Ori Group, L.L.C. v. Nicols

2025 Ohio 5222

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: 114641
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Ori Group, L.L.C. v. Nicols, 2025-Ohio-5222.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ORI GROUP LLC, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 114641 v. :

JAY NICOLS, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 20, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court Housing Division Case No. 2024-CVG-013349

Appearances:

Lieberman, Dvorin & Dowd, LLC, David M. Dvorin, and Richard A. Teel, for appellant.

Jay Nicols, pro se.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

Plaintiff-appellant Ori Group LLC (“Ori”) appeals the judgment of the

Cleveland Municipal Court, Housing Division, dismissing without prejudice Ori’s

first cause of action in a forcible-entry-and-detainer action governed by R.C. Ch. 1923 for failure to file documentary evidence of rental registration as required by

Cleveland M.C., Hous.Div., Section 3(B)(4)(a), eff. Feb. 1, 2024 (“Section

3(B)(4)(a)”), cited by the trial court and appellant as HCLR 3.014, and formerly

Cleveland M.C. Hous.Div. Loc.R. 3.014 (“Loc.R. 3.014”).

We find that Section 3(B)(4)(a) is invalid in a forcible-entry-and

detainer action and reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the

trial court to grant the forcible-entry-and-detainer claim within 30 days of this

court’s judgment.

I. Background and Pertinent Facts

Ori owns the residential real property located at 17105 Lotus Drive in

Cleveland, Ohio (the “Premises”) occupied by appellee Jay Nicols (“Nicols”) on a

month-to-month tenancy basis.

On June 10, 2024, Ori served a notice of termination of tenancy

effective July 31, 2024, and on August 6, 2024, Nicols was served with a three-day

notice to vacate the Premises for “Lease Termination/Tenant Holding Over.” No

rent was accepted by Ori after the three-day notice was served.

On October 10, 2024, Ori filed a complaint for forcible entry and

detainer to terminate the tenancy and receive restitution of the Premises.

On October 31, 2024, the first cause of action hearing was held to

determine the right to possession of the Premises. Ori appeared represented by

counsel. Appellee failed to appear. At the conclusion of testimony by Ori’s property managers in support

of the first cause, a dialogue ensued between the magistrate and counsel regarding

Ori’s failure to provide evidence of a rental registration certificate or a receipt for the

rental registration of the Premises under Section 3(B)(4)(a).

COURT: . . . A rental registration certificate or receipt is not being provided?

COUNSEL: Correct. It’s Plaintiff’s position that it’s invalid and contradicts Chapter 1923 of the Revised Code [that governs forcible- entry-and-detainer actions].

COURT: All right. Now, we’ll just put on the record that our position is that City of Cleveland requires owners to register and pay registration fees for each of their properties. And while we understand that part of the lead safe certification [sic], there is a requirement to certify occupancy, but that’s not what we’re asking for. We’re just requesting proof that the registration fee was paid. So with that being said, I’m going to take this case. Heard and submitted.

(Emphasis added.) Tr. 9.

Sua sponte, on November 4, 2024, a magistrate’s order was filed

granting Ori “[l]eave to file [a] Rental Registration Certificate or proof of payment

for such until 11/7/24. Case is taken Heard [and] Submitted.”

The November 12, 2024, magistrate’s decision filed on November 15,

2024, provided:

On October 31, 2024, a virtual hearing was held before [a magistrate], to whom it was assigned by [the trial court] pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 53, to take evidence on all issues of law and fact regarding Plaintiff’s first cause hearing. Present for Plaintiff were [property managers], with [appellant’s counsel]. Defendant failed to appear. Testimony was taken and the only finding that was not in favor of Plaintiff was that Plaintiff has not provided documentary evidence of rental registration per [Section 3(B)(4)(a)]. As a result, the case was taken heard and submitted and Plaintiff was given unsolicited leave until November 7, 2024 to file the Rental Registration Certificate of proof of payment for such.

