1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 OTANO ALEXEIS, Case No. 1:26-cv-03599 (EJD)
8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 9 v.
10 WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 1 Respondents. 11
12 13 This habeas action concerns the detention of Petitioner Otano Alexeis, a noncitizen who 14 has lived in the United States for at least twenty-five years. See Dkt. 5-2 at 1. Petitioner was 15 convicted for possessing a firearm without a warrant on June 24, 2021. See Dkt. 5-1. He was 16 subsequently re-detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on April 27, 17 2026. Respondents maintain that Petitioner’s continued detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 18 1226(c) due to his 2021 conviction. This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s writ of habeas 19 corpus, in which he seeks a bond hearing before a neutral arbiter. See Dkt. 1. For the reasons 20 explained below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The instant action arises from Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful detention. See Dkt. 1. On 23 May 14, 2004, Petitioner was “accorded Lawful Permanent Resident status of the United States as 24 of February 17, 2001.” Dkt. 5-2 at 1. During his over twenty-five years living in the United States, 25 Petitioner has started a family and is the primary financial provider for his household. Dkt. 1 at 6. 26 He was also recently diagnosed with cancer, and claims that he has not been receiving proper 27 treatment for the disease while in detention. Id. 1 In 2021, Petitioner was convicted for possessing a firearm without a license and sentenced 2 to six months of probation. See Dkt. 5-2 at 7–8; Dkt. 10 at 2. In sentencing Petitioner, the trial 3 court noted that Petitioner was “not likely to engage in a criminal course of conduct” such that a 4 sentence of probation, rather than jail time, was appropriate. Dkt. 5-2 at 7. Petitioner completed his 5 probation six months later, and has had no arrests, criminal charges, or convictions since. Dkt. 10 6 at 2. 7 On September 4, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner a 8 Notice to Appear, charging him with removability due to his 2021 conviction. Dkt. 5-2 at 1. 9 Following the notice, Petitioner was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 10 (“ICE”) on April 27, 2026. Dkt. 1 at 4. Respondent maintains Petitioner is currently being held 11 subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See Dkt. 5. 12 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 11, 2026 13 challenging the lawfulness of his ongoing detention and seeking injunctive relief in the form of 14 immediate release or a bond hearing in the alternative. See Dkt. 1. On May 13, 2026, Respondent 15 filed an Opposition to the Petition. See Dkt. 5. After being appointed counsel, Petitioner filed his 16 reply on May 27, 2026. See Dkt. 10. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 19 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 20 (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 21 custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure 22 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 23 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 24 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 25 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 26 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a 27 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. 1 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 A. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 4 Under § 1226(c), detention is mandatory where a noncitizen “is deportable by reason of 5 having committed any offense covered” in § 1227(a)(2)(C). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). Section 6 1227(a)(2)(C) provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted under any 7 law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or 8 of attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, 9 any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive ... in violation of any law is 10 deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). Under this provision, non-citizens may be released “only if 11 the Attorney General decides ... that release ... is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a 12 potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation ... and the alien will not pose a 13 danger to the safety of other[s] ... and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” Id. at § 14 1226(c)(4). “Thus, noncitizens detained under this category are not entitled to bond hearings as 15 those detained under § 1226(a) are.” Kakkar v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-1627 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 16 3638298, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025); see also, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303– 17 304 (2018) (“By expressly stating that the covered aliens may be released ‘only if’ certain 18 conditions are met, § 1226(c)(2), the statute expressly and unequivocally imposes an 19 affirmative prohibition on releasing detained aliens under any other conditions.”) (emphasis in 20 original). 21 Given Petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of a firearm, there seems to be no 22 dispute that § 1226(c) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Dkt. 10 at 3 (“Petitioner does not dispute 23 that § 1226(c), rather than § 1226(a), governs his detention.”). Rather, Petitioner argues that 24 “[e]ven under § 1226(c), the Due Process Clause requires that” he be afforded “a hearing before a 25 neutral decisionmaker to determine whether continued detention is justified.” Id. As such, the 26 Court turns to whether application of the mandatory detention scheme under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to 27 Petitioner comports with due process or if Petitioner must be afforded a bond hearing. 1 B. Procedural Due Process 2 Respondents do not engage with Petitioner’s as-applied due process challenge to the 3 application of § 1226(c) without a bond hearing, and instead simply argue that he is subject to 4 mandatory detention under the statute because of his 2021 conviction for illegal possession of a 5 firearm. See Dkt. 5. In Nielsen v. Preap, the Supreme Court analyzed the statutory text of 8 U.S.C. 6
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 OTANO ALEXEIS, Case No. 1:26-cv-03599 (EJD)
8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 9 v.
