Olivia M. Shea v. Nissan North America, Inc. et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 Case No.: 26-cv-01321-DMS-DEB 9 OLIVIA M. SHEA,

10 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING 11 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. et al., 12

13 Defendants. 14 15 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court (“Motion”). 18 (Mot., ECF No. 3). In response to the Motion, Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. filed 19 an opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply. (Opp’n, ECF No. 4; Reply, ECF No. 5). For the 20 following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit in San Diego Superior Court against 23 Nissan North America, Inc. and Does 1 through 10. (Compl., ECF No. 3-2 at 1, 2, 9). 24 Plaintiff asserts claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act arising from her 25 lease of a 2022 Nissan Sentra on June 29, 2022. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 20–61); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 26 1790–1795.8 (West 2026). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “is a citizen of the State 27 of California, residing in the City of Ramona.” (Compl. ¶ 2). It further alleges that the 28 “amount paid/payable by the Plaintiff for the Subject Vehicle, as reflected in the Lease 1 Agreement, is $28,155.00.” (Id. ¶ 8). According to the Complaint, the vehicle “was 2 delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and developed 3 other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to, 4 structural, steering, suspension, transmission, engine, electrical, and emission system 5 defects.” (Id. ¶ 10). In total, Plaintiff alleges she presented the vehicle for repairs four 6 times: in October 2023 with approximately 28,630 miles, in February 2024 with 7 approximately 33,147 miles, in July 2025 with approximately 57,170 miles, and in 8 September 2025 with approximately 58,532 miles. (Id. ¶¶ 11–14). Plaintiff’s prayer for 9 relief seeks damages, rescission of the lease agreement, restitution, a civil penalty in the 10 amount of two times actual damages, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. (Id. 11 at 9). 12 On November 5, 2025, Plaintiff served the Complaint on Defendant. (Notice of 13 Removal, ECF No. 1 at 2). Defendant answered the Complaint in state court on December 14 4, 2025. (Id.). On March 2, 2026, Defendant removed the action to this Court, invoking 15 diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Id. at 3, 9). Defendant alleges that diversity 16 of citizenship exists and that the amount in controversy is over $75,000. (Id. at 3–4 17 (alleging that Plaintiff is a citizen of California while Defendant is a citizen of Delaware 18 and Tennessee)). On March 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed the present Motion to Remand, 19 arguing that removal was untimely. (Mot. 1). Defendant maintains that the amount in 20 controversy was not ascertainable from the face of the Complaint and it “was [therefore] 21 entitled to remove on its own investigation within the one-year outer limit of 28 U.S.C. § 22 1446(c).” (Opp’n 3). 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power 25 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) 26 (citation modified). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a civil action brought in state court may 27 be removed if the federal court has original jurisdiction. Federal courts have original 28 jurisdiction where there is a federal question or where there is diversity of citizenship and 1 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. There are several 2 time limits on removal. The first is that a notice of removal must be filed within thirty days 3 of receipt of the initial pleading. § 1446(b). However, this only applies “when that 4 pleading affirmatively reveals on its face the facts necessary for federal court jurisdiction.” 5 Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). 6 The second limit is that a notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of receipt of 7 “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained 8 that the case is one which is or has become removable.” § 1446(b)(3). The document in 9 question “must make a ground for removal unequivocally clear and certain.” Dietrich v. 10 Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2021). Finally, “provided that [the defendant] 11 has not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines,” it may remove the action “on the 12 basis of its own information” within one year of commencement of the action. Roth v. 13 CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013); § 1446(c)(1) (setting 14 the outer limit of removal to one year unless the plaintiff “has acted in bad faith in order to 15 prevent a defendant from removing the action”). Any procedural challenges to removal, 16 such as timeliness, must be made on a motion to remand within thirty days of the filing of 17 the notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Blumberger v. Tilley, 115 F.4th 1113, 1124 18 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that timeliness is a procedural defect). However, if at any time 19 before final judgment, it appears that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the case 20 must be remanded to state court. § 1447(c). The burden of establishing subject-matter 21 jurisdiction rests on the removing party and “any doubt about the right of removal requires 22 resolution in favor of remand.” Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 23 773–74 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 The Parties do not dispute the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. 26 (See Notice of Removal 3–5; Reply 3–4). Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s 27 removal was untimely. (Mot. 1). Defendant contends that removability was not 28 1 ascertainable from the face of the Complaint, thus failing to trigger the thirty-day deadline 2 pursuant to § 1446(b). (Opp’n 2). 