Upon review of the docket, Plaintiff has failed to file any supplemental documents since the October 31, 2024, hearing date. Based upon the foregoing, the Magistrate recommends the following: 1st Cause dismissed by or by order of the Court, without prejudice.

(Emphasis added.)

The same date, the trial court approved and confirmed the

magistrate’s decision. Ori “has failed to file documentary evidence of rental

registration as required by [Section 3(B)(4)(a)]. The First Cause is dismissed by

order of the Court without prejudice.”

Ori appeals. On June 11, 2025, this court granted Ori’s unopposed

motion for leave to file a supplemental brief advancing that the issue on appeal is

not rendered moot in the event Nicols has vacated the Premises.

II. Final Appealable Order

“The jurisdiction of an appellate court to review a trial court’s decision

is limited to final appealable orders.” Hrina v. Martin, L.P., 2025-Ohio-549, ¶ 11

(8th Dist.), citing Rae-Ann Suburban, Inc. v. Wolfe, 2019-Ohio-1451, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.),

citing Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(2); R.C. 2505.02 and 2505.03. “A reviewing court

must examine, sua sponte, potential deficiencies in jurisdiction.” Id., citing id.

Generally, “a dismissal without prejudice is not a final order capable

of invoking appellate jurisdiction under R.C. 2505.02.” State ex rel. Rosolowski v.

Scott, 2024-Ohio-2074, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing Crown Servs. v. Miami Valley Paper

Tube Co., 2020-Ohio-4409. This, however, is not always the case. The appellate court determines whether an order is appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Id. at ¶ 10,

citing State ex rel. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of

Common Pleas, 2011-Ohio-626, ¶ 16, quoting In re S.J., 2005-Ohio-3215, ¶ 10

(“‘[T]he determination as to the appropriateness of an appeal lies solely with the

appellate court . . . .’”).

In Shaker House LLC v. Daniel, 2022-Ohio-2778 (8th Dist.), an

appeal was taken from an order dismissing a forcible-entry-and-detainer action

without prejudice after the plaintiff owner failed to provide a certification that the

leased premises were lead free as required by local rule of court Mun. Ct. R. Prac. &

P. 3.015. Id. at ¶ 11. Shaker House had complied with all requirements of R.C. Ch.

1923.

On appeal, this court sua sponte ordered that the parties address

whether the appeal should be dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. State

ex rel. Rosolowski v. Scott, 2024-Ohio-2074, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Shaker House

LLC, motion No. 551864 (Jan. 13, 2022). The appellee did not respond.

This court held:

Based on the appellant’s show cause brief, the appeal shall proceed forward. Although the appellant could refile the eviction action it would first have to obtain the lead-safe certificate that it claims is an invalid requirement. The appellant would have no recourse to determine whether Housing Court Local Rule 3.015, which imposes the certificate requirement, is enforceable when there is a statutory right to evict. Additionally, the second cause of action for money damages has been dismissed and eviction orders have been found to be final orders even when the claim for money damages remains pending. See Bryan v. Johnston, 7th Dist. Carrol No. 11 CA871, 2012-Ohio-2703, ¶ 5. (Emphasis added.) Id., quoting id., motion No. 552289 (Feb. 3, 2022).

This court adopts the rationale espoused in Shaker House LLC and

finds that the appeal presents a final appealable order and shall proceed as to

Section 3(B)(4)(a) because the parties are similarly positioned. Though Ori could

refile the eviction, Ori would have no recourse to have a court determine whether

the local rule is enforceable when there is a statutory right to evict.

III. Mootness

This court granted Ori’s motion for leave to supplement its appellate

brief pursuant to App.R. 14(B) to address the issue of mootness. Ori contends that

the issue on appeal is not rendered moot if Nicols vacates the Premises because

exceptions apply.

“Under the mootness doctrine, American courts will not decide cases

in which there is no longer an actual legal controversy between the parties.” Cyran

v. Cyran, 2018-Ohio-24, ¶ 9, citing In re A.G., 2014-Ohio-2597, ¶ 37. “Thus, when

parties ‘lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,’ a case becomes moot.” Id.,

quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).

