Schwellenbach, J.
This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial after a verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $40,000 in an action for libel. Defendants cross-appeal from orders overruling their demurrer, denying motion for dismissal at close of plaintiff’s evidence, refusing to grant a directed verdict, and refusal to grant judgment n.o.v.
Harvey Owens, who is familiarly known as Pat Owens, alleged the following facts in his complaint: that the defendant Scott Publishing Company is a Washington corporation and owner and publisher of the Tri-City Herald, a daily newspaper; that defendant Lee is the chief executive officer of the publishing company and that he writes articles for the newspaper; that plaintiff has been for many years a resident of Kennewick where he had an excellent reputation and was a respected citizen; that prior to April 6, 1952, he had served for many years as a director on the Kennewick School Board; that on April 6, 1952, for the purpose, of ruining plaintiff’s reputation and exposing him to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy and to deprive him of public confidence and embarrass him publicly, defendant Lee maliciously wrote and the corporate defendant published a false article concerning plaintiff to his damage in the sum of $100,000; that said article was false and untrue, particularly in certain respects.
We shall set out the article in full, italicizing the excerpts which plaintiff, alleged were particularly false and untrue, in order that they may be considered in proper context:
“The Way I See It. . . . By Glenn Lee
“Was the School District A Clearing House ior Surplus?
“When I Was A Boy I Lived on a farm that had a great many rocks on it. With much toil and time we collected the rocks and piled them in large quantities in one location. We would plow around the rockpile and plant seed around it and harvest around it.
[669]*669“Some animals took a fancy to the rockpile and made their home in it. They prospered and propagated. We might stir up one of the animals away from the rockpile, once in a while, but we could never catch one. He would head for home and wiggle into the rocks and we couldn’t budge him.
“The rockpile was a home base; it was a refuge. There was power in the unity and security of the group. Of course we could have moved all rocks and run the animals out, but that was just too big a job. So they stayed. We went about our farm tasks and life went ‘around’ the family in the rockpile.
“The Kennewick School Board up until the recent election, reminded me of that rockpile. Much power stemmed from the compact character of the school board. It was a rubber stamp board for Black, the superintendent.
“But I have thought for some time now that the board was a rubber stamp for Black and Pat Owens. They ran the show together. It will soon appear as to whether or not this is correct.
“When the hearing gets under way this week it likely will unfold that Pat Owens was a ‘big dealer’ in surplus of all kinds. Pat bought and sold like a veteran. He did a lot of traveling. He got around to many places. He always seemed to know the ins and outs that got him to the right places at the right time.
“But We Also Know that Black did a lot of traveling too. His expenses show that. Black always had companionship. But the companion, according to the expense accounts, was never Pat Owens.
“Frank Dunham, contractor, built the ball park, with surplus supplies and materials. Pat Owens supplied the supplies and materials. Where did Owens get them? That is a good question for Owens to answer this week on the witness stand under oath.
“In the course of the ball park construction program it was found that some lumber the school district had in its possession would fill the bill at the ball park. Dunham Construction company, owned and financially backed by L. E. Baldwin of Seattle, obtained the material frorji the school district.
“In paying for it they traded a piece of land to the school district for about $400 worth of lumber. The title to the land at that time was in the name of L. E. Baldwin.
“Don Pugnetti and I have read the minutes of the school board meetings several times, but we have never come across this transaction. It must have been voted on at one of those ‘special meetings’ when no one was around who remembered it. Maybe they fust forgot to put it in the book.
“Or perhaps they threw it out of the book. There are some pages missing from the minute book. The stubs of the missing pages look like they were slit off with a razor blade. Mutilation or destruction of public records is a dangerous pastime. Whether or not the dates would correspond remains to be seen later.
“Now how did Owens get all of this material? Many of the readers of the Tri-City Herald have bumped their noses up against a wall in
[670]*670
the past few years trying to buy surplus that was worth anything. It seemed like a person needed a ‘connection’ to be able to get surplus.
