Covello, J.
This is a summary process action involving a mobile home site. The trial court, Gaffney, J., rendered judgment for possession in favor of the plaintiff, Jeffrey P. Ossen. The defendants, Gail Wanat, Joseph Driscoll, Eugene Ellis and Laura Ellis, appealed to the Appellate Court. The dispositive issues are: (1) whether the trial court was required to determine the defendants’ constitutional claims within the context of a summary process action; and (2) whether the defendants were entitled to sell their mobile home on site pursuant to General Statutes § 21-79 during the pendency of the summary process action. We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly resolved both issues in favor of the plaintiff and therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
[315]*315In 1985, the plaintiff leased to the defendants a mobile home site in Three Oaks Mobilehome Park, Wallingford. On May 14,1988, the plaintiff served a notice to quit possession upon the defendants on or before June 16, 1988, claiming nonpayment of rent.1 On July 7, 1988, the plaintiff began the present action alleging the defendants’ continuing occupancy of the premises despite the passage of the time designated in the notice to quit and seeking a judgment of possession in accordance with the statute.2
On August 15, 1988, the defendants moved for a stay of the proceedings and simultaneously sought permission to sell the mobile home on the leased premises in accordance with General Statutes § 21-79.3 On August 26, 1988, the trial court, Stanley, J., denied both motions.
On October 21,1988, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendants’ three special defenses including, inter alia, a claim of an unconstitutional taking, a violation of due process and a denial of equal protection, all in violation of the fifth and four[316]*316teenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 10 of the Connecticut constitution.4 At the same time, the trial court struck the defendants’ counterclaim that sought an injunction restraining the plaintiff’s interference with the defendants’ sale of their mobile home on the leased premises. On November 18, 1988, the trial court, Gaffney, /., rendered judgment for possession in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which thereafter affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Upon the petition of the defendant Gail Wanat (defendant), we granted certification limited to the issues of: (1) whether the trial court was required to determine the defendants’ constitutional claims within the context of a summary process action; and (2) whether the defendants were entitled to sell their mobile home on [317]*317site pursuant to General Statutes § 21-79 during the pendency of the summary process action. We answer both questions in the negative and affirm the decision of the Appellate Court.
I
The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court was required to take up and address in the summary process action the constitutional issues raised in their first and second special defenses, and that the Appellate Court should not have concluded that the trial court was not required to do so.
“It has always been the policy of our law to limit the issues in an action of summary process to a few simple ones within the express scope of the statutory provisions.” Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 550-51, 7 A.2d 228 (1939). “Because of the summary nature of this remedy, the statute granting it has been narrowly construed and strictly followed.” Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 600-601, 96 A.2d 217 (1953). “The purpose of summary process proceedings . . . is to permit the landlord to recover possession on termination of a lease . . . without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which he may be subjected under a common-law action. . . . The process is intended to be summary and is designed to provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession.” Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 164 Conn. 287, 292, 320 A.2d 797 (1973).
Concededly, statutory modifications have created new rights and remedies within the context of the landlord and tenant relationship. A tenant may now plead by way of special defense, first, that the landlord has breached an implied warranty of habitability,5 or sec[318]*318ond, that the landlord’s claim for possession is a retaliatory act motivated by the tenant’s attempt to correct substandard conditions on the leased premises.6 Despite these additional remedies, the legislature, in its recodification and reenactment of the entire summary process chapter, saw fit to leave in place provisions for an abbreviated return day,7 and an accelerated appearance, pleading and judgment procedure,8 all of which comport with earlier notions of the summary nature of these proceedings. The fact remains that unless the tenant can prove payment of rent, the existence of a lease, one of the special defenses above, or superior title in the premises, he or she must yield possession.9
“We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the constitutional issues that the defendants attempted to [319]*319raise ‘are far beyond the scope of the statutory action that is before the Court.’ ” Ossen v. Wanat, 21 Conn. App. 40, 46, 571 A.2d 134 (1990).