“Mootness is a question of justiciability, and ‘[j]urisdiction and

justiciability are threshold considerations in every case, without exception.’” Saqr

v. Naji, 2017-Ohio-8142, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.), quoting Barrow v. New Miami, 2016-

Ohio-340, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). “[A] court cannot entertain jurisdiction over a moot

question. It is not the duty of the court to decide purely academic or abstract

questions.” Cleveland v. K.O. Drugs Boxing Acad., 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5436, *5 (Nov. 19, 1998); James A. Keller, Inc. v. Flaherty, 74 Ohio App.3d 788, 791 (10th

Dist. 1991).

“Once possession of the property has been restored to the landowner

in a forcible entry and detainer action, the action becomes moot because ‘no further

relief can be granted to the landowner.’” Amujiogu v. Oko, 2022-Ohio-1323, ¶ 5 (8th

Dist.), quoting Knop v. Davet, 2017-Ohio-1416, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.). If the defendant

vacates the premises and possession is restored to the plaintiff, immediate

possession is no longer an issue. For that reason, “continuation of the forcible entry

and detainer action or an appeal of such action is unnecessary, because there is no

further relief that may be granted.” Id., citing Kimberly Office Park, LLC v.

Williams, 2015-Ohio-5002, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.).

Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, “such as

when issues are ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting State

ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Donaldson, 63 Ohio St.3d 173, 175 (1992).

This exception applies only in exceptional circumstances where two factors are

present: “(1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated

before its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the

same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.’” Id., quoting State

ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 231 (2000); State ex rel.

White v. Kilbane Koch, 2002-Ohio-4848, ¶ 13.

“An appellant must establish more than a theoretical possibility that

the same action will arise again.” Olentangy Commons Owner LLC v. Fawley, 2023-Ohio-4039, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), citing Grandview Hts. v. B.S.H., 2023-Ohio-940,

¶ 14 (10th Dist.); Croce v. Ohio State Univ., 2021-Ohio-2242, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.).

There must be a “demonstrated probability” or “reasonable expectation” that the

situation “will recur involving the same complaining party.” Id., citing B.S.H. at

¶ 14; Croce at ¶ 23.

“The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized two other exceptions to

the mootness doctrine: (1) when the issue involves ‘a matter of great public interest,’

or (2) when ‘there remains a debatable constitutional question to resolve.’”

Amujiogu at ¶ 7, quoting Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St.3d 28

(1987), paragraph one of the syllabus.

Ori first offers that the instant case poses a situation that is capable

of repetition but evades review. Ori contends that dismissal based on mootness

would subject Ori and others to enforcement of Section 3(B)(4)(a) though it is

contrary to law because of its infringement on a landlord’s rights provided by the

summary procedures set forth under R.C. Ch. 1923.

Ori asserts that a landlord will suffer further delays by being required

to refile the action or file an appeal. The forcible entry and detainer summary

process is, and is designed to be, “too short in duration to be fully litigated before its

cessation or expiration,” and “there is a reasonable expectation that the same

complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Robinson v. Indus.

Comm., 2005-Ohio-2290, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Calvary, 89 Ohio St.3d

at 231; Amujiogu, 2022-Ohio-1323, at ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). In Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778, this court reversed and

remanded the action to the housing court to grant the writ of restitution within 30

days of the appellate judgment, but the court did not comply. On September 16,

2022, Shaker House LLC commenced a mandamus action in State ex rel. Shaker

House LLC v. Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111952, to compel issuance of the writ.

Thus, Shaker House LLC was forced to file an appeal and writ action to exercise its

summary process rights under R.C. Ch. 1923.

In State ex rel. Shaker Hts. Apts. Owner, LLC v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-

2589 (8th Dist.), the relator sought via procedendo and mandamus actions to

compel the respondents to issue a decision in the underlying eviction action, Shaker

Hts. Apts. Owner, LLC v. Granberry, Cleveland M.C. No. 2023-CVG-002960, as

well as to issue decisions in all such cases in a timely manner. The relator also sought

to compel the respondents to require defendants in forcible-entry-and-detainer

actions to post bond under R.C. 1923.08 when a continuance is granted in excess of

eight days.