“If Owens had a connection, how did he arrange it? We know he was a good friend of E. S. Black, school superintendent. We know Black had good connections in getting surplus. He had a top priority because he represented the school district.
“Keep your eye on the subject of ‘priorities’ as the hearing unfolds this week.
“Huge amounts of surplus materials were shipped to the Kennewick School District. Where did it all go? I think John Williams ought to be asked if he knows anything about whether or not some of it was used in the contract work he did for the schools. And so should men like him be asked. Williams’ books and records might unfold interesting things too.
“School Employes like John Atterbury, Everett Dague, Charles Thuot, John Dickinson and Bill Altrogge might have noticed from time to time what happened to piles and piles of surplus. Someone must know where it went.
“I think more subpoenas will follow this week. Pat Owens, if he opens up his books, might have quite a story to tell about the purchase and sale of surplus.
“St. Johns Motor Express Company of Kennewick hauled load after load of lumber and supplies. I think the demand should be made by the public to have a complete and exact explanation made of where every stick of it was used.
“Representatives of AEC should be called to explain how the material was supplied to the school district. Also to Pat Owens. Were priorities used? Was the material donated or paid for by Owens?
“Surplus food now seems to play a stronger part in this transaction. Stories of food becoming rotten and being disposed of also crop up.
“On Voucher 25430, Dated October 10, 1947, the school district bought $500 worth of potatoes in Mt. Vernon and paid freight and tax of $118. These potatoes were trucked to Kennewick. The spuds were piled up at Kennewick but it took a long time -to use that many spuds. Some spoiled.
“Why were potatoes trucked about 300 miles? We have lots of potatoes in this area in the lower Yakima Valley.
“I telephoned Maloy Brothers of Mt. Vernon to ask about the transaction. Robert Maloy said he might have sold the spuds but he could not remember the transaction to a school district in Kennewick. He said that the government had price support under potatoes at that time and that the government was buying spuds and giving them to school districts.
“That seems funny, doesn’t it? It does' not add up. Well maybe the answers are available but they are slow in appearing.
“But employees of the school cafeteria who bought food and cooked it and threw out the garbage could probably tell how the surplus food was used and how the Mt. Vernon potatoes were used. Perhaps they ought to be called to testify.
[671]*671“I have sent Mrs. Pearl Wanamaker a letter asking ii she will make available a basic list of all surplus received by the Kennewick School District so the public can look it over. It might show up some surprising items.
“It looks more and more like there was so much free surplus floating around available to school districts that some of it might have been lost in the shuffle.”
The answer set out two affirmative defenses: (1) that the article from which the complaint had taken excerpts was one of a series of articles which constituted fair comment and criticism upon a matter of public interest, and (2) that the facts in the article upon which the comments and criticism were based were true.
At the time that this article was published Pat Owens had been a member of the Kennewick school board for nine years. He had been defeated for re-election the month before and his term of office had expired a week prior to the publication of the article on April 6, 1952. The state auditor had called a public hearing to be held in Kennewick on April 8, 1952, for the purpose of investigating the affairs of the school district.
The trial consumed nearly two weeks. Plaintiff produced considerable evidence tending to support his basic contention that the article was false and was maliciously written and published. Defendants presented considerable evidence which tended to support their defenses that the article was true or substantially so and was written only after careful investigation and in the belief that it was true, and that the article was not maliciously written but was published only to inform the public about a matter of public interest concerning which it was entitled to be informed.
The trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granted a new trial on eight specific grounds.
“1. That Instruction 21 of the Court is legally erroneous in that it attempts to cover the two separate and distinct defenses of qualified privilege and privileged criticism interposed by defendants which were in issue in the case, but the instruction fails to properly define and distinguish the two separate defenses and fails to properly inform the jury [672]*672upon such questions to the prejudice of defendants, thus justifying a new trial.
“2. That the Court committed error in failing to give defendants’ requested Instruction No. 10, which is a correct and proper definition and statement of privileged criticism, to which Instruction defendants were entitled under the issues and evidence, and the jury was not otherwise properly instructed on such defense, to the prejudice of defendants, thus justifying a new trial.