10 WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 1 Respondents. 11
12 13 This habeas action concerns the detention of Petitioner Otano Alexeis, a noncitizen who 14 has lived in the United States for at least twenty-five years. See Dkt. 5-2 at 1. Petitioner was 15 convicted for possessing a firearm without a warrant on June 24, 2021. See Dkt. 5-1. He was 16 subsequently re-detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on April 27, 17 2026. Respondents maintain that Petitioner’s continued detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 18 1226(c) due to his 2021 conviction. This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s writ of habeas 19 corpus, in which he seeks a bond hearing before a neutral arbiter. See Dkt. 1. For the reasons 20 explained below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The instant action arises from Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful detention. See Dkt. 1. On 23 May 14, 2004, Petitioner was “accorded Lawful Permanent Resident status of the United States as 24 of February 17, 2001.” Dkt. 5-2 at 1. During his over twenty-five years living in the United States, 25 Petitioner has started a family and is the primary financial provider for his household. Dkt. 1 at 6. 26 He was also recently diagnosed with cancer, and claims that he has not been receiving proper 27 treatment for the disease while in detention. Id. 1 In 2021, Petitioner was convicted for possessing a firearm without a license and sentenced 2 to six months of probation. See Dkt. 5-2 at 7–8; Dkt. 10 at 2. In sentencing Petitioner, the trial 3 court noted that Petitioner was “not likely to engage in a criminal course of conduct” such that a 4 sentence of probation, rather than jail time, was appropriate. Dkt. 5-2 at 7. Petitioner completed his 5 probation six months later, and has had no arrests, criminal charges, or convictions since. Dkt. 10 6 at 2. 7 On September 4, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner a 8 Notice to Appear, charging him with removability due to his 2021 conviction. Dkt. 5-2 at 1. 9 Following the notice, Petitioner was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 10 (“ICE”) on April 27, 2026. Dkt. 1 at 4. Respondent maintains Petitioner is currently being held 11 subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See Dkt. 5. 12 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 11, 2026 13 challenging the lawfulness of his ongoing detention and seeking injunctive relief in the form of 14 immediate release or a bond hearing in the alternative. See Dkt. 1. On May 13, 2026, Respondent 15 filed an Opposition to the Petition. See Dkt. 5. After being appointed counsel, Petitioner filed his 16 reply on May 27, 2026. See Dkt. 10. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 19 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 20 (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 21 custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure 22 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 23 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 24 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 25 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 26 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a 27 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. 1 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 A. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 4 Under § 1226(c), detention is mandatory where a noncitizen “is deportable by reason of 5 having committed any offense covered” in § 1227(a)(2)(C). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). Section 6 1227(a)(2)(C) provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted under any 7 law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or 8 of attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, 9 any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive ... in violation of any law is 10 deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). Under this provision, non-citizens may be released “only if 11 the Attorney General decides ... that release ... is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a 12 potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation ... and the alien will not pose a 13 danger to the safety of other[s] ... and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” Id. at § 14 1226(c)(4). “Thus, noncitizens detained under this category are not entitled to bond hearings as 15 those detained under § 1226(a) are.” Kakkar v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-1627 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 16 3638298, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025); see also, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303– 17 304 (2018) (“By expressly stating that the covered aliens may be released ‘only if’ certain 18 conditions are met, § 1226(c)(2), the statute expressly and unequivocally imposes an 19 affirmative prohibition on releasing detained aliens under any other conditions.”) (emphasis in 20 original). 21 Given Petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of a firearm, there seems to be no 22 dispute that § 1226(c) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Dkt. 10 at 3 (“Petitioner does not dispute 23 that § 1226(c), rather than § 1226(a), governs his detention.”). Rather, Petitioner argues that 24 “[e]ven under § 1226(c), the Due Process Clause requires that” he be afforded “a hearing before a 25 neutral decisionmaker to determine whether continued detention is justified.” Id. As such, the 26 Court turns to whether application of the mandatory detention scheme under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to 27 Petitioner comports with due process or if Petitioner must be afforded a bond hearing. 1 B. Procedural Due Process 2 Respondents do not engage with Petitioner’s as-applied due process challenge to the 3 application of § 1226(c) without a bond hearing, and instead simply argue that he is subject to 4 mandatory detention under the statute because of his 2021 conviction for illegal possession of a 5 firearm. See Dkt. 5. In Nielsen v. Preap, the Supreme Court analyzed the statutory text of 8 U.S.C. 6 § 1226(c) and found that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation—namely, that criminal aliens not 7 arrested immediately upon release from criminal custody are exempt from § 1226(c)’s mandatory 8 detention scheme, and are thus entitled to a bond hearing—is wrong. 586 U.S. 392, 396 (2019). In 9 so holding, however, the Supreme Court noted that its decision, “on the meaning of that statutory 10 provision[,] does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to 11 applications of the statute.” Id. at 420. As such, courts may grant as-applied due process 12 challenges and find that detention without a bond hearing under § 1226(c) is unconstitutional, 13 even for noncitizens with severe convictions. See e.g., Perera v. Jennings, No. 21-cv-04136-BLF, 14 2021 WL 2400981, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2021); Pham v. Becerra, No. 23-cv-01288-CRB, 15 2023 WL 2744397, at *5 (N.D. Cal. March 31, 2023); Carballo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00978- 16 KES-EPG, 2025 WL 2381464, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025). The Court does the same here. 17 Petitioner’s as-applied due process challenge is analyzed “in two steps: the first asks 18 whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second 19 examines the procedures necessary to ensure that any deprivation of that protected liberty interest 20 accords with the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 21 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 22 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). 