On the question of mootness in Shaker Hts. Apts. Owner, this court

recounted multiple cases where landlords brought complaints for mandamus and

procedendo orders against the housing court to have writs of restitution issued

where the landlords had presented sufficient evidence of compliance with R.C. Ch.

1923.1 Id. at ¶ 3-8. References included Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778,

1“When deciding questions of mootness, a court is not limited only to the complaint and may consider other evidence, including extrinsic evidence.” State ex rel. AIY Props., Inc. v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-3484, ¶ 8, fn.1 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Evans discussed herein finding that Mun. Ct. R. Prac. & P. 3.015 was invalid. Also

referenced was State ex rel. Shaker Hts. Apts. Owner, LLC v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-1901

(8th Dist.), where “the respondent judge had issued stays in 28 underlying forcible

entry and detainer cases on the grounds of unclean hands.” Id. at ¶ 7.

Pending in the Cleveland Municipal Court was Cleveland v. Shaker Hts. Apartments Owner, LLC, Cleveland M.C. No. 2022CRB005101, a first-degree misdemeanor for failure to comply with an order of the Cleveland Building Department. Judge Scott had issued an order in each of the 28 subject cases, staying the eviction hearings until resolution of the pending criminal case because of the equitable doctrine of clean hands.

Id. at ¶ 1.

Thus, this court granted the writs in those cases and denied the

requests of respondents to dismiss on the grounds of mootness. “So too in the

present case, this court’s own docket evidences a pattern of delay in forcible entry

and detainer cases that thwarts the purpose of R.C. Ch. 1923.” Shaker Hts. Apts.

Owner, LLC, 2023-Ohio-2589, at ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). “The repetition of cases before

this court convinces it that applying the principle of ‘capable of repetition, yet

evading review’ is appropriate in this matter and considering the underlying issue

of delay in forcible entry and detainer actions.” Id.2

v. Mohr, 2018-Ohio-5089, ¶ 5. AIY involved writs of mandamus and procedendo addressing several issues surrounding the housing court’s delays in granting evictions, including writs relating to the impediments to R.C. Ch. 1923 posed by provisions of Mun. Ct. R. Prac. & P. 3. This court declined to address the validity of the provisions in a mandamus action where AIY was essentially seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the rules. AIY at ¶ 18-19.

2 See also State ex rel. Cleveland 2, LLC, 2023-Ohio-3066 (8th Dist.), issuing

peremptory writs of mandamus and procedendo and ordering respondents to proceed to Due to the pattern of delays in forcible-entry-and-detainer cases over

the past several years and the fact that Loc.R. 3.014 and subsequently Section

3(B)(4)(a) is still in effect, we find that the exception to mootness for issues that are

“capable of repetition, yet evading review has been met” as: (1) the challenged action

is too short in its duration to be fully litigated before its cessation or expiration, and

(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject

to the same action again. Amujiogu, 2022-Ohio-1323, at ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).

Ori also argues that the appeal meets the exception concerning

matters of great public or general interest.

[Section 3(B)(4)(a)] improperly seeks to enforce Cleveland Codified Ordinances (“CCO”) Sections 365.02 and 365.04 in forcible entry and detainer actions. Continued enforcement of [Section 3(B)(4)(a)] subjects all landlords to additional elements to bring eviction actions which are not required by R.C. 1923.01, et seq., exceeding the Housing Court’s authority under Civ.R. 83, and which abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right in violation with Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution. As such, the enforceability of [Section 3(B)(4)(a)] is of grave importance to the general public, and the mootness doctrine should permit the appeal to proceed even if Appellee vacates the subject Premises.

Supplemental Brief p. 3.

