O'Reilly Winship LLC v. Snaprays LLC

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedFebruary 7, 2023
Docket3:21-cv-02719
StatusUnknown

This text of O'Reilly Winship LLC v. Snaprays LLC (O'Reilly Winship LLC v. Snaprays LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Reilly Winship LLC v. Snaprays LLC, (N.D. Tex. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

O’REILLY WINSHIP, LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-2719-N § SNAPRAYS, LLC, § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Order addresses the construction of several disputed claim terms pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Snaprays LLC (“SnapPower”) contends that O’Reilly Winship, LLC (“OWL”) infringes United States Patent Nos. 9,871,324 (the ’324 Patent) and 9,035,180 (the ’180 Patent). Having reviewed the relevant intrinsic evidence in the record, and such extrinsic evidence as necessary, the Court construes the disputed terms and phrases as provided below. I. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTIONS The Patents relate to a cover for an electrical box, such as an outlet or light switch, where the cover is configured to make an electrical connection with the device in the box, and the electricity can then be used to power electrical loads built into the cover, such as a night light. II. BASIC CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS Claim construction is a question of law for the Court, see Markman, 517 U.S. at 391, although it may involve subsidiary factual questions. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v.

Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 324-28 (2015). In construing the claims of a patent, the words comprising the claims “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by “a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, courts must determine the meaning of

claim terms in light of the resources that a person with such skill would review to understand the patented technology. See id. at 1313 (citing Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). First, “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term . . . in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. If the specification

“reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess . . . , the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Id. at 1316. Likewise, if “the specification . . . reveal[s] an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor . . .[,] the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is regarded as dispositive.” Id. (citation omitted). While the claims

themselves provide significant guidance as to the meaning of a claim term, the specification is generally dispositive as “it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1314-15 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to the specification, courts must examine the patent’s prosecution history – that is, the “complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includ[ing] the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Id. at 1317 (citation omitted). “Like the

specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” Id. (citation omitted). In particular, courts must look to the prosecution history to determine “whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id. (citations omitted). “[W]here the patentee has unequivocally disavowed a certain

meaning to obtain his patent, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of the surrender.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Finally, in addition to evidence intrinsic to the patent at issue and its prosecution history, courts may look to “extrinsic evidence, which ‘consists of all evidence external to

the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). In general, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id. at 1318. When the intrinsic evidence, that is the patent specification and prosecution history,

unambiguously describes the scope of a patented invention, reliance on extrinsic evidence, which is everything outside the specification and prosecution history, is improper. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). While the Court may consult extrinsic evidence to educate itself about the invention and relevant technology, it may not rely upon extrinsic evidence to reach a claim construction that is clearly at odds with a construction mandated by the intrinsic evidence. See Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

III. DISPUTED TERMS A recurring theme in the claim construction briefing in this case is that SnapPower contends that OWL “has committed one of the cardinal sins of patent law — reading a limitation from the written description into the claims.” SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

SnapPower, in contrast, argues that very few of the disputed terms require construction and most can be given their ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Mannatech, Inc. v. Wellness Quest LLC, 2015 WL 12731760, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. 2015). Also, some of the disputed terms were construed by the International Trade Commission (ITC) in In re Certain Powered Cover Plates, Inv. No. 337-TA-1124 (Feb.

21, 2019). See SnapPower Appx. Ex. N [25-14] (the “ITC Decision”). A. U.S. Patent No. 9,871,324 1. At least one clip OWL’s Proposed Construction – A clip comprising non-wire conductive elements and optionally non-conductive elements

SnapPower’s Proposed Construction – No construction is necessary Analysis – Claim 1 is instructive: An active cover plate comprising: a face plate; an electrical load; at least one clip extending rearward from the faceplate, the clip comprising: a contact; a resilient strip supporting a front side of the contact, wherein the contact is joined to the resilient strip and extends through an aperture in the resilient strip; and a rear insulator covering a rear side of the contact; and an electrical connection between the clip and the electrical load.

’324 Patent, c. 30, l. 25-32. Thus, the claim itself defines what is meant by “clip.” The other independent claims, 13 and 17, are similar in that respect. This is not to say the claim language is self-executing. It appears to the Court that the claim can be parsed as follows: 1. An active cover plate comprising: [a] a face plate; [b] an electrical load; [c] at least one clip extending rearward from the faceplate, the clip comprising: [1] a contact; [2] a resilient strip

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