Orzell Billingsley, Sr., C. Herbert Oliver, J. S. Phifer and Abraham Woods, Jr. v. George W. Clayton

359 F.2d 13, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6609
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 5, 1966
Docket22304_1
StatusPublished
Cited by69 cases

This text of 359 F.2d 13 (Orzell Billingsley, Sr., C. Herbert Oliver, J. S. Phifer and Abraham Woods, Jr. v. George W. Clayton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Orzell Billingsley, Sr., C. Herbert Oliver, J. S. Phifer and Abraham Woods, Jr. v. George W. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6609 (5th Cir. 1966).

Opinion

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

This is a jury exclusion case, but not one of the usual type. Most of the cases dealing with the subject arise from a conviction in a serious criminal case in which it is claimed that the constitutional rights of a Negro defendant have been infringed because Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service. This is a civil proceeding.

The Negro plaintiffs (appellants) brought this class action against the three members and the cerk of the Jefferson County, Alabama Jury Board (appellees), claiming systematic exclusion of qualified Negroes from the jury rolls of Jefferson County. 1 A preliminary injunction was sought but was denied after a hearing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, such denial being without prejudice to the right to relief on final hearing. A further hearing was held, additional findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered, and relief was denied. The trial court found the existence of a disparity between the proportion of Negroes actually serving as jurors and the proportion of Negro Residents in the County, but concluded there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of improper conduct or constitutional wrongdoing on the part of appellees.

This is one of several cases relating to the problem of discriminatory exclusion from juries recently heard by this Court en banc. Various fact situations were presented, and both State and Federal cases were involved. This case deals with a state jury selection system. Several Attorneys General of the interested states filed briefs, and the United States filed briefs in each case- as amicus curiae by invitation of the Court. 2

Before outlining the facts which were presented at the trial, it is appropriate to discuss some of the legal principles and guidelines which have been developed by the numerous cases dealing with the subject, insofar as the same relate to the issues presented by this appeal.

A just and fair trial by an unbiased, unprejudiced and impartial tribunal is one of the great American constitutional principles. There can be no “due process” or “equal protection” unless that principle remains inviolate. Brown v. State of New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175, 20 S.Ct. 77, 44 L.Ed. 119; Hayes v. State of Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71, 7 S.Ct. 350, 30 L.Ed. 578; Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 646, 6 S.Ct. 590, 29 L.Ed. 755. There is no expressed constitutional provision as to the classes of persons entitled to render jury service, but the law does require that qualified persons not be excluded from jury service on a class basis. Systematic and purposeful exclusion of *16 qualified persons cannot be reconciled with the American concept of an impartial trial. Prejudices against certain classes tend to affect the judgment of jurors and result in a denial to members of such classes the full and complete enjoyment of constitutional guarantees. Strauder v. State of West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345, 25 L.Ed. 676; Fay v. People of State of New York, supra. It makes no difference whether the exclusion is the result of administrative action or legislative enactments. Both administrative and legislative exclusion are condemned. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567. The applicable rules are aimed at eradicating bias, prejudice, unfairness and partiality.

The attack of the appellants in this case must be grounded upon proof that they and the class they represent have been the victims of improper discrimination and exclusion from jury service in the jury selection procedure. Fay v. People of State of New York, supra; Rawlins v. State of Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 26 S.Ct. 560, 50 L.Ed. 899. If their proof establishes the existence of a purposeful and substantially effective effort on the part of the appellees to deprive the appellants and members of their class of a realistic opportunity to render jury service, they are entitled to relief. 2a Brownfield v. State of South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426, 23 S.Ct. 513, 47 L.Ed. 882; Tarrance v. State of Florida, 188 U.S. 519, 23 S.Ct. 402, 47 L.Ed. 572; Bush v. Com. of Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 1 S.Ct. 625, 27 L.Ed. 354; Martin v. State of Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 L.Ed. 497; Thomas v. State of Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 29 S.Ct. 393, 53 L.Ed. 512; Akins v. State of Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 65 S.Ct. 1276, 89 L.Ed. 1692; Patton v. State of Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 68 S.Ct. 184, 92 L.Ed. 76; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469; Swain v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759.

Bias and prejudice are not easily inferred and tend to be expelled by proof of fair representation of members of the complaining class or group on the juries involved. For example, see Swain v. State of Alabama, supra; Akins v. State of Texas, supra; Thomas v. State of Texas, supra. Minimal representation of the group claimed to have been excluded from a particular jury roll in comparison with their proportion of the population is a proper element of proof, but such proof standing alone does not constitute sufficient evidence of constitutional violation if it is adequately explained and is not long continued. In the instant case the appellants allege an intention to exclude, and the burden is upon them to prove such intent; if proved, they would be entitled to relief on that ground. Brown v. Allen, supra; Smith v. State of Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592, 16 S.Ct. 900, 40 L.Ed. 1082; Tarrance v. State of Florida, supra; Fay v. People of State of New York, supra.

Notwithstanding the foregoing rules, the burden of proof is not insurmountable, though sometimes difficult. The difficulty arises out of the effort to prove sufficient facts to entitle the com *17 plaining parties to relief. 2b For this reason, litigants are permitted to establish a prima facie case by proof of the objective results of the jury selection procedure. Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074; Pierre v. State of Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757; Smith v. State of Texas, supra; Patton v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Nacarino v. Chobani, LLC
N.D. California, 2022
Redd v. Negley
785 P.2d 1098 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989)
State v. Cage
337 So. 2d 1123 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1976)
Patterson v. State
324 N.E.2d 482 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1975)
Ford v. Hollowell
385 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Mississippi, 1974)
Overton v. State
317 N.E.2d 467 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1974)
Patterson v. State
314 N.E.2d 92 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1974)
Bryant v. State
272 So. 2d 286 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 1972)
Sanders v. State
284 N.E.2d 751 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1972)
Ochoa v. Monsanto Company
335 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Texas, 1971)
Commonwealth v. Carroll
278 A.2d 898 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1971)
United States v. Oscar E. Hyde
448 F.2d 815 (Fifth Circuit, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
359 F.2d 13, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6609, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/orzell-billingsley-sr-c-herbert-oliver-j-s-phifer-and-abraham-woods-ca5-1966.