This court’s determination that the capable of repetition exception

applies in this case renders the second exception posed moot as the issues cited in

Ori’s general public interest argument are addressed within the analysis of the first

exception. “‘American courts will not decide cases in which there is no longer an

judgment without delay in all pending forcible-entry-and-detainer cases because the underlying cases had proceeded to judgment. Id. at ¶ 4. actual legal controversy between the parties.’” Cyran, 2018-Ohio-24, at ¶ 9, quoting

In re A.G., 2014-Ohio-2597, at ¶ 37.

IV. Assignment of Error

Ori assigns a single error on appeal: The trial court committed

prejudicial error in dismissing Appellant’s complaint in forcible entry and detainer

and denying Appellant a writ of restitution to retain possession of the Premises.

Appellee Nicols did not appear in the trial court nor file a responsive

brief in this case. Generally, when an appellee fails to file responsive briefs, “this

‘court may accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues as correct and

reverse judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain such an action.’”

Smallwood v. Shiflet, 2016-Ohio-7887, ¶ 8, fn. 1 (8th Dist.), quoting App.R. 18(C).

However,

App.R. 18(C) does not impose a form of appellate default judgment where the court of appeals can reverse solely because the appellee failed to file a brief. Reversal is warranted only if the arguments in the appellant’s brief reasonably appear to support a reversal.

In re S.M.T., 2012-Ohio-1745, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.).

In the interest of justice, we have reviewed the record in this case and

issue an opinion.

A. Standard of Review

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Ceccarelli

v. Levin, 2010-Ohio-5681, ¶ 8. “‘No court—not a trial court, not an appellate court,

nor even a supreme court—has the authority, within its discretion, to commit an

error of law.’” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 38, quoting State v. Boles, 2010-Ohio-278, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). “This should be axiomatic: a court does not have

discretion to misapply the law. A court has discretion to settle factual disputes or to

manage its docket, for example, but it does not have discretion to apply the law

incorrectly.” Id. That is why courts apply a de novo standard when reviewing issues

of law. Id., citing Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 2010-Ohio-4505, ¶ 30.

B. Discussion

Ori contends that Section 3(B)(4)(a) is contrary to law and invalid

because it conflicts with the purpose of the forcible entry and detainer statutes under

R.C. Ch. 1923 and with this court’s holding in Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778.

This court agrees.

Both the instant case and Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778, (8th

Dist.), involve Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances (“C.C.O.”) Chapter 365 entitled

“Rental Registration and Lead-Safe Certification.” The instant case involves the

rental registration certificate required by C.C.O. 365.02 and Section 3(B)(4)(a).

Shaker House LLC involved the trial court’s dismissal of the landlord’s complaint

for forcible entry and detainer against defendant-appellee Daniel for failing to

comply with Mun. Ct. R. Prac. & P. 3.015 that required a landlord to obtain a lead-

safe compliance certification pursuant to C.C.O. 365.04 as a condition precedent to

obtaining an eviction.3 The trial court dismissed Shaker House LLC’s complaint for

3 Daniel did not file a responsive brief but Amici Curiae filed a merit brief in

support of Daniel. The Amici was comprised of Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, Enterprise Community Partners, Environmental Health Watch, Schubert Center for Child Studies of Case Western Reserve University, the George Gund Foundation, United Way of Greater failure to comply with Mun. Ct. R. Prac. & P. 3.015 though the landlord established

compliance with R.C. Ch. 1923. This court reversed the trial court’s judgment.

The purpose of R.C. Ch. 1923 governing forcible-entry-and-detainer

actions “‘“is to provide a summary, extraordinary, and speedy method for the

recovery of possession of real estate in the cases especially enumerated by statute.”’”

Shaker House LLC at ¶ 12, quoting Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson, 67

Ohio St.2d 129, 131 (1981), quoting 24 Ohio Jur.2d, Forcible Entry and Detainer,

§ 2., at 455.

The local rule “effectively adds an additional element to an eviction

cause of action that is not required by the eviction statutes.” Id. at ¶ 15. “Courts may

not add or delete elements to statutory claims by judicial fiat.” Id., citing Hulsmeyer

v. Hospice of S.W. Ohio, Inc., 2014-Ohio-5511, ¶ 26, In re Application of Columbus

S. Power Co., 2014-Ohio-462, ¶ 26 (“The court must give effect to the words used,

making neither additions nor deletions from words chosen by the General

Assembly.”).

