Osborne v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.

12 S.W.2d 947, 158 Tenn. 278, 5 Smith & H. 278, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 151
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 21, 1929
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 12 S.W.2d 947 (Osborne v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Osborne v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 12 S.W.2d 947, 158 Tenn. 278, 5 Smith & H. 278, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. 1929).

Opinion

Mr. Justice McKinney

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action to recover damages for the wrongful death of Gerald Osborne.

The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed the case and remanded it for a new trial. A writ of certiorari was heretofore granted by this court and the case has been argued by counsel at the bar of the court.

The deceased was employed as a fireman by the City of Alton Park, a suburb of Chattanooga.

The defendant is the owner of certain lines transmitting electric current in the City of Chattanooga, and of Alton Park. Thirty-third Street, in Alton Park, is about thirty feet wide and runs east and west. 'The plant of the Crane Enamelware Company is located on the north side of said street between Tarlton and D'eLong *280 Streets. There are a number of buildings on the south side of the street, including a two story frame building about the middle of the block. There is a concrete walk on the south side of said street, in the northern.edge of-which poles have been erected by defendant upon which are strung seven wires, one of which transmits 11,400 volts of electricity. This was an emergency wire to supply St. Elmo, another suburb of Chattanooga, and a few houses in the vicinity of the Crane Enamelware plant. The current on this wire could be cut off without affecting the other wires. With the exception of this wire, the highest current transmitted on either of the other wires was 500 volts.

At the main plant of the defendant, which is two miles from the Chañe Enamelware plant, a trouble department is maintained day and night, and a truck with two experienced linemen is kept in readiness to respond to any call, and it is a part of their duties to go to fires.

Under the fire alarm system in Chattanooga the defendant is informed of a fire at the same time that the fire company receives notice.

About eleven o’clock on the night of June 7,1928, Baldwin, a foreman at the Crane Enamelware plant, looked through a window and noticed that the two story frame building across the street was on fire. The eaves of that house were ten or twelve feet from the transmission line of the defendant, and a strong wind was blowing from the south.

Baldwin testified that after telephoning the fire department he noticed that the fire had broken through and was getting up. through the wires, and he called the trouble department of the defendant and told the operator in charge “that there was a fire across the street from *281 the Crane Enamelware Company’s plant and that their wires were in danger and that they ought to out them off.” The reply was “All right, we have got it.”

Five minutes later Leon Spears, another employee qf the Crane Enamelware Company, telephoned the trouble department of the defendant, and told them “there was a fire out there and told them where it was and I told them there was some high voltage wires that were right in the blaze and that the current should be cut off from them.” He further testified that he advised them as to “the exact location of the fire.”

The operator in charge of the trouble department of defendant testified that when he learned of the fire from the police department he immediately sent the two linemen in the truck to the fire, which was six ■ or seven minutes before he received the first of several telephone messages from Alton Park, and that, in response to those calls, he replied that the truck and mén were on the way.

After the alarm was sounded the fire truck, driven by Osborne, reached the fire in about fifteen minutes. Osborne parked the fire truck about ten or twelve feet north of a water plug located in the edge of the sidewalk, and from 120 to 160 feet east of the burning building. He had connected one hose with the fire plug and had it in use, and was on the north side of the engine connecting another hose when the high voltage wire burned in two, swung out into the street, struck the truck, and. sent a voltage of electricity into the body of Osborne, resulting in his instant death. This string of wires was directly over the fire plug, and Osborne was about the middle of the street, or fifteen feet north of said plug.

*282 There is proof that Osborne was killed thirty minutes after the fire alarm was given, or fifteen minutes after he arrived at the fire.

There is proof that the truck of the defendant, with the two linemen, did not arrive for thirty minutes after Osborne was killed. In other words, an hour intervened from the time the alarm was given until the truck and linemen of the defendant arrived.

The proof shows that the truck could be driven from the plant to the fire in from six to twelve minutes.

Following the general rule, we are stating the case from the plaintiff’s standpoint. Most of these facts were controverted by the witnesses for defendant.

In holding that these facts made a case for submission to the jury the Court of Appeals said:

“Defendant in error insisted, and its proof tended to show, that it did all that it reasonably could after notice of the fire to relieve the situation of1 the menace of its wires, but whether after such notice as was indicated was received, it could, and should, by telephone orders have shut off the current, or have adopted the mode it did to further inform itself and act, and whether such investigations as it did make were with reasonable dispatch and efficiency under the circumstances, or whether the actions it did take were such that an ordinarily prudent man would have adopted under the circumstances, were questions for the jury and not for the court. . . .
“Undoubtedly if timely informed of the character of the menace which their wires had become they owed the deceased that degree of care that any ordinarily prudent man would have used under the circumstances to relieve the situation of the particular peril of the wires, and that care, whether it was to turn off the current, or *283 to send men two miles to cut the wires, or to take less efficient means, was commensurate with the danger to be avoided, and the deceased himself was obligated to use all means that an ordinarily prudent man would have used under the circumstances to look out for his own safety. These are the principles under which this case should be tried, and under which the proof must be measured.”

Counsel for defendant in their brief say:

“We fully recognize, as we have heretofore indicated, that the defendant under the law is required to exercise the highest degree of care in the maintenance and operation of its plants and its poles and wires, particularly when constructed along public streets, and, furthermore, that this duty comprehends not only the public in general, but exists in favor of individuals lawfully and rightfully in the vicinity of the wires. ’ ’

In 9 E. G.' L., 1200, it is said:

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Bluebook (online)
12 S.W.2d 947, 158 Tenn. 278, 5 Smith & H. 278, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/osborne-v-tennessee-electric-power-co-tenn-1929.