response to a “sunset report” on the GLCB by the Division of Legislative Audit, which was harshly critical of the Board’s implementation of the EGA program.
See
Division of Legislative Audit,
A Performance Report on the Department of Commerce and Economic Development Guide Licensing and Control Board,
Audit Control No. 08.01253-86-R (Nov. 21, 1985).
II.
Kenneth D. Owsichek is a registered guide who was licensed to lead hunts in Game Management Units 17, 18 and 19 in February 1976.
He alleges that he had worked as an assistant guide in this area from 1972 to 1976. He claims that in January 1976, upon passing his guide license examination, he invested $300,000 to build a lodge and several cabins together with other facilities for a full-scale guiding operation on Lake Clark. He also claims to have spent $150,000 on four aircraft to fly in clients.
Owsichek’s licensing and concurrent investments occurred at approximately the same time the GLCB decided to extend the EGA program on a statewide basis.
Accordingly, Owsichek submitted an application for EGAs in Units 17 and 19 before the November 1, 1976, deadline established by the Board. The Board considered applications for EGAs in Units 17 and 19 in its December 1977 meeting. Owsichek’s application was denied on the ground that he had not submitted “evidence of contracts
for guided hunts in the area for two of the five years preceding the application.”
Owsichek petitioned for review of this decision. In November 1978, the Attorney General’s office found that, based on contracts submitted for hunts in 1976, 1977 and 1978, he was qualified to receive an EGA in Units 17 and 19, and recommended that the Board adopt this decision. In its December 1978 meeting, the Board resolved “that the portion of Mr. Owsichek’s application that is not in conflict with presently granted gide [sic] areas be allowed. That no portion of the application that overlaps or is presently in joint use be granted.” By letter dated February 5, 1979, the Board informed Owsichek of its decision and assigned him area 19:38, in Unit 19. Owsichek objected to this decision because he was unable to land his planes within the areas granted to him, rendering them “un-huntable.”
On April 6, 1979, Owsichek filed a complaint in superior court challenging the Board’s actions. His amended complaint alleged that: (1) prior to January 1, 1977, the Board lacked authority to promulgate regulations creating EGAs; (2) the actions of the Board violated due process and equal protection under the federal and state constitutions; (3) the actions of the Board were an unconstitutional taking of property; (4) AS 08.54.040(a)(8) was an unconstitutional delegation of authority because of the lack of standards; (5) the statutes and regulations constituted an unlawful impairment of contracts under the Alaska Constitution; (6) the regulations did not comply with what standards existed in the statute; and (7) he suffered damages. By way of relief Owsichek sought a declaration that the Board’s assigning of EGAs is unconstitutional and that he is entitled to recover damages against the state in an amount in excess of $100,000 as a consequence of the state’s illegal and unconstitutional actions.
After considering the briefs and hearing oral arguments,
the superior court affirmed the actions of the Board, holding “that the Board did not commit any error or abuse of discretion, that its regulations comport with the governing statutes, and that no constitutional infirmity exists in the statutes, regulations or Board decision.” This appeal followed.
III.
A.
Owsichek argues that the EGA statutes and regulations violate the common use clause of the Alaska Constitution, which provides:
Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.
Alaska Const., art. VIII, § 3. The state argues that this clause is a broad grant of authority to the state to manage these resources, and that it places no limitations on this authority greater than those contained in other constitutional provisions, such as equal protection.
We observe initially that, in guaranteeing people “common use” of fish, wildlife and water resources, the framers of the constitution clearly did not intend to prohibit all regulation of the use of these resources. Licensing requirements, bag limits, and seasonal restrictions, for example, are time-honored methods of conserving the resources that were respected by delegates to the constitutional convention. Questions presented by this case concern the type and extent of permissible regulation consistent with common use.
This court has never considered these questions before. However, in four cases, we have indicated an intent to apply the common use clause in a way that strongly protects public access to natural resources. First, with respect to article VIII generally, we have written, “A careful reading of the constitutional minutes establishes that the provisions in article VIII were intended to permit the broadest possible access to and use of state waters by the general public.”
Wernberg v. State,
516 P.2d 1191, 1198-99 (Alaska 1973). Given the text of the common use clause, the same policy should apply to wildlife as well.