Given the summary nature of the forcible entry and detainer process,

“‘“the drafters of the Rules of Civil Procedure were careful to avoid encrusting this

special remedy with time consuming procedure tending to destroy its efficacy.”’”

Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778, at ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting Miele v. Ribovich,

90 Ohio St.3d 439, 441 (2000), quoting Jackson at 131. Thus, this court determined

Cleveland, the Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio, LLC, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, Advocates for Basic Legal Equity, Inc., and the Ohio Poverty Law Center, LLC. that Mun. Ct. R. Prac. & P. 3.015 impeded the purpose and policy of R.C. Ch. 1923.

Id. at ¶ 15.

Also indicative of the Ohio Supreme Court’s recognition of the

summary nature of the process, Ohio Civ.R. 1(C) excepts “forcible entry and

detainer” and several other actions from application of the civil rules, “to the extent

that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable . . . .” Id. For that reason,

“‘when the operation of a local court rule and an Ohio Civil Rule conflict, the local

rule must give way to the operation of the Civil Rule.’” Colosimo v. Kane, 2015-

Ohio-3337, ¶ 42, (8th Dist.), quoting Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters v. Aetna

Cas. & Sur. Co, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3324 *45 (6th Dist. June 30, 1993).

This court concluded in Shaker House LLC that the trial court’s

dismissal of the complaint for the failure to comply with Mun. Ct. R. Prac. & P. 3.015

“effectively adds an additional element to an eviction cause of action that is not

required by the eviction statutes.” Id. at ¶ 15.

In the instant case addressing Section 3(B)(4)(a), Section 3 is entitled

“Civil Rules.” Section 3(B) is entitled “Documents to be filed with Complaint” and

directs that a plaintiff provide evidence of (1) the status of domestic, foreign and

fictitious entities, (2) current ownership, and (3) certification regarding criminal

housing cases involving the plaintiff. Section 3(B)(4)(a) provides:

4. Evidence of Current Cleveland Residential Rental Registration Status.

a. Complaints in eviction must include, at the time of filing, documentary evidence from the City of Cleveland Department of Building and Housing verifying the active registration of the premises with the City’s Rental Registration Program, or an exemption thereto. See C.C.O. Chapter 365.

(Emphasis added.) Id. Section 3(B)(5) adds as to all of the documents listed that

the “[f]ailure to include sufficient documentation may result in sanctions, up to the

dismissal of the complaint without prejudice.”

The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision that stated,

“[t]estimony was taken and the only finding that was not in favor of Plaintiff was

that Plaintiff has not provided documentary evidence of rental registration per

[Section 3(B)(4)(a)].” Thus, there is no dispute that Ori fully complied with the

requirements of R.C. Ch. 1923 and was entitled to restitution of the premises but for

the failure to provide evidence supporting registration under Section 3(B)(4)(a).

This is true though R.C. 1923.09(A) provides that “‘the judge shall render a general

judgment against the defendant, in favor of the plaintiff, for restitution and costs of

suit’” “‘[i]f the judge finds the complaint to be true.’” (Emphasis added.) Shaker

House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778, at ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), quoting id.

Ori further argues and case law supports that Section 3(B)(4)(a) is

invalid because it violates Ohio Const. art., IV, § 5(B) that provides the Ohio

Supreme Court may “‘prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts

of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive

right.’” (Emphasis in original.) Shaker House LLC at ¶ 19, quoting id., R.C. Ch.

1923. A “substantive” law is “‘that body of law which creates, defines and

regulates the rights of the parties.’” Id. at ¶ 21, quoting Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St.2d

132, 145 (1972). The local rule conflicts with the substantive rights of the landlord

under R.C. Ch. 1923. The article further states that “‘[c]ourts may adopt additional

rules concerning local practice in their respective courts which are not inconsistent

with the rules promulgated by the supreme court.’” Id.