II
The defendant next claims that the defendants were entitled to sell their mobile home on its site during the pendency of the summary process action and that the Appellate Court should not have affirmed the trial court’s decision not to permit this. In support of her position, the defendant relies upon General Statutes § 21-79. Section 21-79 provides in pertinent part: “(a) No owner or operator of a mobile manufactured home park shall require a resident . . . to remove the home from the development at the time such mobile manufactured home is sold . . . . (e) Any resident wishing to sell his or her home shall request a written statement of the [park] owner’s intentions regarding the condition of the home. Within twenty days after receipt of such a request, the owner shall approve the home’s condition for resale or deliver a written statement to the resident specifying the reasons” for denying approval. The defendant claims that they have complied with the provisions of § 21-79 and, therefore, have a right to sell the mobile home during the summary process action.
“Section 21-79 protects tenants at mobile home parks from being forced to sell to park owners at a substantial loss and as a consequence benefits many low income people who cannot otherwise afford to purchase more expensive housing.” Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 208 Conn. 620, 648, 546 A.2d 805
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Covello, J.
This is a summary process action involving a mobile home site. The trial court, Gaffney, J., rendered judgment for possession in favor of the plaintiff, Jeffrey P. Ossen. The defendants, Gail Wanat, Joseph Driscoll, Eugene Ellis and Laura Ellis, appealed to the Appellate Court. The dispositive issues are: (1) whether the trial court was required to determine the defendants’ constitutional claims within the context of a summary process action; and (2) whether the defendants were entitled to sell their mobile home on site pursuant to General Statutes § 21-79 during the pendency of the summary process action. We conclude that the Appellate Court correctly resolved both issues in favor of the plaintiff and therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
[315]*315In 1985, the plaintiff leased to the defendants a mobile home site in Three Oaks Mobilehome Park, Wallingford. On May 14,1988, the plaintiff served a notice to quit possession upon the defendants on or before June 16, 1988, claiming nonpayment of rent.1 On July 7, 1988, the plaintiff began the present action alleging the defendants’ continuing occupancy of the premises despite the passage of the time designated in the notice to quit and seeking a judgment of possession in accordance with the statute.2
On August 15, 1988, the defendants moved for a stay of the proceedings and simultaneously sought permission to sell the mobile home on the leased premises in accordance with General Statutes § 21-79.3 On August 26, 1988, the trial court, Stanley, J., denied both motions.
On October 21,1988, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendants’ three special defenses including, inter alia, a claim of an unconstitutional taking, a violation of due process and a denial of equal protection, all in violation of the fifth and four[316]*316teenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 10 of the Connecticut constitution.4 At the same time, the trial court struck the defendants’ counterclaim that sought an injunction restraining the plaintiff’s interference with the defendants’ sale of their mobile home on the leased premises. On November 18, 1988, the trial court, Gaffney, /., rendered judgment for possession in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which thereafter affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Upon the petition of the defendant Gail Wanat (defendant), we granted certification limited to the issues of: (1) whether the trial court was required to determine the defendants’ constitutional claims within the context of a summary process action; and (2) whether the defendants were entitled to sell their mobile home on [317]*317site pursuant to General Statutes § 21-79 during the pendency of the summary process action. We answer both questions in the negative and affirm the decision of the Appellate Court.
I
The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court was required to take up and address in the summary process action the constitutional issues raised in their first and second special defenses, and that the Appellate Court should not have concluded that the trial court was not required to do so.
“It has always been the policy of our law to limit the issues in an action of summary process to a few simple ones within the express scope of the statutory provisions.” Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 550-51, 7 A.2d 228 (1939). “Because of the summary nature of this remedy, the statute granting it has been narrowly construed and strictly followed.” Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 600-601, 96 A.2d 217 (1953). “The purpose of summary process proceedings . . . is to permit the landlord to recover possession on termination of a lease . . . without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which he may be subjected under a common-law action. . . . The process is intended to be summary and is designed to provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession.” Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 164 Conn. 287, 292, 320 A.2d 797 (1973).