“3. That the Court committed error in failing to give defendants requested Instruction No. 8, which is a correct and proper definition and statement of the defense- of qualified privilege'to which Instruction defendants were entitled under the issues and evidence, and the jury was not otherwise properly instructed on such defense, to the prejudice of the defendants, thus justifying a new trial.
“4. That the Court committed error in failing to give defendants requested Instruction No. 9, which is a correct and proper definition and statement of the statutory defense of justification, to which instruction defendants were entitled under the issues and evidence, and the jury was not otherwise properly instructed on such defense, to the prejudice of the defendants, thus justifying a new trial.
“5. That the Court committed error in giving Instructions No. 12 and No. 23 for the reason that same are inconsistent one with the other, Instruction No. 12 having advised the jury as a matter of law that all the complained of portions of the article in question are libelous per se and Instruction No. 23 permitting the jury to make a determination based upon a finding that only parts of the article are libelous and other parts are not libelous, and said inconsistency is not otherwise cured in the instructions, prejudicial to the defendants, thus justifying a new trial.
“6. That the Court erred in failing to give defendants’ requested Instruction No. 22 and particularly that portion thereof in which it was proposed that the jury be told that it could not ‘assess any damage by way of penalty’ for the reason that the case was of a character justifying the giving of such an instruction to the jury and the point was not otherwise covered in the instructions, to the prejudice of the defendants, thus justifying a new trial.
“7. That the amount of the verdict rendered by the jury herein is so excessive as to unmistakably indicate that it was given under the influence of passion or prejudice and such passion or prejudice has so permeated the deliberations of the jury as to render it unjust to hold the defendants [673]*673foreclosed by any of the jury findings, thus justifying a new trial.
“8. For the foregoing reasons particularly substantial justice has not been done in this cause, thus justifying a new trial.”
It is evident that the court did not give definite reasons as required by Superior Court Rule 16, 34A Wn. (2d) 117, for holding that substantial justice had not been done. Paragraph 8 of the order was merely a recap of the other seven grounds for a new trial.
A written publication which tends to expose a living person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse, is libelous per se. Section 1, chapter 117, Laws of 1935, p. 329 [cf. RCW 9.58.010]; Ziebell v. Lumbermens Printing Co., 14 Wn. (2d) 261, 127 P. (2d) 677; Gaffney v. Scott Publishing Co., 35 Wn. (2d) 272, 212 P. (2d) 817. Defamatory words spoken of a person, which in themselves prejudice him in his profession, trade, vocation or office, are slanderous and actionable per se, unless they are either true or privileged. In determining whether the words spoken are defamatory, they must be construed in the sense in which they would ordinarily be understood by persons hearing them. Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847. This rule is also applicable to the libel of a person in his business, profession, or office. 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts, 168, § 569.
The author of a libelous publication may not be liable in damages therefor, because of certain defenses. The principal defenses to an action upon a publication libelous per se are consent, truth, absolute privilege, qualified or conditional privilege, and fair comment or privileged criticism. Gaffney v. Scott Publishing Co., 41 Wn. (2d) 191, 248 P. (2d) 390. We are not here concerned with the defenses of consent or absolute privilege, but shall briefly discuss the other defenses.
1. Truth.
It is well settled that truth is a complete defense to a [674]*674civil action for libel. Carey v. Hearst Publications, 19 Wn. (2d) 655, 143 P. (2d) 857. 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts 218, § 582. However, a publication may still be actionable as libel, even though based on true facts, if it contains criticism or comment which tends to expose a living person to hatred, contempt, etc. 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts 156, § 566.