In
CWC Fisheries v. Bunker,
755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988), we addressed the question of whether a state tidelands grant included an exclusive right of fishery, or whether it was subject to a public trust easement. In holding the latter, we relied in part on the common use clause. While specifically declining to determine whether this clause imposed a higher duty than that imposed by common law public trust principles,
id.
at 1120 n. 10, we stated, “At least in the absence of some clear evidence to the contrary, we will not presume that the legislature intended to take an action which would, on its face, appear inconsistent with the plain wording of this constitutional mandate.”
Id.
at 1120.
In
State v. Ostrosky,
667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983),
appeal dismissed,
467 U.S. 1201, 104 S.Ct. 2379, 81 L.Ed.2d 339 (1984), we addressed the constitutionality of limited entry fishing. Limited entry fishing bears an obvious similarity to the EGA scheme in that both place restrictions on the commercial harvesting of a natural resource by giving a special status to a limited number of licensees. In
Ostrosky
we stated:
[W]e have difficulty squaring the section 3 reservation of fish to the people for common use with a system which grants an exclusive right to fish to a select few who may continue to exercise that right season after season. We accept, therefore, at least for the purposes of this case, the proposition that limited entry is inconsistent with the command of article VIII, section 3.
Id.
at 1189. In
Ostrosky
we held that the Limited Entry Act was not unconstitutional because of a 1972 constitutional amendment explicitly permitting limited entry to fisheries, notwithstanding section 3.
Id.
at 1190.
In a subsequent limited entry fishing case,
Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n,
758 P.2d 1256 (Alaska 1988), we stated:
In
State v. Ostrosky,
667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983), we noted that there is a tension between the limited entry clause of the state constitution and the clauses of the constitution which guaranty open fisheries. [Citing sections 3 and 15 of article VIII] We suggested that to be constitutional, a limited entry system should impinge as little as possible on the open fishery clauses consistent with the constitutional purposes of limited entry, namely, prevention of economic distress to fishermen and resource conservation.
Id.
at 1266.
Since there is no constitutional amendment authorizing EGAs, we must in this case address a common use question similar to that which was not addressed in
Ostrosky.
We do so, however, in light of
our observations in
Wernberg, CWC Fisheries, Ostrosky,
and
Johns
that the common use clause was intended to guarantee broad public access to natural resources.
B.
We begin by examining constitutional history to determine the framers’ intent in enacting the common use clause. This was a unique provision, not modeled on any other state constitution. Its purpose was anti-monopoly. This purpose was achieved by constitutionalizing common law principles imposing upon the state a public trust duty with regard to the. management of fish, wildlife and waters.
The framers’ reliance on historic principles regarding state management of wildlife and water resources is evident from a written explanation in the committee materials for the term “reserved to the people for common use.” This discussion also highlights an intent to prohibit “exclusive grants or special privilege[s].”
Ancient traditions in property rights have never recognized that a private right and title can be acquired by a private person to wildlife in their natural state or to water in general. The title remained with the sovereign, and in the American system of government with its concept of popular sovereignty this title is reserved to the people or the state on behalf of the people.
The expression “for common use” implies that these resources are not to be subject to exclusive grants or special privilege as was so frequently the case in ancient royal tradition.
Rather rights to use are secured by the general laws of the state. In all English and American legal systems ownership of water cannot be asserted, rights acquire only to the
use
of water. Once wildlife is captured and removed from their natural state possesso-ry right accrues to the captor, provided that the wildlife was captured in conformity with provisions of law.
Alaska Constitutional Convention Papers, Folder 210, paper prepared by Committee on Resources entitled “Terms” (emphasis added, except to “use”). Because an EGA is clearly a type of monopoly, “exclusive grant,” or at least a "special privilege,” this history strongly suggests that the statutes at issue here are unconstitutional. However, this history also states that “rights to use are secured by the general laws of the state,” clearly giving the legislature some leeway in regulating use of the resources.
The state finds support for its position in a debate that occurred at the convention over registered trap lines. This debate is significant because, like EGAs, registered trap lines would allow a prior existing user to exclude newcomers from the privilege of harvesting the wildlife resource. On the floor of the convention, a delegate asked whether the common use clause would prohibit registered trap lines, and the spokesman for the Resources Committee responded that it would be “arguable.” 4 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 2462-63 (Jan. 17,1956). In response to this concern, the Resources Committee inserted language in the commentary to the common use clause authorizing registered trap lines: “This provision does not apply to the domestication of fur-bearing animals or other animals subject to intensive culture, to fish in private ponds,
or to registered trap lines if authorized by law.”
