Ortiz Oil Co. v. Geyer

159 S.W.2d 494, 138 Tex. 373, 1942 Tex. LEXIS 347
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 4, 1942
DocketNo. 7693.
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 159 S.W.2d 494 (Ortiz Oil Co. v. Geyer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ortiz Oil Co. v. Geyer, 159 S.W.2d 494, 138 Tex. 373, 1942 Tex. LEXIS 347 (Tex. 1942).

Opinion

Mr. Judge Slatton

delivered the opinion of the Commission of Appeals, Section B.

This is a suit by royalty owners, against the holder of the seven-eighths working interest in a certain leasehold estate to recover the value of their part of the oil produced from the lease in excess of the amount allowed by the rules of the Railroad Commission of Texas during December, 1933, through 1934 and April, 1935. Special issues were submitted to a jury and upon the verdict judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the oil company and against the royalty owners. The aggrieved parties appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals at Texarkana. That court reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment in favor of the royalty owners. 134 S. W. (2d) 814. The Ortiz Oil Company was granted the writ of error. We summarize the evidence taken from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and the record.

The evidence shows that the oil company filed with the State Comptroller verified reports showing the amounts, of allowable oil produced from the least during the period and sold to the Century Refining Company at the market price of $1.00 per barrel, which company remitted by checks monthly to the royalty owners. The allowable oil is not in controversy in this suit. The verified reports reveal and an officer of the Ortiz Oil Company admitted, that said company during the same period produced 297,899 barrels of oil in excess of the amount allowed by the rules of the Railroad Commission.

May 2, 1934, the oil company filed its first production reports, which showed 82,352 barrels of excess oil to have been produced during December, 1933, and January, February and March, 1935. The first remittance received by the royalty owners other than checks for the allowable oil was in the form of cashier’s checks, which was mailed from Shreveport on or about March 24, 1934. No information accompanied this remittance to disclose the sender or the purpose for which the check was sent. Reports were filed by the oil company in September, October and November ■ showing the company to have produced 120,870 barrels of excess oil during July, August and September, 1934, and that the same was sold for the sum of $41,207.64. The Louisiana Brokerage Company sent checks *376 to the royalty owners on or about October 27, 1934, aggregating the sum of $1,154.19. These checks do not represent the pro rata part of the royalty owners’ share even at the price which the oil company claims to have sold the excess oil. The reports made by the oil company to- the comptroller further shows the production of 94,677 barrels of excess oil during October and December, 1934, and April 1935. The Louisiana Brokerage Company sent to the royalty owners the second check on November 20, 1934, and continued to send the small checks through January, May, June and September, 1935. The royalty owners were never furnished with any statement showing when the oil was produced or the price for which the oil was sold. The only checks received by the royalty owners which could be said to be in part payment for excess oil produced were either cashier’s checks or from the Ocean Oil Company and the Louisiana Brokerage Company. No showing is made that other companies to which the Ortiz Oil Company reported excess oil to have been sold during the period ever remitted to the royalty owners for any amount. The checks of the Louisiana Brokerage Company contained a clause reading: “This check is in full settlement of account as shown hereon. Acceptance by endorsement constitutes receipt in full.” The brokerage company accompanied the checks issued for September, October and December, 1935, with the following memorandum: “The enclosed check is in payment of your net royalty interest for oil purchased from the Tolliver lease for the (respective month).” Some of the royalty owners went to Shreveport to ascertain from the Ocean Oil Company and Louisiana Brokerage Company information concerning the early remittances which they had received. Neither company could be located. A lawyer promised to send statements showing the amount of oil sold and the price for which the oil was sold and whether the same was allowable oil, but this was not done. The checks were cashed by the royalty owners.

The oil company urges four contentions in this court, viz:

(1) That an issue of fact was presented, with respect to the amounts the royalty owners, received in part payment of the excess oil; (2) that the evidence raised an issue of fact with respect to the defense of accord and satisfaction; (3) that the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitation; and (4) that the royalty owners were entitled to recover for the cash market value of excess oil which the jury found to be fifty cents per barrel and not the market price of $1.00 per barrel which was paid for allowable oil.

