Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc. v. Sixteen to One Mining Corp. (In Re Sixteen to One Mining Corp.)

9 B.R. 636, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4911
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nevada
DecidedFebruary 12, 1981
Docket19-10469
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 9 B.R. 636 (Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc. v. Sixteen to One Mining Corp. (In Re Sixteen to One Mining Corp.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc. v. Sixteen to One Mining Corp. (In Re Sixteen to One Mining Corp.), 9 B.R. 636, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4911 (Nev. 1981).

Opinion

OPINION AND DECISION

BERT M. GOLDWATER, Bankruptcy Judge.

This is an action by a lessor to have a mining lease declared terminated and not property of the estate of a Chapter 11 debt- or. Notice of termination was given by the lessor after the filing of the case for failure to operate the mine both before and after filing for reorganization.

The plaintiff as lessor entered into a mining lease with one Sapp in October 1974, which lease was thereafter assigned with consent of the lessor to debtor defendant. On December 7, 1979, a creditors’ involuntary petition under Chapter 11 was filed which resulted in an order for relief on January 14, 1980.

The plaintiff lessor gave debtor notice of default on January 16, 1980 (Exhibit M) with declaration that it would exercise its option to terminate in 30 days unless the defaults alleged were cured. On April 8, 1980, lessor gave notice that the lease was terminated. 1

The plaintiff relies upon breach of paragraph 4 of the lease relative to operation of the mine. 2 The defendant defends that the *638 “rent” has been paid by payment of $25,000 per year minimum royalty as provided in paragraph 6 of the lease on December 31, 1978 and again on December 31, 1979; that acceptance of such payments constitute a waiver of any default as to operation under paragraph 4; that the mine could not operate because a trustee appointed by the Chapter 11 Court refused to allow the debt- or to operate; that there is a mill now on the premises capable of handling 225 tons per day and is ready to proceed; that a plan can be presented and the lease performed; that if debtor is in default it is entitled in a plan to accept the lease and cure all defaults [11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)],

Plaintiff has not requested relief from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 and gave notice of default and notice of termination without regard to the automatic stay. The plaintiff’s theory is that either (a) the lease is not property of the estate since the termination or (b) the lessor is entitled to possession because the lessor does not have adequate protection and, the lease having been terminated, the lessee has no equity and is thus not entitled to use the lease in reorganization.

Primarily, when this case was filed on December 7, 1979 an estate was created (11 U.S.C. § 541) and the estate included the debtor’s interest in the lease. At that time the lease had not been terminated.

Secondly, the automatic stay of Section 362 prevents any act to obtain possession of the property of the estate. [11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)] Does this include the giving of notices of default? The answer is that so long as there is no attempt to obtain possession a notice may be given to alert a debtor lessee of breach of the terms of a lease. A landlord is entitled to put a lessee on notice of where and when the lessee is failing in performance. Otherwise there may be no knowledge of the default which the landlord expects to be cured in the event of assumption of the lease. The giving of a notice in January 1980 that there was a default and describing it is only valid for what it is — notice. The landlord cannot obtain possession without an order of the Court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), or by abandonment, rejection of the lease or stipulation. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) and (d)(2). The notice in April 1980 from the landlord attempting to terminate the lease and thereby obtain possession is a nullity.

Paragraph 6 of the lease providing for lease payments states in part:

“6. CONSIDERATION: LESSEES RECORDS:

(A) LESSEE shall pay to “OWNER”, as rent and royalty for the use and depletion of the claim and the removal of ore from the claim, the sum of 10% of the gross value of said gold, silver and platinum ores sold, minted, smelted or milled, after deducting therefrom any mint charges or smelter and/or refining costs, together with any State or Federal charges, commissions or taxes, now or hereafter imposed by Federal or State Government Authorities of the United States. The “OWNER” reserves the right to receive production in kind in accordance with the above royalty schedule.
*639 (B) Minimum royalties payable under this lease are $25,000.00 per calendar year starting with calendar year 1978.
As provided for, minimum royalties are due and payable by LESSEE to “OWNER” as follows: $25,000.00 on or before December 31, 1978 and $25,000.00 on or before December 31 of each calendar year while this lease is in full force and effect.
If LESSEE defaults in making said minimum royalty payments in any calendar year, OWNER shall give to LESSEE notice to cure said default within sixty (60) days. If LESSEE fails to cure default during this grace period, OWNER may terminate this lease at its option on thirty (30) days notice in writing, in such event at the expiration of said thirty (30) day notice period, this lease shall be deemed terminated and all rights of LESSEE hereunder shall forthwith cease.” The issues are as follows:

1. Was there a prepetition default and a post petition default as to performance by operation of the mine under paragraph 4 of the lease?

2. Was such operational performance default cured by the landlord’s acceptance of the $25,000 minimum annual royalty for 1978 and 1979?

3. Was acceptance of royalty payment in 1978 and 1979 by the landlord a permanent waiver of the requirements of paragraph 4 of the lease?

4. In any event can paragraph 4 be construed as so ambiguous as to make performance impossible?

5. If there has been a default, may the defendant debtor cure that default?

6. Does the lessor have adequate protection until the time for a plan and the acceptance or rejection of the lease?

7. What equity does debtor have in the lease property?

8. Is the lease necessary for an effective reorganization?

The answer to those issues is that:

1. Paragraph 4 of the lease calls for mining operations. There can be no question that there was a failure to conduct mining operations both before and after the filing of this case.

2. Mining leases are a different kind of property lease although the rules governing ordinary leases apply to private mineral leases. In the latter the lessor is primarily interested in the removal of minerals while in the ordinary lease the lessor is chiefly interested in the rent. See 44 Cal.Jur.3d, § 95, p. 455.

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Bluebook (online)
9 B.R. 636, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4911, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/original-sixteen-to-one-mine-inc-v-sixteen-to-one-mining-corp-in-re-nvb-1981.