6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention app. V, at 98 (Commentary on Article on State Lands and Natural Resources, Jan. 16, 1956) (emphasized language added after first draft;
cf. id.
at 83 (Dec. 16, 1955)).
Resolution of the trap line issue begs the question in the instant case. One might argue that addition of the language excluding registered trap lines from the effect of the common use clause was intended to authorize the legislature to enact this type
of regulation generally, and that the reasoning should extend to EGAs. However, the language in the commentary is highly specific, which more likely suggests that the common use clause would prohibit all similar regulation, with registered trap lines as a narrow exception in response to the political pressures of the moment.
In a discussion about fishing in lakes, the Constitutional Convention underscored its intent that the public retain broad access to fish, wildlife and water resources, and that these resources not be the subject of private grants. In floor debates, a question arose about the status of a natural lake falling within the boundaries of someone’s private property. The delegates agreed that the common use clause guaranteed the public’s right to use the lake for fishing, although it did not authorize a trespass across the landowner’s property to get to the lake. 4 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 2460 (Jan. 17, 1956). The Convention made it clear that only fish in small private ponds may be owned free of the public’s right of access.
See id.
at 2460-61; 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention app. V, at 98 (Commentary on Article on State Lands and Natural Resources, Jan. 16, 1956). This confirms the view of the common use clause and the public trust expressed in
CWC Fisheries v. Bunker,
755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988), holding that a grant of a fee interest in tidelands remains impressed with a public trust easement. It also reinforces our conclusion that grants of exclusive rights to harvest natural resources listed in the common use clause should be subjected to close scrutiny.
C.
As we have noted, the drafters of the common use clause apparently intended to constitutionalize historic common law principles governing the sovereign’s authority over management of fish, wildlife and water resources. A review of the history of wildlife law will therefore shed further light on the central issue in this case.
The Supreme Court traced the history of wildlife law from its roots in ancient Rome through its English common law development and transfer to this country in
Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 522-29, 16 S.Ct. 600, 601-04, 40 L.Ed. 793, 794-97 (1896). In that case, the Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, upholding a state statute forbidding transportation of certain game birds killed in Connecticut across state lines. The Court noted that in England, the right to hunt and fish “[was] vested in the King alone and from him derived to such of his subjects as [had] received the grants of a chase, a park, a free warren, or free fishery.”
Id.
at 527, 16 S.Ct. at 603, 40 L.Ed. at 796 (quoting 2 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries
* 410). As a recent authority explains:
Stripped of its many formalities, the essential core of English wildlife law on the eve of the American Revolution was the complete authority of the king and Parliament to determine what rights others might have with respect to the taking of wildlife.
M. Bean,
The Evolution of National Wildlife Law
12 (rev. ed. 1983).
The
Geer
court asserted that this authority to regulate taking of wildlife passed to the states upon separation from England. 161 U.S. at 528, 16 S.Ct. at 604, 40 L.Ed. at 796. However, unlike the authority vested in the King, the authority of the states, with their guarantees of democratic government, was not plenary.
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common property in game rests have undergone no change, the development of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact that the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised like all other powers of government
as a trust for the benefit of the ;people,
and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from the people,
or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good.
Id.
at 529, 16 S.Ct. at 604, 40 L.Ed. at 797 (emphasis added). The Court held that the
state’s “ownership” of wildlife, in trust for the people, authorized the statute at issue in that case.
Id.
The framers of the common use clause probably relied heavily on
Geer.
The following statement from the constitutional papers, as quoted above, closely tracks the reasoning of
Geer:
The title remained with the sovereign, and in the American system of government with its concept of popular sovereignty this title is reserved to the people or the state on behalf of the people. The expression “for common use” implies that these resources are not to be subject to exclusive grants or special privilege as was so frequently the case in ancient royal tradition.
Alaska Constitutional Convention Papers, Folder 210, paper prepared by Committee on Resources entitled “Terms.”
Thus, common law principles incorporated in the common use clause impose upon the state a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for the benefit of all the people.
We have twice recognized this duty in our prior decisions. In
Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Reserve v. Egan,
362 P.2d 901, 915 (Alaska 1961),
aff'd,
369 U.S. 45, 82 S.Ct. 552, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962), we stated:
These migrating schools of fish, while in inland waters, are the property of the state,
held in trust for the benefit of all the people of the state,
and the obligation and authority to equitably and wisely regulate the harvest is that of the state.