Concededly, statutory modifications have created new rights and remedies within the context of the landlord and tenant relationship. A tenant may now plead by way of special defense, first, that the landlord has breached an implied warranty of habitability,5 or sec[318]*318ond, that the landlord’s claim for possession is a retaliatory act motivated by the tenant’s attempt to correct substandard conditions on the leased premises.6 Despite these additional remedies, the legislature, in its recodification and reenactment of the entire summary process chapter, saw fit to leave in place provisions for an abbreviated return day,7 and an accelerated appearance, pleading and judgment procedure,8 all of which comport with earlier notions of the summary nature of these proceedings. The fact remains that unless the tenant can prove payment of rent, the existence of a lease, one of the special defenses above, or superior title in the premises, he or she must yield possession.9
“We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the constitutional issues that the defendants attempted to [319]*319raise ‘are far beyond the scope of the statutory action that is before the Court.’ ” Ossen v. Wanat, 21 Conn. App. 40, 46, 571 A.2d 134 (1990).
II
The defendant next claims that the defendants were entitled to sell their mobile home on its site during the pendency of the summary process action and that the Appellate Court should not have affirmed the trial court’s decision not to permit this. In support of her position, the defendant relies upon General Statutes § 21-79. Section 21-79 provides in pertinent part: “(a) No owner or operator of a mobile manufactured home park shall require a resident . . . to remove the home from the development at the time such mobile manufactured home is sold . . . . (e) Any resident wishing to sell his or her home shall request a written statement of the [park] owner’s intentions regarding the condition of the home. Within twenty days after receipt of such a request, the owner shall approve the home’s condition for resale or deliver a written statement to the resident specifying the reasons” for denying approval. The defendant claims that they have complied with the provisions of § 21-79 and, therefore, have a right to sell the mobile home during the summary process action.
“Section 21-79 protects tenants at mobile home parks from being forced to sell to park owners at a substantial loss and as a consequence benefits many low income people who cannot otherwise afford to purchase more expensive housing.” Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 208 Conn. 620, 648, 546 A.2d 805 (1988), appeal dismissed, 489 U.S. 1002,109 S. Ct. 1104, 103 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1989). Section 21-79, however, does not lend support to the procedure advanced by the defendant. Section 21-79 nowhere permits a defendant to use its right to sell its mobile home to delay a summary process action. Furthermore, § 21-79 must be read in con[320]*320junction with the rest of the chapter. For example, General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (1) (A) contains a list of permitted circumstances in which a park owner may bring a summary process action and specifically states that “an owner [of a mobile home park] may terminate a rental agreement or maintain a summary process action against a resident who owns his mobile manufactured home only for one or more of the following reasons: (A) Nonpayment of rent, utility charges or reasonable incidental services charges . . . .” Nowhere does § 21-80 include the limitation on a park owner’s right to evict a nonpaying tenant as claimed by the defendant.
“[I]t is an elementary rule of construction that all sections of an act relating to the same subject matter should be considered together .... Insofar as possible the separate effect of each individual part or section of an act is made consistent with the whole.” 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1984) § 47.06. Read together, §§ 21-79 and 21-80 (b) (1) (A) thus permit a resident generally to sell his or her mobile home but preserve the right of a mobile home park owner to evict a resident for nonpayment of rent with thirty days notice. The two sections do not in any way suggest that § 21-79 is to be read to limit the right of a park owner to initiate a summary process action based upon any of the grounds specified in § 21-80 including nonpayment of rent. Furthermore, such a construction is consistent with the intent of the legislature that a summary process action be an accelerated and relatively straightforward procedure. The interpretation advanced by the defendant would create the potential for delay without any express authority in the statute. We conclude that the trial court correctly decided that § 21-79 does not give a party the right to delay a summary process action pending the on-site sale of a mobile home.
[321]*321The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion Peters, C. J., Glass and Santaniello, Js., concurred.