Owens v. Wallace

821 S.W.2d 746, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 194, 1992 WL 9635
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 23, 1992
Docket12-91-00294-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 821 S.W.2d 746 (Owens v. Wallace) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Owens v. Wallace, 821 S.W.2d 746, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 194, 1992 WL 9635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Vince Colvin and his wife, Sandy Colvin, the real parties in interest (hereinafter “the plaintiff”), sued relator, John Owens, (hereinafter “the defendant”) for damages allegedly relating to Owens’ construction of a swimming pool for the plaintiff. Defendant served his first set of interrogatories on the plaintiff. A copy of the interrogatories is attached to this opinion as Appendix A. In response, the plaintiff filed objections to the interrogatories asserting that: (1) the set of interrogatories called for more than thirty answers; (2) interrogatories numbers 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 exceeded the permissible scope of discovery, asked for work product of their attorney, and invaded the attomey/client privilege; and (3) that interrogatory number 28 exceeded the scope of discovery and “specifically violates subsection 3(b)” of Rule 166b. The defendant requested a hearing on the objections. The trial court held a hearing at which no evidence was produced. Thereafter, the trial court signed an order stating “that Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories are hereby sustained.”

The defendant now comes before this Court asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the plaintiffs’ objections. He contends that since the plaintiffs put on no evidence to support their objections to numbers 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 — that the information requested was protected by the work product privilege, the attorney client privilege and were beyond the scope of discovery — the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining those objections. The plaintiffs respond that the privileged nature of the information sought by those interrogatories is apparent from the face of the interrogatories and therefore, no evidence was necessary to support the trial court’s action of sustaining the objections.

Six of those interrogatories, numbers 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10, asked the plaintiffs to “state each and every fact upon which you intend to rely” in proving various allegations in their petition. The remaining two, numbers 11 and 12, are phrased in terms of steps or actions the plaintiffs claim someone should have taken and contend caused the defect. At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that the objection as to those two interrogatories was probably not legitimate. We agree. The objection stated in response to the interrogatories did not apply. Therefore, the trial court abused his discretion in sustaining those objections to interrogatories 11 and 12.

The remaining dispute centers on the “intend to rely” language employed by the defendant. The plaintiffs argue, that on its face this inquiry seeks to discover their attorney’s trial strategy and therefore, is not discoverable under the work product privilege and the attomey/client privilege. The plaintiffs have not cited any authority in support of this position. Apart from the bald assertion of the attomey/client privilege below, the plaintiffs advance no argument in support of that claim in this Court.

The two privileges protect different types of material. The work product privilege found in Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b, subd. *748 3, par. a. protects from discovery the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories prepared and assembled by the attorney in actual preparation for trial. Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 755 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1988) (orig. proceeding). The purpose is to protect the attorney’s mental impressions and strategy, not to prevent disclosure of the facts of the case. Leede Oil and Gas, Inc. v. McCorkle, 789 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990) (orig. proceeding).

The attomey/client privilege is codified at Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 503, as follows:

a client has the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client: (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer’s representative, (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer’s representative, (3) by him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer, or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein, (4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client.

A. “confidential communication” is one “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.”

From the context and argument made by the plaintiffs below and in this Court, it is clear that the crux of their objection relates to the work product privilege. The defendant did not seek confidential communications; rather he requested facts, which are discoverable. See Parten v. Brigham, 785 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989) (orig. proceeding). The attomey/client evi-dentiary privilege does not apply under the facts of this case.

The work product privilege is another question. The information sought, the facts underlying the lawsuit, is clearly discoverable. The purpose of discovery is to ensure that the suit is determined on the basis of what the facts reveal rather than what facts are concealed. That the interrogatories asked what facts the plaintiffs intend to rely upon, does not change the discoverable nature of the information. “It is also not ground for objection that an interrogatory propounded pursuant to Rule 168 involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b, subd. 2, par. a. The six interrogatories at issue fall squarely within that provision. The plaintiffs’ work product objections to interrogatories numbers 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10, were without merit.

By sustaining the objections, the trial court effectively precluded the defendant from discovering the facts of the dispute. It is well settled that the facts of a suit constitute the very core of discovery. The trial court’s sustaining of the objections was a clear abuse of discretion.

The defendant also sought to have the plaintiffs give the "name, address and telephone number of each and every pool contractor or swimming pool builder who has viewed or inspected the swimming pool made the subject of this suit.” See Appendix A, number 28. The plaintiffs objected that this interrogatory asked for information privileged under Rule 166b, subd. 3, par. b. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the inquiry asks for the identity of an expert who has been retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial who will not be called as an expert witness and whose mental impressions and opinions have not been reviewed by a testifying expert.

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Bluebook (online)
821 S.W.2d 746, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 194, 1992 WL 9635, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/owens-v-wallace-texapp-1992.