Similarly noted in Shaker House LLC, and applicable here, Civ.R. 83

provides that a local court may adopt “‘rules of practice which shall not be

inconsistent with these rules or with other rules promulgated by the Supreme

Court[.]’” Id. at ¶ 19. (Emphasis in original.) Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778,

at ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). Consequently, the housing court is authorized to adopt local rules

of practice that are consistent with the rules promulgated by the Ohio Supreme

Court, which “‘shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.’” Id.,

quoting Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B). See also Ohio Civ.R. 1(A) that states the Ohio

Civil Rules “prescribe the procedure to be followed in all courts of this state in the

exercise of civil jurisdiction at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in division

(C) of this rule.” “(C) . . . These rules, to the extent that they would by their nature

be clearly inapplicable, shall not apply to procedures . . . (3) in forcible entry and

detainer . . . .” Id.

“‘[W]hen the operation of a local court rule and an Ohio Civil Rule

conflict, the local rule must give way to the operation of the Civil Rule.’” Colosimo, 2015-Ohio-3337, at ¶ 42, quoting Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters v. Aetna Cas.

& Sur. Co., 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3324 *45 (6th Dist. June 30, 1993).

To elaborate:

“[I]f a rule created pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV conflicts with a statute, the rule will control for procedural matters, and the statute will control for matters of substantive law.” Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-4838, 873 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 17, citing Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St.2d 83, 86, 346 N.E.2d 286 (1976). See also State ex rel. Gudzinas v. Constantino, 43 Ohio App.3d 52, 53, 539 N.E.2d 173 (11th Dist.1988) (“Although municipal judges have the power under R.C. 1901.14(A)(3) to adopt rules governing the administration of the court, such rules are invalid if they conflict with state statute.”).

Id. at ¶ 20.

Ori further proffers that the local rule exceeds the trial court’s

authority under R.C. 1901.181 which provides that

the housing court has exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action to enforce any local building, housing, air pollution, sanitation, health, fire, zoning, or safety code, ordinance, or regulation applicable to premises used or intended for use as a place of human habitation . . . .”

Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778, at ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting R.C. 1901.181.

“However, an eviction action is not a ‘civil action to enforce’ any local ordinance.”

Id., quoting id.

Ori further states that the Cleveland Codified Ordinances do not

empower the local rule to infringe a landlord’s rights under R.C. Ch. 1923 as a

sanction for violating the ordinance. It argues that the Cleveland housing

ordinances fall under the sole authority of the Cleveland Housing Commissioner per

C.C.O. 367.01 and 367.99. C.C.O. 367.01 provides that the “Housing Code shall be

enforced by the Commissioner of Housing” and sets forth the procedures and penalties for enforcement and not the housing court’s local rules. Violators of C.C.O.

365.02 regarding rental registration (and of C.C.O. 365.04 concerning lead-safe

certification per Shaker House LLC) “shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first

degree. Each day of a continuing violation shall be deemed a separate offense.”

C.C.O. 367.99(d).

The Section 3(B)(4)(a) registration certificate requirement stems

from C.C.O. 365.02 which provides in part:

“Non-Owner-Occupied Residential Unit Registration Required; Application for and Issuance of Certificate of Non-Owner-Occupied Residential Registration; Certificate Approving Rental Occupancy; Revocation

(a) Non-Owner-Occupied Residential Unit Registration Required. An owner of a non-owner-occupied residential unit or units located in the City shall apply to register each unit in a manner prescribed in writing by the Director in a publicly available non-owner-occupied residential unit registry established and maintained by the Director. Upon approval of an application, the owner shall receive a Certificate of Non- Owner-Occupied Residential Unit Registration. Such an owner, before renting such a unit, shall obtain a Certificate Approving Rental Occupancy. . . .

C.C.O. 365.02(a).

