Ormsby v. Ratcliffe

1 S.W.2d 1084, 117 Tex. 242, 1928 Tex. LEXIS 61
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 11, 1928
DocketApplication No. 15673.
StatusPublished
Cited by368 cases

This text of 1 S.W.2d 1084 (Ormsby v. Ratcliffe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ormsby v. Ratcliffe, 1 S.W.2d 1084, 117 Tex. 242, 1928 Tex. LEXIS 61 (Tex. 1928).

Opinion

Mr. Justice PIERSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause is pending in this court on application for writ of error to the Honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Eleventh District.

The Honorable Court of Civil Appeals rendered a correct judgment in the case, and the application for writ of error should be refused. However, it is deemed advisable to write upon one issue in the case, inasmuch as there seems to be considerable confusion in *243 the Courts of Civil Appeals and among some very able lawyers of the State in relation to a certain rule of practice and the construction of Art. 2190 of the Revised Statutes of the State.

The following from the last page of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals will be a sufficient statement of the case for the purposes of this opinion:

“As the record comes before us the court submitted to the jury five special issues. The only two of these answered by the jury were at most mere evidentiary facts and not ultimate issues of fact. The other issues submitted were upon a defense pleaded by the defendant, and were, in fact, real issues raised by the pleadings and evidence. On these issues the jury presumably was unable to agree, for no answers were made thereto. The record does not disclose a request on the part of the defendants in error for the submission of other issues to the jury. It is well established by decisions of our courts that- where the court fails to submit a ground of recovery pleaded by plaintiff or a special defense pleaded by the defendant and there is no request to submit the issue or issues omitted, such issue or issues are thereby waived. Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Havron, 277 S. W., 742, and authorities there cited.

“As this case was submitted to the jury all special defenses were waived, except the defense covered by special issues Nos. 3, 4, and 5. The jury being unable to agree on these material issues, there was a mistrial of the case. The trial court did not have the power to substitute its findings, where none were made by the jury, upon an independent ground of defense which the party alleging did not urge.

“When a case is submitted to a jury, and the jury is unable to answer the material issues submitted, it is error for the trial court to dismiss the case on a ground which has been waived by the defendant. The judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the cause remanded.”

Art. 2190, Revised Statutes, 1925, in part reads as follows:

“Upon appeal or writ of error, an issue not submitted and not requested is deemed as found by the court in such manner as to support the judgment if there is evidence to sustain such finding.”

In this case, and in a number of other cases, it is insisted and has been urged that the provision of the statute wherein it is provided that “an issue not submitted and not requested is deemed as found by the court in such manner as to support the judgment if there is evidence to sustain such finding,” includes and applies to all un *244 submitted issues in a case, and that such an issue is not waived, and can not be waived, by a mere failure to request its submission.

It has been held in a number of well considered cases, and we think correctly so, that the above quoted provision of the statute does not apply to issues in the case which are independent causes of action in themselves or controlling and independent grounds of recovery, or independent grounds of defense, but that it applies only to such omitted issues as are in accord with and supplemental or incidental to, and which support,- the issues of fact which were submitted and found by the jury, and upon which the judgment is based. It will be observed that the statute provides that such an issue not submitted and not requested is deemed “as found by the court in such manner as to support the judgment,” but it does not provide that such omitted issue or finding shall in itself form the basis for the judgment as an independent ground of recovery, but only in support of the judgment properly found and based on a recoverable ground. The language used clearly implies that such unsubmitted and unrequested issues could not form ail independent and original basis for the judgment, but only shall be found in such manner as to support the judgment. That this is the proper construction and meaning of Art. 2190 is made clear also by the provisions of Arts. 2185, 2186, and the first part of Art. 2190 quoted above..

Art.. 2185 provides:

“The charge shall be in writing, signed by the judge, filed with the clerk, and shall be a part of the record of the cause. It shall be prepared after the evidence has been concluded and shall be submitted to the respective parties or their attorneys for inspection, and a reasonable time given them in which to examine and present objections thereto, which objections shall in every instance be presented to the court before the charge is read to the jury and all objections not so made and presented shall be considered as waived. * * *”

Art. 2186 provides:

“Either party may present to the judge such written instructions as he desires to be given to the jury. * * *”

The first part of Art. 2190 provides:,

“Failure to submit an issue shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment, unless a submission has been requested in writing by the party complaining of the judgment.”

And these words are immediately followed by that part of Art. 2190 which provides:

*245 “An issue not submitted and not requested is deemed as found by the court in such manner as to support the judgment if there is evidence to sustain such finding.”

We think there is no inconsistency with these different provisions of statutory law, and that the construction we are giving them is in thorough harmony and in keeping with our system of practice in regulating and controlling the trial of cases. In administering justice under our rules of procedure it is necessary that issues be brought and presented to the jury in such a way as a clear and final finding by it may be had sufficient to a rendition of a judgment in the case. The construction contended for would put this statute entirely out of harmony with other provisions, and would not only make uncertain jury trials, but in many instances be a denial of a trial by a jury, and would open the way for surprise holdings and results not contemplated by the parties. Independent grounds of recovery, or grounds of defense wholly neglected and ignored by the parties to the suit themselves, would be made the basis for judgment in the face of the issues submitted, and regardless of the findings by the jury, and, too, upon issues which under reason and the statutes above quoted should be held to have been waived. Can it be said that the Legislature in enacting Art. 2190 (Art. 1985, R. S., 1911) intended to provide in a suit submitted on special issues that a party can abandon or waive an unsubmitted issue only by an overt act or declaration indicating such an intention ? We think not.

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Bluebook (online)
1 S.W.2d 1084, 117 Tex. 242, 1928 Tex. LEXIS 61, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ormsby-v-ratcliffe-tex-1928.