2. Qualified or Conditional Privilege.
On certain occasions one is qualifiedly or conditionally privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another and is not liable therefor, provided such privilege is not abused. Facts contained in such communication need not be true, if published without malice, in good faith, and in an honest belief of their truth arrived at after a fair and impartial investigation or upon reasonable grounds for such belief. 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts 241 to 260, §§ 593 to 598. These occasions arise when the publication is for the protection of the interest of the publisher, Fahey v. Shafer, 98 Wash. 517, 167 Pac. 1118; the recipient or a third person, Ecuyer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Wash. 247, 172 Pac. 359; persons sharing a common interest, Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285, 86 Pac. 627; Ward v. Painters’ Local Union, 41 Wn. (2d) 859, 252 P. (2d) 253; family relationships, Kimble v. Kimble, 14 Wash. 369, 44 Pac. 866; public interest, Stevens v. Haering’s Grocetorium, 125 Wash. 404, 216 Pac. 870. In connection with the last mentioned type of privilege the publication is privileged only when made to a public officer or a private citizen who is authorized to act. The privilege does not extend to a publication to the entire public. 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts 261, § 598.
3. Fair Comment or Privileged Criticism.
The rule is stated in 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts 275 and 279, §§ 606 and 607.
Ҥ 606.
“(1) Criticism of so much of another’s activities as are matters of public concern is privileged if the criticism, although defamatory,
“(a) is upon,
(i) a true or privileged statement of fact, or
[675]*675(ii) upon facts otherwise known or available to the recipient as a member of the public, and
(b) represents the actual opinion of the critic, and
(c) is not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the other.”
Ҥ 607.
“(1) The privilege of criticism, stated in § 606, includes a privilege to criticize the public conduct of all officers or employees of the United States, a State or Territory thereof, or a municipal corporation of a State or Territory, and all candidates for such office and applicants for such employment in so far as the conduct of such officer, employee or candidate is a matter of public concern to those to whom the criticism is published.”
The latter section states, under “Comment”:
“a. The rule stated in this Section is a special application of the general rule stated in § 606. Therefore criticism to be privileged under the rule stated in this Section must conform to the conditions stated in that Section. The rule stated in this Section is applicable only to defamatory comment and does not afford protection for the publication of false defamatory statements of fact about public officers or candidates for office (see § 598).” (Italics ours.)
Criticism of the acts of public officials may be vehement, or severe, provided the criticism or comment does not impute crime, misconduct, or improper motives, unless the facts clearly warrant such an imputation. For example, if an official embezzles public funds, it would be permissible to call him a crook and unfit to hold public office. That, under the circumstances, would be a fair comment. However, such criticism or comment must be based on true facts.
As to the cross-appeal we are satisfied that the trial court correctly ruled the publication in question to be libelous per se. It imputed to appellant charges of misconduct in office and want of official integrity and fidelity to public trust. Ziebell v. Lumbermens Printing Co., supra, and cases and texts cited therein.
Ground 5 upon which the court granted a new trial was that instructions Nos. 12 and 23 were inconsistent, and prejudicial to the defendants.
[676]*676“Instruction No. 12.
“As a matter of law the portions of the publication complained of in the article which is in evidence in this case, come within the foregoing definition of libel.
“The law presumes that the defamatory statements in a publication that is libelous per se are false.
“The defendants are liable in damages for the injuries sustained, if any, by plaintiff as a result of said libelous per se publication, unless the defendants have justified said publication.”
“Instruction No. 23.
“When a newspaper publishes an article such as the one in evidence in this case and the portions of such article of which complaint is made intermingles innocent or indifferent statements of fact with libelous statements, it is no defense of such libelous statements to prove the truth of the innocent or indifferent statements.
“In order for the defendants to sustain the defense of truth of such libelous or defamatory matter, the evidence introduced in support of such defense must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence the substantial truth of each and every defamatory and libelous statement made in such article about which complaint is made, as imputed or interpreted by its ordinary meaning.
“Therefore, if you find that some of the statements complained of were true, nevertheless, if those that remained are libelous—as that term has been defined to you—the defendants have failed to establish their defense of truth.
“On the other hand, if the statements that remain are not libelous, as that term has been defined to you in these instructions, your verdict must be for the defendants.”
