Oscar Cortez-Hernandez v. Kristi Noem; Christopher J. LaRose; Gregory J. Archambeault; Todd Lyons; Pamela Bondi; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Department of Homeland Security

Opinion

OSCAR CORTEZ-HERNANDEZ, Case No.: 3:25-cv-3112-JES-DDL

Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 KRISTI NOEM; CHRISTOPHER J.

LaROSE; GREGORY J. [ECF NO. 1] ARCHAMBEAULT; TODD LYONS; PAMELA BONDI; IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; and DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND Respondents. Before the Court is Petitioner Oscar Cortez-Hernandez’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court’s order to show cause (ECF No. 2), Respondents filed a return to the petition. ECF No. 3. Petitioner did not file an optional traverse by the deadline. See ECF No. 2. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner, a native of Mexico, entered the United States in 2002. ECF No. 1 ¶ 16. Since his entry, Petitioner alleges that he has continuously resided in North San Diego County. Id. On August 26, 2025, Petitioner was apprehended by Immigration and Custom Enforcement (“ICE”) after he parked his vehicle at a shopping center. Id. ¶ 17. He is currently being detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id. ¶ 13. After his detention, on September 23, 2025, Petitioner alleges that he requested a custody redetermination before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). Id. ¶ 19. On September 30, 2025, the IJ denied the request on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a bond redetermination pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Id. Petitioner alleges in his complaint that he should not be subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and should rather be subject to § 1226(a). Id. ¶¶ 25- 36. As such, his detention without a meaningful bond hearing violates § 1226. He seeks either release or that the Court order a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226. A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). In Respondents’ return to the petition, they raise several issues: (1) Petitioner’s claim and requested relief is jurisidictionally barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252; (2) alternatively, if not barred, Petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) Petitioner is lawfully detained under § 1225 and it is that section, rather than § 1226, that applies to his detention. ECF No. 2. Respondents’ arguments with regards to jurisdiction, administrative exhaustion, and applicability of § 1225 versus § 1226 are identical to those recently addressed by the undersigned in Martinez Lopez v. Noem et al., No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). In that decision, this Court held that the Court finds that the jurisdiction stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 do not strip it of jurisdiction to hear similar claims challenging detention without an adequate bond hearing, and that any further administrative exhaustion requirements are waived in light of Matter of Yajure Hurtado. Further, the Court, along with many others, held that it is § 1226 that applies to noncitizens that have be detained when after residing in the United States for a period of time. The Court adopts it reasoning as to these issues and incorporates it by reference. See also Beltran et al. v. Noem et al., No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (holding same). As applied here, there is no dispute that Petitioner was detained by ICE after having already resided in the United States for many years. Therefore, it is § 1226’s discretionary detention that applies to him, rather than § 1225’s mandatory discretion as Respondents urge and Petitioner is entitled to a meaningful bond determination, not solely based on Matter of Yajure Hurtado. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s petition on this ground. For the reasons discussed above, the Court ORDERS as follows: (1) Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED; (2) The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten days of this Order. At the hearing, Respondents may not deny Petitioner bond on the basis that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); (4) Respondents are ORDERED to File a Notice of Compliance within ten days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing; (5) The Clerk of Court SHALL enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this case. Dated: November 21, 2025

Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. United States District Judge