Ostrer v. Pine-Eagle School District No. 61

594 P.2d 1296, 40 Or. App. 265, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2338, 1979 Ore. App. LEXIS 2121
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMay 14, 1979
DocketERB C-34-78, CA 12122
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 594 P.2d 1296 (Ostrer v. Pine-Eagle School District No. 61) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ostrer v. Pine-Eagle School District No. 61, 594 P.2d 1296, 40 Or. App. 265, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2338, 1979 Ore. App. LEXIS 2121 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinions

[267]*267BUTTLER, J.

Petitioner Pine-Eagle School District No. 60 (District) seeks judicial review of an Employment Relations Board (ERB) order holding it guilty of an unfair labor practice, and directing the District to proceed to binding arbitration "as provided in the collective bargaining contract” to which the District was. a party.

Mr. Ostrer, the complainant before ERB, was a probationary teacher employed by the District. On December 2, 1977, he met with the principal of his school and the District Superintendent to discuss complaints received about his teaching practices, at which meeting the Superintendent suspended Mr. Ostrer pending a meeting of the District School Board on December 12,1977, when the matter was to be considered. At that time, with Mr. Ostrer and his attorney present, the District school board met in executive session to consider the suspension, and voted to dismiss him effective December 13. Mr. Ostrer demanded and, on January 26, 1978, received, an evidentiary hearing before the school board in accordance with ORS 342.835(1).1 After hearing the evidence, the board affirmed its earlier dismissal action; no appeal was taken.2

[268]*268In the meantime, Mr. Ostrer filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement with his principal and the superintendent, which the District refused to process as a grievance.3 His demand for binding arbitration of his grievance, the third and final step in the contractual grievance procedure sought to be invoked, was refused by the District on January 24, 1978. Thereafter, he filed an unfair labor practice complaint against the District with ERB. After a hearing, ERB concluded that the provisions of the agreement were ambiguous as they apply to the scope of arbitrability of the discharge in this case and that the District’s refusal to arbitrate the grievance constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning of ORS 243.672(l)(g).4 The District was ordered to proceed with arbitration, apparently to determine initially whether the question is arbitrable. See Portland Teachers v. School Dist., 27 Or App 247, 555 P2d 943 (1976).

An underlying question is whether a school board, an elected public body, charged by statute with the responsibility for educating children residing in its district (ORS 332.072), may be required to submit to binding arbitration its dismissal of a probationary teacher where the collective bargaining agreement [269]*269with the bargaining representative of the teachers does not clearly and expressly provide therefor. A school board has statutory duties to its electorate; an incident of those duties applicable here is to discharge, or not renew contracts of, probationary teachers whom the board determines in good faith ought not be retained. If the board fails to perform its duty effectively in this respect, the probationary teacher achieves the status of a permanent ("tenured”) teacher after three years, after which he or she may be discharged only for certain statutory reasons (ORS 342.865) under carefully circumscribed procedures. (ORS 342.895-342. 915.) The statutory scheme would then malfunction.

Assuming, arguendo, that the school board may delegate its duty with respect to the discharge of probationary teachers to some unknown third party, or to limit its statutory authority with respect to such discharges,5 at the least the agreement with respect to that delegation or limitation must be clear and specific, and will not be implied. Our holding in Corvallis Sch. Dist. v. Corvallis Education Assn., 35 Or App 531, 581 P2d 972 (1978),6 is not inconsistent with the foregoing proposition. The agreement in that case clearly required arbitration, and the district submitted the dispute pursuant to its provisions. The only question presented on appeal was whether the arbitrator, having found the discharge to be in "violation of the law, policy, rule or regulation,” (the contractual lan[270]*270guage) had authority to order reinstatement with back pay. We held that the formulation of an appropriate remedy was within the authority of the arbitrator. It is apparent that without that authority, all the arbitrator could do was declare that the discharge was unlawful.

Unlike the Corvallis School Dist. case, the agreement here does not clearly provide that teacher dismissals are subject to the grievance procedure ending in arbitration. Article 3 of the agreement is a broad management rights clause, which states:

"It is jointly recognized and agreed that the parties to this Agreement share a common goal in the educational process to provide a superior educational program within the framework of the limits of available resources. Teaching personnel covered by this Agreement have a continuing, professional commitment to the education process, to young people, to their colleagués, and to the improvement of their own skills. The Board consists of citizens who are elected by and directly responsible to the community for the total education program. The Board acts by and through its administrative and supervisory staff. The parties, therefore, jointly recognize that pursuant to ORS 332.072 - ORS 332.075 and ORS 332.105 - 332.107 the Board has the responsibility for formulation of and implementation of policies and rules governing the educational program and services of the District. No delegation of such responsibility is intended or to be implied by any provisions of this Agreement.
"Recognizing the relationship noted in Section 1 of this- Article; the parties agree that the District retains all the customary, usual, and exclusive rights, decision-making, prerogatives, functions, and authority connected with or in any way incident to its responsibility to manage the affairs of the District or any' part of it, consistent with ORS 243.711 to 243.795. Rights of employes in the bargaining unit and’the Associati.on are limited to those set forth in this Agreement or provided by Oregon statute, and the District retains all prerogatives, functions, and [271]*271rights not limited by the terms of this agreement or by Oregon statute.”7

Article 5 covers the rights of professional employes and states in section B:

"B. Rules and regulations governing teacher conduct shall be reasonable, and enforcement of teacher discipline shall be fair and exercised for just cause.”

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Ostrer v. Pine-Eagle School District No. 61
594 P.2d 1296 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
594 P.2d 1296, 40 Or. App. 265, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2338, 1979 Ore. App. LEXIS 2121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ostrer-v-pine-eagle-school-district-no-61-orctapp-1979.