We fail to find any inconsistency in the two instructions which were prejudicial to the defendants. In a prior instruction the court had correctly defined “libel.” In No. 12 the judge instructed that the portions complained of, as a' whole, were libelous per se. In No. 23 he was discussing the defense of truth. If some of the statements were true and the remaining statements were false, and the statements that remained were libelous, the defendants failed to establish their defense of truth. Then, realizing that by striking some of the statements, those remaining might not then come within the definition of libel, and as a precautionary measure and to the benefit of the defendants, rather than [677]*677to their detriment, he instructed the jury that in that event, its verdict must be for the defendants.
Other grounds for granting a new trial were that the court felt that it committed error in failing to give defendants’ proposed instructions Nos. 8 and 9.
“Defendants’ Proposed Instruction No. 8.
“If you find from a fair preponderance of the evidence that before the publication of the editorial in question the defendants conducted a fair and impartial investigation of the activities of the Kennewick school board and of the activities of plaintiff as and while a director thereof, which disclosed circumstances inducing the defendants to correctly or reasonably believe the existence of facts affecting a matter of sufficiently important public interest requiring the publication thereof, and that the defendants published the editorial for the purpose of informing the public of such matter of public interest, without malice toward the plaintiff, honestly believing in the truth of the statements therein contained and with reasonable grounds for such belief, then you are instructed that even though you may find any statement in the editorial to be untrue, your verdict must be for the defendants.”
“Defendants’ Proposed Instruction No. 9.
“You are instructed the plaintiff alleges that a part of the editorial in question was libelous in that plaintiff has been held in contempt, calumny and ridicule of the public at large.
“You are instructed that in this state a libelous publication is excused when honestly made in belief of its truth and fairness and upon reasonable grounds for such belief and consists of fair comments upon the conduct of any person in respect of public affairs made after a fair and impartial investigation.
“You are further instructed that if you find from a fair preponderance of the evidence that said editorial was honestly made in belief of its truth and fairness and upon reasonable grounds for such belief and consists of fair comments upon the conduct of the plaintiff in respect of public affairs made after a fair and impartial investigation, then your verdict must be for the defendants.”
The trial court was of the opinion that the proposed instructions correctly stated the law concerning the defenses of qualified privilege and fair comment. As heretofore pointed out, the defense of qualified privilege does not ex[678]*678tend to a publication to the general public and the defense of fair comment does not afford protection for the publication of false, defamatory statements of fact about public officers or candidates for office.
We have heretofore discussed the law in this state with respect to cases involving communications which are qualifiedly or conditionally privileged, pointing out on what occasions one may publish false and defamatory matter of another. However, in those cases where the words spoken or written concern matters of public interest, such as matters concerning the administration of government, public officials and candidates for office, etc., the words spoken or written must be true. For an analysis of Washington cases on this question, see Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24.
We do not wish to recede from the above rule, which is the majority rule in the United States. See annotations, 110 A. L. R. 412 and 150 A. L. R. 358. The author of the annotation in 110 A. L. R. on page 415 states the logical and sound reason for the rule as follows:
“The theory underlying the majority rule is that while it is important that the public be informed of the character, qualifications, and conduct of public officers and candidates for public office so far as they are relevant, the extension of the doctrine of privilege to false statements of fact is not necessary to that end, and should not be permitted, in view of the grave consequences to the individual libeled from the wide circulation of falsehoods and calumnies concerning him. It has also been observed that there is no advantage to the public, but rather to the contrary, from the circulation of falsehoods about officers and candidates for office.”