*377 The suit of the royalty owners was a liquidated demand and their case was made when it was shown that the holder of the working interest in the leasehold estate had unlawfully produced oil in excess of the amounts allowed by the rules of the Railroad Commission of Texas. The verified reports showed the amount of such oil. The reports further disclosed the cash market price of allowable oil to be $1.00 per barrel during the period in review. The royalty owners admitted the receipt of checks aggregating the following amounts: Geyer, $636.39; Will Thompson, $1,175.71; Mrs. J. A. Ferguson, $949.09; Miss Augusta Nichols, $949.09, and R. G. Storey, $670.48. The checks were introduced in evidence. After these checks were introduced in evidence the following stipulation was entered into between counsel for the respective parties: “That in the event there should be a recovery and judgment entered for plaintiffs for any sum, that the amount of such judgment should bear credits for the total amounts paid to the respective plaintiffs by the Ocean Oil Company and/or Louisiana Brokerage Company as evidenced by checks in evidence and any cashier’s checks that may be hereafter produced, that were endorsed by any of the plaintiffs herein.” No issues were submitted to the jury by the trial court with respect to the amounts received by the royalty owners and none were requested by the oil company. Under these circumstances the oil company cannot complain. If there were disputed issues of fact with respect to such amounts, the oil company by its failure to request their submission waived the right to have such issues determined by the jury. Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Pepper, 134 Texas 360, 135 S. W. (2d) 79. Moreover, we are of the opinion that under the facts stated, together with the stipulation quoted, the Honorable Court of Civil Appeals correctly held that the amounts received by the royalty owners were shown without dispute in the evidence and property gave effect to the stipulation in allowing the oil company such amounts so received as credits upon the judgment rendered against the oil company.

The defense of accord and satisfaction cannot be sustained under the record in this case.

“An accord is in essence a contract or agreement, and accord and satisfaction is founded and dependent on, and results from a contract, express or implied, between the parties.” 1 C. J. S., Sec. 3, p. 468.

*378 It cannot'be contended that an express agreement is shown by the evidence.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

DeNucci v. Matthews
463 S.W.3d 200 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2015)
Milton M. Cooke Co. v. First Bank and Trust
290 S.W.3d 297 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy Co.
23 S.W.3d 372 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Dorchester Gas Producing Co. v. Harlow Corp.
743 S.W.2d 243 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1987)
Clem G. Flowers v. Diamond Shamrock Corporation
693 F.2d 1146 (Fifth Circuit, 1983)
Miranda v. Joe Myers Ford, Inc.
638 S.W.2d 36 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1982)
Harris v. Rowe
593 S.W.2d 303 (Texas Supreme Court, 1979)
Wronski v. Sun Oil Company
279 N.W.2d 564 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1979)
Bolton v. Coats
533 S.W.2d 914 (Texas Supreme Court, 1975)
General American Life Insurance Co. v. Valley Feed Mills, Inc.
458 S.W.2d 860 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1970)
Shell Oil Company v. State
442 S.W.2d 457 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1969)
Reeves v. Hall
437 S.W.2d 424 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1969)
French v. Bank of Southwest Nat. Ass'n, Houston
422 S.W.2d 1 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1967)
Industrial Life Insurance Company v. Finley
382 S.W.2d 100 (Texas Supreme Court, 1964)
Burgamy v. Davis
313 S.W.2d 365 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1958)
Stewart v. Friona State Bank
278 S.W.2d 425 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1955)
Bell v. Biffle
244 S.W.2d 675 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1951)
Jordan v. Collier
223 S.W.2d 544 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1949)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
159 S.W.2d 494, 138 Tex. 373, 1942 Tex. LEXIS 347, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ortiz-oil-co-v-geyer-tex-1942.