OmniLingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc.

500 N.W.2d 721, 1993 Iowa App. LEXIS 45, 1993 WL 180788
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedMarch 30, 1993
Docket92-860
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 500 N.W.2d 721 (OmniLingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
OmniLingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 721, 1993 Iowa App. LEXIS 45, 1993 WL 180788 (iowactapp 1993).

Opinion

HAYDEN, Judge.

Plaintiff OmniLingua, Inc. (OmniLingua) appeals the district court’s ruling dismissing its cause of action for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc. (Great Golf).

OmniLingua is an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. OmniLingua provides foreign language translation services. Great Golf is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and headquartered in Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania. Great Golf had used OmniLingua’s services on two projects in 1989 and 1990. OmniLingua’s cause of action concerns payment for services performed by OmniLingua in translating Great Golf’s 1991 Selection Magazine into Japanese.

Prior to January 9, 1991, two of plaintiff’s representatives went to Pennsylvania and approached Great Golf’s president at its office. The representatives solicited the opportunity to translate into Japanese the 1991 annual directory published by Great Golf. On January 9, 1991, OmniLingua mailed to Great Golf a letter containing a written proposal for the translation project. Great Golf later sent to OmniLingua the 1991 directory with a request for plaintiff to translate into Japanese the article on Scotland.

On March 5, 1991, OmniLingua sent a revised proposal to Great Golf’s principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Following the closing of the letter, an “acceptance of firm quotation” provision was included with spaces designated for defendant’s authorized signature and the date. Defendant accepted the proposal by signing and dating the acceptance provision in Omni-Lingua’s letter dated March 5. Great Golf sent the acceptance to OmniLingua in Iowa. OmniLingua mailed a confirmation of the order to Great Golf on April 17, 1991. Subsequently, the parties engaged in written and telephone communications regarding the project.

The parties’ agreement required a down payment from Great Golf before OmniLin-gua would begin. Great Golf allegedly forwarded a $2,000 deposit to OmniLingua, which was received by July 29, 1991. Om-niLingua shipped the translated manuscript from Cedar Rapids to Pennsylvania on August 5, 1991. Great Golf refused to accept delivery. In a letter dated August 6, 1991, Great Golf terminated the contract because plaintiff failed to complete the project in time for a deadline to defendant’s customer. OmniLingua billed Great Golf for work completed minus the $2,000 deposit.

OmniLingua commenced a breach of contract and quantum meruit action for the defendant’s refusal to comply with the agreement. Great Golf filed a motion to dismiss claiming it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to justify the district court exercising personal jurisdiction over it. OmniLingua resisted the motion.

On April 27, 1992, the district court entered an order sustaining the motion to dismiss. The court determined Great Golf lacked sufficient minimum contacts for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

*723 On May 22, 1992, OmniLingua filed a notice of appeal.

Our scope of review in examining a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is the district court’s “ ‘findings of fact have the effect of a jury verdict and are subject to challenge only if not supported by substantial evidence in the record; we are not bound, however, by the trial court’s application of legal principles or its conclusions of law.’ ” Hagan v. Val-Hi, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Iowa 1992) (quoting Meyers v. Kallestead, 476 N.W.2d 65, 66 (Iowa 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Meyers v. Bette, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1294, 117 L.Ed.2d 517 (1992)). The burden to sustain the requisite jurisdiction falls on plaintiff. Robert Half, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 453 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Iowa App.1990) (citation omitted). Once a prima facie case has been established, however, defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to rebut it. Id.

A two-step analysis is used to determine whether a court has jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. We must determine: (1) whether a statute authorizes assumption of jurisdiction over a defendant, and (2) whether the nonresident defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with Iowa such that the exercise of jurisdiction meets the requirements of due process. Martin v. Ju-Li Corp., 332 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Iowa 1983) (citing Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 1980)).

Iowa Code section 617.3 (1991) provides the statutory authority necessary to satisfy the first part of the two-part test. Section 617.3 authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has entered into a contract “to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Iowa.” Iowa Code § 617.3 (1991). Plaintiff has met his burden with respect to the requirement by alleging the parties’ contract was performed in whole or in part in Iowa.

Great Golf’s motion to dismiss challenged whether sufficient contacts existed to satisfy due process requirements. The second part of the test has five subsections. Our courts use this five-part test in determining whether sufficient contacts exist to support the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. This five-part test is set forth in Larsen v. Scholl:

(1) the quantity of the contacts;
(2) the nature and quality of the contacts;
(3) the source and connection of the cause of action with those contacts;
(4) the interest of the forum state; and
(5) the convenience of the parties.

Larsen, 296 N.W.2d at 788 (citations omitted). The first three factors are the most important. Meyers, 476 N.W.2d at 67.

The “constitutional touchstone” in determining jurisdiction is whether defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts in a forum state, and defendant’s conduct and connection is such defendant should have reasonably anticipated being' haled into court in a forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 566, 62 L.Ed.2d 490, 501 (1980); Bankers Trust Co. v. Fidata Trust Co., 452 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Iowa 1990); Robert Half, Inc., 453 N.W.2d at 238 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzew icz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 542 (1985)).

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500 N.W.2d 721, 1993 Iowa App. LEXIS 45, 1993 WL 180788, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/omnilingua-inc-v-great-golf-resorts-of-world-inc-iowactapp-1993.