The rule was adopted to prevent the injustice of irreparable harm being inflicted on public officials and candidates for public office. In Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N. E. 1, 13 L. R. A. 97, Judge Holmes, speaking for the court, said:
“But there is an important distinction to be noticed between the so called privilege of fair criticism upon matters of public interest, and the privilege existing in the case, for instance, of answers to inquiries about the character-[679]*679of a servant. In the latter case, a bona fide statement not in excess of the occasion is privileged, although it turns out to be false. In the former, what is privileged, if that is the proper term, is criticism, not statement, and however it might be if a person merely quoted or referred to a statement as made by others, and gave it no new sanction, if he takes upon himself in his own person to allege facts otherwise libellous, he will not be privileged if those facts are not true. The reason for the distinction lies in the different nature and degree of the exigency and of the damage in the two cases. In these, as in many other instances, the law has to draw a line between conflicting interests, both intrinsically meritorious. When private inquiries are made about a private person, a servant, for example, it is often impossible to answer them properly without stating facts, and those who settled the law thought it more important to preserve a reasonable freedom in giving necessary information than to insure people against occasional unintended injustice, confined as it generally is to one or two persons. But what the interest of private citizens in public matters requires is freedom of discussion rather than of statement. Moreover, the statements about such matters which come before the courts are generally public statements, where the harm done by a falsehood is much greater than in the other case. If one private citizen wrote to another that a high official had taken a bribe, no one would think good faith a sufficient answer to an action. He stands no better, certainly, when he publishes his writing to the world through a newspaper, and the newspaper itself stands no better than the writer.”
A similar explanation of the rule was given by Chief Justice Taft when he was a circuit judge, in Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530. He said:
“The existence and extent of privilege in communications are determined by balancing the needs and good of society against the right of an individual to enjoy a good reputation when he has done nothing which ought to injure it. The privilege should always cease where the sacrifice of the individual right becomes so great that the public good to be derived from it is outweighed. Where conditional privilege is extended to cover a statement of disgraceful fact to a master concerning a servant or one applying for service, the privilege covers a bona fide statement, on reasonable ground, to the master only, and the injury done to the servant’s reputation is with the master only. This is [680]*680the éxtent of the sacrifice which the rule compels the servant to suffer in what was thought to be, when the rule became law, a most important interest of society. But, if the privilege is to extend to cases like that at bar, then a man who offers himself as a candidate must submit uncomplainingly to the loss of his reputation, not with a single person or a small class of persons, but with every member of the public, whenever an untrue charge of disgraceful conduct is made against him, if only his accuser honestly believes the charge upon reasonable ground. We think that not only is such a sacrifice not required of every one who consents to become a candidate for office, but that to sanction such a doctrine would do the public more harm than good.”
The newspapers have assumed the responsibility of bringing matters of public interest into the open. The public is entitled to such information. But such information should be true. To extend the rule of qualified privilege, as urged by the newspapers, would create too great a temptation, during the heat of a political campaign or a sincere crusade against waste or corruption in government, to be too careless in their search for truth.
The instructions requested by respondents did not correctly state the law and the trial court was in error in granting a new trial for failure to give them.
It is undisputed from the record that the jurors deliberated only a half hour in arriving at the amount of the verdict, after having deliberated for twenty-three hours on the issue of liability. It is also undisputed thát the formula used by the jury in assessing damages was based on the evidence that the Tri-City Herald had approximately forty thousand readers. The jury assessed appellant’s damages on the basis of one dollar damage for each reader, resulting in a total of $40,000. Though the circulation of the paper and the number of readers were certainly items to be considered by the jury in assessing damages, such a formula was not the sole factor to be considered.
Obviously, it was error for the jury to use the total number of readers of the article as the sole yardstick for measuring damages. But that does not mean that the award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice which [681]*681permeated the deliberations of the jury. The fact that the jury deliberated twenty-three hours on the question of libel and one-half hour on the question of damages is conclusive that the battle in the jury room was on the question of libel. Having disposed of that issue, the jurors awarded damages on the basis of $1.00 for each reader. The award was the result of calculation (on the wrong basis, it is true), but it definitely was not the result of passion or prejudice.
The court properly and adequately instructed the jury on all phases of the law applicable to the case.
The order granting a new trial is reversed, and the cause remanded with direction to grant a new trial as to the issue of damages alone.
Mallery, Finley, Weaver, and Rosellini, JJ., concur.