Opinion No. (1999)

California Attorney General Reports·Decided March 1, 1999·Published

Opinion

BILL LOCKYER Attorney General CLAYTON P. ROCHE Deputy Attorney General

THE HONORABLE WESLEY CHESBRO, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, has requested an opinion on the following questions:

1. Does a school district have a duty to disclose information received from a law enforcement official concerning the presence of a sex offender in its community?

2. Does a school district have a duty to disclose information received from a parent or employee concerning the presence of a sex offender in its community?

3. Does a school district have a duty to review CD-ROM information when it has notice of the presence of a sex offender in its community?

4. May a school district disclose information it has received from a law enforcement official concerning the presence of a sex offender in its community?

5. May a school official be subject to sanctions when information relating to a sex offender is improperly used or improperly disclosed?

CONCLUSIONS
1. A school district does not have a mandatory duty but may disclose information received from a law enforcement official concerning the presence of a sex offender in its community if the information is disclosed in the manner and to the extent authorized by the law enforcement agency.

2. A school district does not have a mandatory duty but may disclose information received from a parent or employee concerning the presence of a sex offender in its community; however, the district will not have immunity for disclosing information that was not obtained from a law enforcement agency.

3. A school district does not have a mandatory duty but may review CD-ROM information when it has notice of the presence of a sex offender in its community.

4. A school district may disclose information it has received from a law enforcement official concerning the presence of a sex offender in its community to protect students at risk if the dissemination is made in the manner and to the extent authorized by the law enforcement agency.

5. A school official may be subject to sanctions when information relating to a sex offender is improperly used or improperly disclosed.

ANALYSIS
California's version of what is commonly known as Megan's Law1 is contained in sections 290 and 290.4 of the Penal Code.2 Essentially, section 290 requires persons who have been convicted of specified sex offenses and are no longer incarcerated to be registered with the appropriate law enforcement agency where he or she resides or is located.

When a peace officer "reasonably suspects" that a child or other person may be "at risk" from a sex offender, a law enforcement agency may release detailed information it deems relevant and necessary to persons, agencies, or organizations the offender is "likely to encounter." These include "[p]ublic and private educational institutions, day care establishments" and "[o]ther community members at risk." (§ 290, subd. (m)(1).)

Besides the registration and disclosure provisions of section 290, additional protection is provided to the public under the terms of section 290.4. Pursuant to the latter statute, the Department of Justice ("Department") must continually compile information concerning individuals required to register under section 290 and operate a "900" telephone number that interested parties may call to inquire if a named individual is listed in its compilation. The Department is also to provide a CD-ROM or similar electronic medium containing the sex offenders' registration information to sheriffs' departments and to municipal police departments in cities with a population of more than 200,000. The Department and local law enforcement agencies are to make the CD-ROM or other electronic information available to the public for viewing with the understanding that "the release of the information is to allow members of the public to protect themselves and their children from sex offenders," and is not obtained to discriminate against or harass any registrant. (§ 290.4, subd. (a)(4)(A).)

We are asked five questions concerning the responsibilities of school districts under the terms of California's version of Megan's Law.

1. Duty To Disclose Information Received From Law Enforcement Officials

The first question presented is whether a school district has a duty to disclose information concerning registered sex offenders which it has received from law enforcement officials. We conclude that no mandatory duty exists but that a school district may disclose such information in the manner and to the extent authorized by the law enforcement agency (§ 290, subds. (m)(3), (n)(4)), and if it does so in good faith, it is immune from civil liability (§ 290, subd. (p)(2)).

Looking initially at sections 290 and 290.4, we find that disclosure of information by law enforcement officials to agencies such as school districts is "to allow members of the public to protect themselves and their children from sex offenders." (§ 290, subd. (m)(5).) Section 290 does not mandate school districts to take any action with respect to sex offender information provided to them by a law enforcement agency. The statute is silent in this respect; no statutory duty to disclose is imposed upon school districts.

If a school district believes it advisable to inform those "at risk" of a particular sex offender's presence in the community, it may do so. The law contemplates that school officials will work with law enforcement officials regarding the manner and extent of disseminating relevant information. However, such decision would be within the sound discretion of school district officials.

Looking at other provisions of law, we note that article 1, section 28, subdivision (c) of the Constitution provides:

"Right to Safe Schools. All students and staff of primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have an inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful."

This constitutional provision was examined by the court in Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224,1236-1238:

"Under article I, section 26, of the California Constitution, all provisions of the state Constitution `are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.' Unquestionably, section 28, subdivision (c), is mandatory. Thus, all agencies of government are required to comply with it, and are prohibited from taking official actions which violate it or contravene its provisions. [Citations.]

"However, it is an entirely different matter to conclude that section 28, subdivision (c), is self-executing in the sense that it establishes an affirmative duty to act on the part of school districts, provides remedies for its violation, or creates a private cause of action for damages.

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Related

Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Sch. Dist.
83 Cal. App. 3d 492 (California Court of Appeal, 1978)
Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School District
221 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (California Court of Appeal, 1990)
Leger v. Stockton Unified School District
202 Cal. App. 3d 1448 (California Court of Appeal, 1988)
Searcy v. Hemet Unified School District
177 Cal. App. 3d 792 (California Court of Appeal, 1986)
Tirpak v. Los Angeles Unified School District
187 Cal. App. 3d 639 (California Court of Appeal, 1986)
Keech v. Berkeley Unified School District
162 Cal. App. 3d 464 (California Court of Appeal, 1984)
Wright v. Arcade School District
230 Cal. App. 2d 272 (California Court of Appeal, 1964)
Wolfe v. Dublin Unified School District
56 Cal. App. 4th 126 (California Court of Appeal, 1997)
Skinner v. Vacaville Unified School District
37 Cal. App. 4th 31 (California Court of Appeal, 1995)
Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School District
470 P.2d 360 (California Supreme Court, 1970)