Oved Miguel Montoya Diaz v. Warden, California City Correctional Center

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OVED MIGUEL MONTOYA DIAZ, No. 1:26-cv-03171-DJC-SCR (A#206-004-490), 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY 15 CORRECTIONAL CENTER, 16 Respondent. 17 18 Petitioner has been in federal immigration detention for seven months and filed this 19 habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner’s motion for a temporary 20 restraining order (ECF No. 2) and habeas corpus petition (ECF No. 1), both of which he filed pro 21 se, are pending before the Court. District Judge Calabretta referred the matter to the undersigned 22 for the submission of findings and recommendations. For the reasons described below, the 23 undersigned recommends granting the § 2241 petition and ordering petitioner’s immediate release 24 from immigration detention. Based on this recommendation, the undersigned further 25 recommends that the motion for a temporary restraining order be denied as moot. 26 I. Factual and Procedural History 27 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who crossed the border into the United 28 States in July 2021. ECF No. 1 at 4. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen who submitted a 1 family-based immigration petition (known as an I-130) on petitioner’s behalf on January 14, 2 2025. ECF No. 1 at 5, 33. This petition remains pending. Id. On June 25, 2024, he was 3 convicted of the misdemeanor of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) in Salt Lake County, 4 Utah. ECF No. 1 at 34. 5 An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied his request for asylum and ordered him removed, but 6 granted him withholding of removal to Nicaragua on October 22, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 29-32. 7 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained petitioner inside the immigration 8 courthouse in Farmington, Utah after this hearing. ECF No. 8 at 4. Petitioner is currently 9 detained at the California City Detention Center located in this judicial district. ECF No. 1 at 3. 10 While in immigration detention, petitioner sustained a hairline fracture and has also suffered from 11 depression. ECF No. 2 at 3. 12 In claim one of his § 2241 petition, he challenges his prolonged detention as a violation of 13 the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), 14 because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable since he cannot be returned to Nicaragua. ECF 15 No. 1 at 7-8. Next, petitioner challenges his detention as a violation of his Fifth Amendment right 16 to due process. ECF No. 1 at 8. By way of relief, petitioner seeks immediate release, or, in the 17 alternative, a bond hearing to determine whether his detention is justified. Id. at 9. 18 At the outset of its answer, respondent asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to 19 adjudicate claims arising from the execution of immigration removal orders pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1252(g). ECF No. 7 at 1. Regarding the merits, respondent contends that petitioner is 21 mandatorily detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) based on his final order of removal issued 22 on October 22, 2025. ECF No. 7 at 1-2. The government notified petitioner on December 31, 23 2025 that they intend to remove him to the third country of Mexico. ECF No. 7-1 at 1. 24 Petitioner’s detention is not prolonged under Zadvydas since, according to respondent’s 25 calculation, the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention did not commence until 26 January 20, 2026. ECF No. 7 at 2. Additionally, respondent claims there is a significant 27 likelihood of his removal to Mexico. Id. 28 Respondent further contends that petitioner was provided a bond hearing before an 1 immigration judge on November 28, 2025 who denied him bond. ECF No. 7-2 (Notice of Appeal 2 from an IJ Decision). Petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s bond denial remains pending before the 3 Board of Immigration Appeals. ECF No. 7-2. For this reason, respondent submits that the 4 exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be excused for petitioner’s due process 5 challenge. ECF No. 7 at 1-2. 6 Finally, to the extent that petitioner is entitled to any relief, respondent submits that it is 7 generally only a bond hearing and not immediate release. ECF No 7 at 2. 8 In his reply, petitioner emphasizes that his detention has exceeded the presumptively 9 reasonable six-month period established by Zadvydas. ECF No. 8. Additionally, based on his 10 pending I-130 application, his removal is speculative and not reasonably foreseeable. ECF No. 8 11 at 4. 12 II. Immigration Detention Framework After a Final Order of Removal 13 The detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the United States is 14 governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). “In particular, § 1231(a)(6) provides that after a 90-day 15 ‘removal period,’ a noncitizen ‘may be detained’ or may be released under terms of supervision.” 16 Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022). After this 90 day removal period has 17 elapsed, ongoing detention is only authorized for “four categories of people: (1) those who are 18 ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified grounds; (2) those who are ‘removable’ on certain specified 19 grounds; (3) those it determines ‘to be a risk to the community’; and (4) those it determines to be 20 ‘unlikely to comply with the order of removal.’” Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578–79 (quoting 21 8 U.SC. § 1231(a)(6)). Respondent has not taken the position that petitioner falls within one of 22 those four categories based on his single misdemeanor conviction. Therefore, as a threshold 23 matter, it is not clear whether respondent has properly exercised the statutory discretion under § 24 1231(a)(6) to maintain petitioner in custody. 25 The Supreme Court examined the constitutional limits of detention under § 1231(a)(6) in 26 Zadvydas, describing as “obvious” the “serious constitutional problem arising out of a statute 27 that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent, deprivation of human 28 liberty without any” procedural “protection[s.]” 533 U.S. at 692 (2001). Zadvydas read an 1 implicit due process limitation into the immigration statute governing the removal of noncitizens 2 subject to a final order of removal in order to avoid serious constitutional problems. The 3 Supreme Court reasoned that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United 4 States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 5 permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. As a result, “once [a noncitizen’s] removal is no longer 6 reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Zadvydas, 533 7 U.S. at 699. In order to establish a uniform standard for determining when ongoing detention 8 crosses constitutionally acceptable limits, the Court recognized a presumptively reasonable six 9 month period of detention. Id. at 701. If a noncitizen “provides a good reason to believe that 10 there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government 11 must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. 