Opinion No. 80-214 (1980) Ag

CourtOklahoma Attorney General Reports
DecidedDecember 9, 1980
StatusPublished

This text of Opinion No. 80-214 (1980) Ag (Opinion No. 80-214 (1980) Ag) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oklahoma Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. 80-214 (1980) Ag, (Okla. Super. Ct. 1980).

Opinion

The Attorney General has received your request for an Opinion where you ask, in effect: Does the phrase "average monthly salary" as used in computing benefits payable from the Firemen's Pension Fund require, as a basis of calculation, inclusion of payments for accumulated sick leave, annual leave, longevity pay, clothing allowance, overtime pay and other such allowances? The provisions of 11 O.S. 49-101 [11-49-101] (1977), et seq., authorize the establishment of a Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund ("Fund"), the terms of which permit the payment of a monthly pension for eligible participants equal to a certain percentage of the "average monthly salary" paid for services during the last thirty (30) months of employment. 11 O.S. 49-106 [11-49-106] (1977). Your question concerns itself with the identification of those elements which may be included to compute the "average monthly salary." While no provision within the Pension Fund Act defines the term "average monthly salary," the sources of the Fund include monthly deductions from the salary of eligible fire department members, 11 O.S. 49-122 [11-49-122], together with the proceeds of a tax levied upon insurance premiums. Section 11 O.S. 49-119 [11-49-119]. The predecessor statute to 11 O.S. 49-106 [11-49-106] was codified as 11 O.S. 364 [11-364] (1971), as amended, and provided for a firemen's monthly pension "equal to one-half of the monthly salary attached to the rank which he may have held . . . proceeding the date of such retirement." In construing 364, the Supreme Court said in Board of Trustees v. Hicks, 161 Okl. 116, 17 P.2d 428 (1933): "So it can be seen that it was the intention of the Legislature to fix the amount of the pension at one-half of the salary attached to the rank preceding the date of such retirement. The right to the pension and the amount thereof is fixed on the basis of the salary drawn by the fireman preceding the date of his retirement and not on the salary drawn by a fireman in like position subsequent to date of retirement. "The act before us is plain and unambiguous. It provides that the pension shall be based on the salary attached to the rank held by the fireman immediately preceding his retirement. That fixes the basis and amount of the pension." 161 Okl. 119 See also City of Ardmore ex rel. Firemen's Relief and Pension Board v. Ozment, Okl., 467 P.2d 502 (1970). Our research has revealed no Oklahoma authority on the question of definition of "salary" as may be employed for pension computation purposes. Attempts to develop a general rule from the case authorities is not helpful because of the requirement to reconcile definitions of the "compensation" used by the several city ordinances and state statutes considered by the authorities, the terms of the several collective bargaining agreements, the method of funding the several pensions and the bases upon which the regularity of such additional payments are paid. We are not here dealing with contractual rights of firefighters but of statutory pension rights. One must, therefore, look to the statutes or authorizing legislation as the principle guideline. In that connection, we are mindful of several rules of statutory construction applicable to the question. The provisions of the Pension Fund statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of its beneficiaries. Ardmore v. Ozment, supra. The Pension Fund is not municipal property but a trust for the benefit of those to whom payments are finally made as a compensation for past services. Wallace v. Childers, 198 Okl. 604, 180 P.2d 1005 (1947). Where the Legislature has not defined terms used in a statute, a presumption exists that such words bear their ordinary and commonly accepted meanings. Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., Okl., 301 P.2d 212 (1956). The term "salary," as defined by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1976), means a "fixed compensation paid regularly for services" and refers to the synonym "wages." Blacks Law Dictionary (4th Ed.) defines the term as follows: "SALARY. A reward or recompense for services performed. "In a more limited sense a fixed periodical compensation paid for services rendered; a stated compensation, amounting to so much by the year, month, or other fixed period, to be paid to public officers and persons in some private employments, for the performance of official duties or the rendering of services of a particular kind, more or less definitely described, involving professional knowledge or skill, or at least employment above the grade of menial or mechanical labor. State v. Speed, 183 Mo. 186, 81 S.W. 1260. A fixed, annual, periodical amount payable for services and depending upon the time of employment and not the amount of services rendered. In re Information to Discipline Certain Attorneys of Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 351 Ill. 206, 184 N.E. 332, 359. It is synonymous with "wages," except that "salary" is sometimes understood to relate to compensation for officials or other services, as distinguished from "wages," which is the compensation for labor. Walsh v. City of Bridgeport, 88 Conn. 528,91 A. 969, 972, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 318." See also People v. Fry,193 Mich. 476, 160 N.W. 467, 471 (1916); Mich. State Police Command Officers Ass'n, Inc. v. State, 80 Mich. 278,263 N.W.2d 47 (1978). The elements of "salary" for statutory pension purposes, cannot look to collective bargaining agreements or even to city ordinances for the identification of those emoluments which may be includable as salary. The payment of pensions is, in this instance, a matter of legislative policy, as is the eligibility of persons for pensions and the amount to be paid. State v. Police Pension Board, 56 Wis.2d 602, 203 N.W.2d 74 (1973); City of Duncan v. Bingham, Okl., 394 P.2d 456, 460 (1964); Board of Trustees v. Hicks, supra. Three elements appear to be required to ascertain "salary" for pension computation purposes: (1) a predetermined or fixed sum payable to a person holding a position, (2) payable at specified times for services rendered and (3) from which monthly deductions are made and contributed to the Pension Fund. The fundamental nature of "sick leave" is to permit salary continuation during periods of absence from the performance of services by reason of accident or injury. Sick leave is not an additional salary but a continuation of it. The fact that a municipality may choose to encourage attendance by reimbursement of unused sick leave does not permit a conclusion that such payments should be spread over a thirty (30) month period for salary averaging.

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Related

Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal CIT Credit Corporation
1956 OK 221 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1956)
Banish v. City of Hamtramck
157 N.W.2d 445 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1968)
State Ex Rel. City of Manitowoc v. Police Pension Board
203 N.W.2d 74 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1973)
Orban v. Allen
241 N.E.2d 378 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1968)
Kilfoil, Mayor, Etc. v. Johnson
191 N.E.2d 321 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1963)
City of Duncan v. Bingham
1964 OK 165 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1964)
Walsh v. City of Bridgeport
91 A. 969 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1914)
State Ex Rel. Murray v. Riley
70 A.2d 712 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1949)
In Re Information to Discipline Certain Attorneys of Sanitary
184 N.E. 332 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1932)
Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund v. Hicks
1932 OK 714 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1932)
Iverson Tool Co. v. Phillips
1932 OK 775 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1932)
Wallace v. Childers
1947 OK 171 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1947)
City of Ardmore ex rel. Firemen's Relief & Pension Board v. Ozment
1970 OK 502 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1970)
State ex rel. Peters v. McCollister
11 Ohio St. 46 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1841)
Case v. Hart
11 Ohio St. 364 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1842)
McLaren v. Byrnes
45 N.W. 143 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1890)
People v. Lay
160 N.W. 467 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1916)
State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Speed
81 S.W. 1260 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1904)

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Bluebook (online)
Opinion No. 80-214 (1980) Ag, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/opinion-no-80-214-1980-ag-oklaag-1980.