The certificate must be renewed annually on or before March 1 of each

calendar year. C.C.O. 365.02(b). The registration contains the name, address,

telephone number, and email address of the property owners including corporate or

partnership information. The owners must also identify who is in charge of the unit

and provide on-site and emergency contact property management information. In

addition, use and occupancy information and a statement regarding the lead-safe

certification status is required where applicable. C.C.O. 365.02(c). The certificate establishes that the unit has been registered with the

building and housing department but does not certify that the unit is “safe from lead

paint hazards, meets Housing Code and Building Code requirements, or is fit and

habitable to live in.” C.C.O. 365.02(c). To establish compliance with the latter

requirements, an owner must secure a “Certificate Approving Rental Occupancy”

from the Department of Building and Housing prior to renting a residential unit.

C.C.O. 365.02(c) and (d).

C.C.O. 365.02 is a substantive obligation that creates a duty on the

part of landlords to take certain steps regarding registration and management of

their rental properties. The purpose of Section 3(B)(4)(a) is to force compliance

with C.C.O. 365.02. “Requiring proof of compliance with a local ordinance before

allowing a party to proceed with an eviction action is not a practice and procedure

rule analogous to setting a deadline for requesting a jury or setting discovery

deadlines.” Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778, at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Thus, the

ordinance adds an additional impermissible substantive condition to R.C. Ch. 1923.

See e.g., id., and C.C.O. 365.04, “Lead Safe Certification Required for Residential

Rental Units Built Before January 1, 1978.”

“‘[W]henever a statute is in conflict with a rule of the common law, or

of equity, the statute must prevail.”’ Cousins Waste Control Corp. v. Wellston, 1995

Ohio App. LEXIS 2315, *13 (4th Dist. May 26, 1995), quoting Wellston v. Morgan,

65 Ohio St. 219 (1901). The housing court may not use its equitable powers to thwart

the purpose of the forcible-entry-and-detainer statutes, which is to provide a speedy method for the recovery of possession of leased property. Shaker House LLC at

¶ 27 (8th Dist.).

Conclusion

This court finds that Ori’s arguments have merit and agrees that the

local rule is invalid to interfere with a forcible-entry-and-detainer action.

Section 3(B)(4)(a) is contrary to law and invalid because it conflicts

with the purpose and policy of R.C. Ch. 1923 pursuant to this court’s holding in

Shaker House LLC, 2022-Ohio-2778 (8th Dist.). The local rule “effectively adds an

additional element to an eviction cause of action that is not required by the eviction

statutes.” Id. at ¶ 15. The local rule also “abridge[s], enlarges[s], or modif[ies]” the

substantive rights of a landlord under R.C. Ch. 1923 in violation of the Ohio Const.,

art. IV, § 5(B). Id. at ¶ 19.

The local rule also conflicts with the Ohio Civil Rules of Procedure.

Civ.R. 83 directs that a local court may not adopt rules of practice that are

inconsistent with the Civil Rules or other rules promulgated by the Ohio Supreme

Court. Shaker House LLC at ¶ 19, and Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B). See also Civ.R.

1(C)(3) that provides that the rules “shall not apply” to forcible-entry-and-detainer

actions.

This court agrees that the local rule exceeds the trial court’s authority

under R.C. 1901.181 that gives housing courts exclusive jurisdiction for certain civil

actions but “an eviction action is not a ‘civil action to enforce’ any local ordinance.”

Shaker House LLC at ¶ 17, quoting R.C. 1901.181. C.C.O. 365.02 is a substantive obligation that creates a duty on the

part of landlords to take certain steps regarding registration and management of

their rental properties. The purpose of Section 3(B)(4)(a) is to force compliance

with C.C.O. 365.02, effectively adding an impermissible condition to R.C. Ch. 1923,

impeding the substantive rights of landlords.

The housing court may not use its equitable powers to negate the

purpose of the forcible-entry-and-detainer statutes to provide a speedy method for

the recovery of leased property. Shaker House LLC 2022-Ohio-2778, at ¶ 27 (8th

Dist.).

Ori’s assignment of error is sustained. The trial court erred, and the

judgment is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court to grant Ori’s forcible-

entry-and-detainer claim within 30 days of the date of this court’s judgment.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the Cleveland

Municipal Court, Housing Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

____________________________ ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR