Omar Elsoudy v. University of Arizona

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 23, 2023
• Docket: 22-15777
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OMAR MAHMOUD ELSOUDY, No. 22-15777

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:21-cv-00508-RCC

v. MEMORANDUM* UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, in its official capacity; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 16, 2023**

Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Omar Mahmoud Elsoudy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action alleging federal discrimination and retaliation claims,

violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and state law claims. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Elsoudy’s APA claim because Elsoudy

failed to identify a final agency action. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178

(1997) (for an agency action to be final, it “must mark the consummation of the

agency’s decision-making process” and “must be one by which rights or

obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Rattlesnake Coal. v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095,

1104 (9th Cir. 2007) (federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear an APA

claim if there is no final agency action).

The district court properly dismissed Elsoudy’s remaining claims because

Elsoudy failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that although pro se

pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations

sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Furnace v. Sullivan, 705

F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth pleading requirements for a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment); Huey v. Honeywell, Inc., 82 F.3d 327, 333 (9th Cir.

1997) (setting forth the elements for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional

2 22-15777 distress under Arizona law); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439,

1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth pleading requirements for a Title VI

discrimination claim), overruled on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA

Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); McMurtry v.

Weatherford Hotel, Inc., 293 P.3d 520, 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (setting forth

elements for a claim of negligence under Arizona law).

Elsoudy’s motion for injunctive relief (Docket Entry No. 5) is denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 22-15777