Orvis v. Hutchins

179 A.2d 470, 123 Vt. 18, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 187
CourtSupreme Court of Vermont
DecidedMarch 7, 1962
Docket41
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 179 A.2d 470 (Orvis v. Hutchins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Orvis v. Hutchins, 179 A.2d 470, 123 Vt. 18, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 187 (Vt. 1962).

Opinions

Holden, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the Commissioner of Industrial Relations. The question is whether an award for permanent partial disability arising from an injury covered by 21 V.S.A. §648 should be reduced by the indefinite and unscheduled benefits previously awarded for partial disability under 21 V.S.A. §646.

The facts of this controversy were stipulated without a hearing.

The claimant was injured on December 20, 1957, in the course of his employment by the defendant Bobbin Company. As a result of his injury he was totally disabled for a period of 70 weeks. During this time the defendant insurance company paid him compensation for temporary total disability at the agreed rate of $38.00 a week. The total amount paid in this category was $2,667.60. The total disability payments included $2.00 a week for each of four minor dependent children.

Following the period of total disability the claimant was partially disabled. By a filed agreement the defendant insurance carrier paid [20]*20compensation to the claimant for partial disability at the rate of $18.00 a week for a period of 43 weeks, a total of $774.40. It further appears in the agreed facts that the claimant’s permanent disability is established at twenty-seven and one-half per cent with benefits payable for a period of ninety and three-fourths weeks.

On the facts agreed to the commissioner reached several conclusions of law. The gist of the legal conclusions is that awards for temporary total disability, a temporary partial disability and permanent partial disability are separately compensable with the period specified for each accumulating a total of two hundred three and three-fourths weeks.

Accordingly, the order directs that the award for permanent partial disability be paid to the claimant “beginning at the end of his temporary partial disability.” The defendants’ appeal centers on this point. The defendants contend that the award for temporary partial disability should be credited against the compensation allowed for permanent disability.

The stipulated findings, legal conclusions of the commissioner and his order have been certified to this Court as provided in 21 V.S.A. §672 and Supreme Court Rule 19. The outcome involves the application of these sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

21 V.S.A. §642. Total disability, benefits — “Where the injury causes total disability for work, the employer during such disability, . . . shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly wages . . .”
21 V.S.A. §643. Period of payments — “Payments shall not continue after such disability ends, nor longer than three hundred and thirty weeks. In case the total disability begins after a period of partial disability, the period of partial disability shall be deducted from such total period of three hundred and thirty weeks.”
21 V.S.A. §646. Partial disability, benefits — -“Where the disability for work resulting from an injury is partial, the employer, during such disability and beginning on the eighth day thereof, shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to half the difference between his average weekly wage before the injury and the average weekly wage which he will probably be-able to'earn thereafter, but not more than $18.00 a week.”
[21]*2121 V.S.A. §647. Period of payment — “Payment shall not continue after such disability ends nor longer than three hundred and thirty weeks, and in case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability, the period of total disability shall be deducted from such total period of three hundred and thirty weeks.”
21 V.S.A. §648. Special benefits — “In case of the following injuries, the compensation shall be paid during total disability, as provided in sections 642 and 643 of this title, and at the termination of the total disability occasioned by such injuries the employer shall pay to the injured employee sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly wages, for the periods stated against such injuries respectively, but in no case to exceed the period of three hundred and thirty weeks, which compensation shall be in lieu of all other benefits except those provided in sections 640 and 641 of this title.”

Sections 640 and 641 relate to medical benefits. Then follow nineteen subsections constituting a list of specific injuries and the particular periods of weekly compensation prescribed for each. The claimant’s injury is not one of the particular injuries specified. However it is compensable under the provisions of subsection (20), providing “In the event an employee shall receive an injury which results in the permanent impairment of any physical function not herein specifically mentioned, the commissioner of industrial relations shall determine the percentage of loss and award compensation accordingly; . . .”

The defendants concede that payments for temporary incapacity provided in section 642 are to be computed and awarded independently of awards for permanent partial disability. However, the defendants contend that awards for temporary partial disability under section 646 are encompassed by the benefits afforded for permanent partial disability as set forth in section 648. The construction sought by the defendants would integrate the two sections relating to partial disability in such a way that payments under one would operate to satisfy in whole or in part, liability arising from the other.

In the original enactment of our Workmen’s Compensation Act in 1915, partial disability, in both its temporary and permanent sense, were combined within a single section. 1915, No. 164, §16. At the next session of the General Assembly the so-called schedule payments [22]*22for permanent partial disability were separated from the provisions concerning partial disability in general, by way of two distinct enactments. 1917, No. 174 §3; 1917, No. 175, §3. The two provisions have remained independent in arrangement since that time. This, coupled with the fact that different rates of compensation apply to temporary, as distinguished from partial, disability confirm the commissioner’s view that two distinct elements of compensation are involved.

First, there is permanent disability in the medical or physical sense resulting from the loss of a member or permanent impairment of a particular physical function. The statute recognizes this concept and expressly mentions it by way of specific benefits for scheduled injuries in 21 V.S.A. §648. The award for permanent incapacity looks to the future to compensate for the probable reduction in earning power that will attend the employee for the remainder of his working life.

The second factor in compensable disability is concerned with the immediate or present loss of wages during the period of physical recovery, whether such recovery be complete or partial. Roller v. Warren, 98 Vt. 514, 519, 129 Atl. 168. Thus there may arise four different compensable situations: (a) temporary total, (b) temporary partial, (c) permanent total, (d) permanent partial. 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, §57.31 (1952). See also, Alaska Industrial Board v. Chugach Electric Association, 356 U. S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 735, 2 L.Ed.2d, 795, 797; Gorman v.

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Orvis v. Hutchins
179 A.2d 470 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
179 A.2d 470, 123 Vt. 18, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 187, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/orvis-v-hutchins-vt-1962.