12 III. Analysis 13 A. Jurisdiction 14 Turning first to respondent’s jurisdictional challenge, the Supreme Court has narrowly 15 interpreted § 1252(g) as applying “only to [those] three discrete actions that the Attorney General 16 may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 17 removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. et al., 525 U.S. 471, 482 18 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The statute, however, does not “sweep 19 in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney 20 General.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018). “Thus, decisions or actions that are 21 a part of the deportation process, but not specifically the action of commencing proceedings, 22 adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders, are not jurisdictionally barred from judicial 23 review.” Trieu Minh Ly, v. Bondi, No. 5:26-cv-01320-SPG-DFM, 2026 WL 917605, * 4 (C.D. 24 Cal. March 31, 2026) (citations omitted). In this case, petitioner is not challenging the decision to 25 “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute [his] removal order[]” because the IJ 26 granted him withholding of removal to Nicaragua. Instead, he is challenging his prolonged 27 detention in immigration custody. Therefore, § 1252(g) is no obstacle to review of that challenge. 28 //// 1 B. Zadvydas Analysis 2 1. Petitioner’s Detention Is Not Presumptively Reasonable 3 Petitioner’s final order of removal became final on October 22, 2025 because each side 4 waived the right to appeal the IJ’s decision granting withholding of removal. See ECF No. 1 at 5 32. The parties only differ as to how to calculate the six-month presumptively reasonable period 6 of detention outlined in Zadvydas. Respondent suggests that the six month presumptively 7 reasonable period does not start until after the 90-day mandatory detention period of 8 U.S.C. § 8 1231(a) has ended. ECF No. 7 at 2. However, they cite no legal authority for that proposition. 9 The undersigned rejects such an interpretation and is unaware of any court to have adopted it. 10 Therefore, the undersigned concludes that petitioner has been detained for seven months which 11 exceeds the length of detention found presumptively reasonable in Zadvydas. 12 2. Significant Likelihood of Removal in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future 13 Petitioner has met his burden of establishing a “good reason to believe” that there is no 14 significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future because he was granted 15 withholding of removal to Nicaragua and because he has a pending family-based immigration 16 petition which respondent does not even address. See Iskondave v. Santacruz, Jr., et al., No. 17 5:26-cv-01036-MCS-DTB, 2026 WL 1047041, *2 (C.D. Cal. March 12, 2026) (finding that “the 18 withholding of removal to Syria coupled with the approved I-130 petition presents good reason to 19 believe that there is no significant likelihood that Petitioner will be removed to Syria in the 20 reasonably foreseeable future”).1 The burden therefore shifts to respondent to rebut that 21 showing. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 22 //// 23 1 The most important fact in favor of petitioner here is withholding of removal to Nicaragua. See 24 Abdirahman v. Noem, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00177-RBM-AHG, 2026 WL 311509, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026) (holding petitioner satisfied his burden under Zadvydas because he was granted 25 withholding of removal to his country of origin and established that “ICE has not been able to 26 remove [him] to a third country for over 7 months”) (internal citation omitted). However, his pending I-130 petition may also be a relevant fact. If that petition is approved, petitioner could 27 then file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. See Kalilu v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (describing a non-citizen’s ability to file a motion to reopen 28 with an approved I-130 petition). 1 In this case, there is no countervailing evidence in the record to demonstrate a significant 2 likelihood of petitioner’s removal to Mexico in the reasonably foreseeable future. Although 3 respondent notified petitioner in December 2025 of DHS’s intent to remove him to Mexico, 4 respondent did not submit evidence describing any specific efforts to do so in the five months that 5 have elapsed since the notice was issued. This silent record leads the court to conclude that there 6 is no significant likelihood of petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 7 Accordingly, petitioner has sufficiently established that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable 8 and that his ongoing detention is not reasonably necessary to secure his removal. See Zadvydas, 9 533 U.S. at 699–700. Therefore, the court recommends granting the § 2241petition on claim one 10 based on his unlawful prolonged detention.2 11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 12 1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be granted on claim 13 one. 14 2. Respondent be ordered to immediately release Petitioner Oved Miguel Montoya Diaz 15 (A#206-004-490) under conditions of supervision dictated by applicable statutes and regulations. 16 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to serve the California City Detention Facility with a 17 copy of any final order granting release. 18 4. Respondent shall not redetain petitioner unless and until they comply with all 19 procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) and any other applicable statutes and regulations. 20 5. Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) be denied as moot in 21 light of the recommendation to grant the § 2241 petition. 22 6. Judgment be entered in petitioner’s favor and this case be closed. 23 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days after 25 being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 26 the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period 27 2 In the interests of judicial economy, the remaining claim is not addressed herein in light of 28 the recommended relief. 1 | is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties 2 || have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v. 3 || Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets 4 | the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties 5 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 6 || the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 7 || DATED: May 22, 2026 8

10 SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28