23 1. Liberty Interest 24 Here, Petitioner has been a lawful permanent resident since August 10, 2010. (See ECF 25 No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 9-1 at 2.) His liberty interest has been strengthened with time. As this Court 26 and numerous other courts have concluded, individuals who have been released from immigration 27 custody have a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Acosta v. Warden 1 of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility, No. 1:26-cv-00530-TLN-EFB, 2026 WL 350831, at 2 *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026); Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-00546-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 266021, at 3 *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2026) (citing cases); Marco Antonio B.R. v. Warden of Golden State Annex 4 Det. Facility, No. 1:26-CV-00810-TLN-CSK, 2026 WL 1091489, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2026) 5 (finding Petitioner obtained liberty interesting through legal permanent resident status). Thus, the 6 Court finds Petitioner has an established liberty interest in his continued freedom. 7 2. Mathews Factors 8 Many courts have applied the test established by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. 9 Eldridge in considering what process is due in the immigration context. See Rodriguez Diaz v. 10 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022). There are three factors relevant to the due process 11 inquiry under the Mathews framework: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official 12 action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation ... and the probable value, if any, of additional or 13 substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function 14 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 15 requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 16 As to the first factor, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from 17 detention, as discussed above. Petitioner has established a life in the United States, as he notes his 18 family, whom he financially supports, lives in the United States with him. Dkt. 1 at 6. Thus, 19 Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 20 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding 21 similarly); Perera v. Jennings (Perera II), 598 F. Supp. 3d 736, 745 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting 22 Rajnish v. Jennings, 2020 WL 7626414, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2020) (“Any length of detention 23 implicates the same fundamental liberty interest in remaining free from imprisonment.”) (cleaned 24 up)). 25 For the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has 26 likely not received any hearing, either pre- or post-detention. “Civil immigration detention, which 27 is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or 1 danger to the community.” Carballo, 2025 WL 2381464, at *7 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 2 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023)). Though it is not this 3 Court’s role to determine whether Petitioner is a danger or flight risk, without a redetermination 4 before an immigration judge, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high. 5 The final Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. “While the Government’s 6 interest in enforcing the nation’s immigration laws is significant, that interest is not at stake here; 7 instead, it is the much lower interest in detaining [Petitioner] pending removal without a bond 8 hearing.” Perera II, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 746 (citing Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 9 777 (N.D. Cal. 2019)); see also Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 10 2019); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093–95 (E.D. Cal. 2025). In immigration court, 11 custody hearings are routine and impose a “minimal” cost, Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d1094, and 12 “Requiring the government to provide [Petitioner] with a bond hearing does not meaningfully 13 undermine the government’s interest in detaining non-citizens who pose a danger to the 14 community or are a flight risk.” Perera I, 2021 WL 2400981, at *5. As there have been no 15 procedural safeguards to determine if Petitioner’s re-detention is justified, “the probable value of 16 additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5. 17 On this record, the Mathews factors demonstrate that the Fifth Amendment Due Process 18 Clause entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing. See Caraballo, 2025 WL 2381464, at *8. 19 Respondents have not provided such a hearing. Therefore, Respondents have denied Petitioner the 20 “fundamental requirement of due process ... the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and 21 in a meaningful manner.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. 22 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 23 Accordingly, the Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. IT IS HEREBY 24 ORDERED: 25 1. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from continuing to detain 26 Petitioner for more than seven days from the date of this Order without a bond hearing before a 27 neutral fact-finder at which Respondents bear the burden to justify Petitioner’s detention by clear 1 and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. See 2 || Perera 2021 WL 2400981, at *6 (explaining basis for burden). The fact-finder must also 3 consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances for bond and alternative conditions of release. See 4 || Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 991. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel 5 || present. If Petitioner is not found to be a danger to society or flight risk, Respondent must 6 || immediately release Petitioner. 7 2. If Petitioner is released, Respondents are further ENJOINED and RESTRAINED 8 from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, 9 || including seven-days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where 10 || Respondent shows material changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of 11 Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be
12 || allowed to have counsel present. E13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: June 4, 2026
5 17 eOQD United States District ludge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Case No.: 1:26-cv-003599-EJD _