(Emphasis added.) Similarly, in
Herscher v. State, Department of Commerce,
568 P.2d 996, 1003 (Alaska 1977), we noted that the state acts “as trustee of the natural resources for the benefit of its citizens.”
The extent to which this public trust duty, as constitutionalized by the common use clause, limits a state’s discretion in managing its resources is not clearly defined. The state argues that it imposes no limit at all. While acknowledging that the common use clause constitutionalizes the state’s trust duty, the state asserts, “The sovereign’s power to allow and control use of the resources is broad, and restricted only by other constitutional limitations such as equal protection.” This assertion clearly overstates the extent of the state’s authority under the public trust duty and the common use clause.
First, as noted above, this court has stated in at least four cases that the common use clause is intended to provide independent protection of the public’s access to natural resources.
See Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n,
758 P.2d 1256, 1266 & n. 12 (Alaska 1988);
CWC Fisheries v. Bunker,
755 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Alaska 1988);
State v. Ostrosky,
667 P.2d 1184, 1189, 1191 (Alaska 1983),
appeal dismissed,
467 U.S. 1201, 104 S.Ct. 2379, 81
L.Ed.2d 339 (1984);
Werberg v. State,
516 P.2d 1191, 1198-99 (Alaska 1973);
see also Ostrosky,
667 P.2d at 1196 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
Second, under the state’s interpretation, the common use clause would be a nullity. “It is a well accepted principle of judicial construction that, whenever reasonably possible, every provision of the Constitution should be given meaning and effect, and related provisions should be harmonized.”
Park v. State,
528 P.2d 785, 786-87 (Alaska 1974). To give meaning and effect to the common use clause, it must provide protection of the public’s use of natural resources distinct from that provided by other constitutional provisions.
Third, the history of the common use clause, as noted above, reveals an anti-monopoly intent to prohibit “exclusive grants” and “special privilege[s],” wholly apart from the limits imposed by other constitutional provisions.
Finally, cases applying the public trust doctrine in navigable waters have frequently struck down state actions in violation of the trust without any reference to either federal or state constitutions. A good example is the lodestar of American public trust law,
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892). In that case, the Illinois legislature purported to grant to a railroad more than 1,000 acres of land underlying Lake Michigan in the harbor of Chicago. The Court applied the doctrine of the public trust in navigable waters to uphold the legislature’s later revocation of the grant:
A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation. The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.
Id.
at 453, 13 S.Ct. at 118, 36 L.Ed. at 1043.
In light of this historical review we conclude that the common use clause was intended to engraft in our constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state. The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, together with the common law tradition on which the delegates built, convince us that a minimum requirement of this duty is a prohibition against any monopolistic grants or special privileges. Accordingly, we are compelled to strike down any statutes or regulations that violate this principle.
D.
We conclude that exclusive guide areas and joint use areas fall within the category of grants prohibited by the common use clause. These areas allow one guide to exclude all other guides from leading hunts professionally in “his” area. These grants are based primarily on use, occupancy and investment, favoring established guides at the expense of new entrants in the market, such as Owsichek. To grant such a special privilege based primarily on seniority runs counter to the notion of “common use.”
Moreover, the grants are not limited in duration. The statutes allow holders of EGAs to sell their “improvements,” and the GLCB routinely transfers the EGA to the purchaser of the improvements or to the guide’s designated successor. This practice allows a guide to effectively sell his EGA as if it were a property interest.
See
Division of Legislative Audit,
A Performance Report on the Department of Commerce and Economic Development Guide Board
10-11, Audit Control No. 08-1305-88-R (Dec. 11, 1987) [hereinafter “1987 Report”].
Although the Board justified the program to the legislature as a means of improving wildlife management,
see
Transcript of Senate Resources Committee Hearing on S.B. 661 (March 12, 1976); Transcript of House Resource Committee Hearing on S.B. 661 (April 27, 1976), it is apparent that area assignments are not based primarily on wildlife management concerns. Rather, as authorized by AS 08.564.195(b) and 12 AAC 38.220(c) & (d)
(eff. 5/12/78, am. 10/15/82), the Board bases its decisions on use, occupancy and investment.
See
1987 Report at 9-10. Thus, the EGA program cannot be justified as a wildlife management tool like other restrictions on common use, such as hunting seasons and bag limits.
The state argues that EGAs do not deny Owsichek common use of the wildlife resources because he, like any other member of the public, may hunt recreationally in these areas. We reject this argument. In
CWC Fisheries v. Bunker,
755 P.2d 1115, 1121 n. 14 (Alaska 1988), we noted that the public trust doctrine guaranteed fishermen access to public resources for “private commercial purposes” as well as for recreation. The same rationale applies to professional hunting guides under the common use clause.
The common use clause makes no distinction between use for personal purposes and use for professional purposes.
Nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest that leases and exclusive concessions on state lands are unconstitutional. The statutes and regulations of the Department of Natural Resources authorize leases and concession contracts of limited duration, subject to competitive bidding procedures and valuable consideration.
See
AS 38.05.070-.075 (authorizing leases and setting forth procedures); AS 41.21.027 (authorizing concession contracts in state parks); 11 AAC 14.200-.260, 14.010-130 (establishing procedures for awarding concession contracts);
see also Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth,
426 P.2d 1006, 1009-11 (Alaska 1967) (discussing procedures required by law for leasing of state lands);
CWC Fisheries v. Bunker,
755 P.2d 1115, 1120-21 (Alaska 1988) (stating in dictum that shore fisheries leasing program would not violate public trust, in part because leases were of finite duration and required annual rental). In contrast, EGAs are not subject to competitive bidding, provide no remuneration to the state, are of unlimited duration, and are not subject to any other contractual terms or restrictions. Rather, as discussed above, they are granted essentially on the basis of seniority, with no rental or usage fee, for an unlimited duration, and are administered in such a way that guides may transfer them for a profit as if they owned them. In these respects the EGAs resemble the types of royal
grants the common use clause expressly intended to prohibit. Leases and concession contracts do not share these characteristics.
For these reasons, we hold that AS 08.-54.040(a)(7), AS 08.54.195, and the regulations of the Board permitting the assignment of exclusive guide areas are in contravention of article VIII, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution.
Accordingly, Owsi-chek is entitled to relief declaring the EGAs that have been granted by the Board to be without legal force.
IV.
In addition to declaratory relief, Owsichek seeks damages against the state. Because the superior court did not reach this issue, we would ordinarily remand for further proceedings. However, when an issue is raised in the trial court and is adequately briefed by all concerned parties on appeal, this court may consider it.
Mullen v. Christiansen,
642 P.2d 1345, 1350-51 (Alaska 1982).
Owsichek bases his claim for damages on allegations that the Board acted without authority in enacting the EGA regulations initially and that the regulations failed to comply with the legislation that was later passed.
We need not decide whether these allegations are true. Even if the Board acted without authority or failed to comply with statutory standards, it is immune from suit under the discretionary function exception provided for in the Tort Claims Act,
as interpreted by our prior decisions.
In at least two cases, we have held that acts of public officials who in good faith misinterpret the law and act in excess of their authority are immune from suit.
Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. State,
691 P.2d 281, 283-84 (Alaska 1984) (police officer lacked authority to temporarily reduce speed limit);
Bridges v. Alaska Housing Authority,
375 P.2d 696, 698, 702 (Alaska 1962) (housing authority lacked power to use declaration of taking). We have also held that decisions involving the formulation of basic policy are entitled to immunity.
See Industrial Indemnity Co. v. State,
669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 1983).
The EGA program was a major policy initiative of the GLCB. Therefore, even if the Board acted in excess of its authority or failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, it is immune from suit under the discretionary function exception provid
ed for in AS 09.50.250. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Board acted in bad faith.
V.
Owsichek argues that it was improper for the superior court to assess attorney’s fees against him, on the ground that he is a public interest litigant.
See Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State,
665 P.2d 544, 553-54 (Alaska 1983). Because the state is no longer the prevailing party, the fee award must be vacated and remanded for redetermination.
We note, however, that successful public interest litigants may be entitled to full attorney’s fees.
City of Anchorage v. McCabe,
568 P.2d 986, 993-94 (Alaska 1977). Thus, the question of whether Ow-sichek is a public interest litigant may be relevant on remand. Since the parties have fully briefed the issue, we will address it here.
We have consistently held that a party will not be deemed a public interest litigant where the party had sufficient economic incentive to bring the lawsuit without regard to the public interest.
E.g., Rosen v. State Board of Public Accountancy,
689 P.2d 478, 480 (Alaska 1984). As discussed above, Owsichek claims that the EGAs in his Units jeopardized the $450,000 he had invested in his guiding operation, and that he suffered over $100,000 in damages. This was clearly sufficient economic incentive to bring the suit. Therefore, we conclude that he is not a public interest litigant.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.