3 A. Diversity of Citizenship 4 The first issue is whether the Complaint “affirmatively reveal[ed]” diversity of 5 citizenship such that Defendant was on notice of the action’s potential removability. 6 Harris, 425 F.3d at 691. A person’s citizenship is determined by their domicile, which is 7 where they reside with the intention to remain or to which they intend to return. Kanter v. 8 Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). The Complaint alleges that 9 Plaintiff “is a citizen of the State of California, residing in the City of Ramona.” (Compl. 10 ¶ 2). Defendant argues that “[b]ecause the Complaint failed to allege Plaintiff’s domicile— 11 the legal standard for citizenship—diversity jurisdiction was not determinable from the 12 four corners of the pleading.” (Opp’n 2). This argument is unpersuasive. The defect in 13 Kanter was that the complaint stated “that Plaintiffs were ‘residents’ of California.” 265 14 F.3d at 857. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff pleads her citizenship in direct terms. Accordingly, 15 diversity of citizenship was established on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 16 B. Amount in Controversy 17 The second issue is whether an amount in controversy over $75,000 “is evident” 18 from the Complaint. Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. The Complaint alleges that the “amount 19 paid/payable by the Plaintiff for the Subject Vehicle, as reflected in the Lease Agreement, 20 is $28,155.00” and requests “a civil penalty of up to two times the amount of actual 21 damages,” among other relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 34). Plaintiff points to these statements and 22 argues that Defendant must “apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in ascertaining 23 removability,” including by “multiplying figures clearly stated in a complaint.” Kuxhausen 24 v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). 25 Plaintiff reasons that $28,155.00 in actual damages plus a penalty twice that amount is 26 $84,465—over the § 1332 threshold even on the face of the Complaint. (Mot. 5). 27 Defendant counters that this “conflates the gross lease amount with actual damages as 28 defined by Song-Beverly.” (Opp’n 2). Instead, Defendant argues that actual damages 1 would be the price paid or payable minus statutory deductions such as the mandatory 2 mileage offset. (Opp’n 2–3, 8 (listing further deductions)). Defendant argues that as the 3 Complaint did not include this information, the amount in controversy was “indeterminate” 4 and did not trigger the removal deadline. (Opp’n 2). For the reasons that follow, the Court 5 agrees with Defendant. 6 Under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer may recover damages “in an amount 7 equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer . . . including any collateral charges 8 such as sales or use tax, license fees, registration fees, and other official fees, plus any 9 incidental damages to which the buyer is entitled under Section 1794, including, but not 10 limited to, reasonable repair, towing, and rental car costs actually incurred by the buyer.” 11 Civ. § 1793.2(d)(2)(B). “But if a plaintiff leased the subject vehicle rather than purchased 12 it, as is the case here, the calculation of actual damages is slightly different. In that case, 13 courts consider the amount a plaintiff has actually paid on her lease, rather than the total 14 value of the lease, to determine whether the amount in controversy has been met.” Gomez 15 v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 2:24-CV-09020-SVW, 2025 WL 26368, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16 3, 2025); see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 871.27(e) (West 2026) (specifying that paid residual 17 value on a lease can be actual damages). Under the statute, actual damages shall be reduced 18 by the “amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer first 19 delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized service and repair 20 facility for correction of the problem that gave rise to the nonconformity.” Civ. § 21 1793.2(d)(2)(C). This offset is calculated by taking the miles driven prior to bringing the 22 vehicle in for repair divided by 120,000, and then multiplying that figure by the amount 23 paid or payable by the buyer. Id. “In addition, amendments to the Song-Beverly Act that 24 took effect January 1, 2025, provide for other statutory offsets based on negative equity, 25 manufacturer’s rebate, any optional equipment or services supplied by third parties, and 26 unpaid interest or financing costs.” Perez v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 25-CV-08210-JST, 27 2026 WL 1468306, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2026) (citation modified); see Civ. Proc. § 28 1 871.27(b)–(d), (f); (Notice of Removal 8 (confirming that Defendant elected to be 2 governed by the new provisions)). 3 In assessing an amount in controversy under the Song-Beverly Act, “[c]onsideration 4 of the Use Offset [is] appropriate.” Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 701 5 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018); (Compl. ¶ 31 (acknowledging the mileage offset)). This is because “an 6 estimate of the amount in controversy must be reduced if a specific rule of law or measure 7 of damages limits the amount of damages recoverable.” Schneider, 756 F. App’x at 701 8 n.3 (citation modified). Applying that offset here defeats facial removability even on the 9 Complaint’s own figures. Assuming the full $28,155.00 lease price was available as 10 damages and assuming the vehicle had 28,630 miles when brought in, the mileage offset 11 would still drop the actual damages to approximately $21,437.69.1 This amount plus the 12 maximum civil penalty of two times actual damages still only comes to $64,313.07—below 13 the jurisdictional threshold on the face of the Complaint. See Civ. § 1794(c). Furthermore, 14 this calculation is generous to Plaintiff because it ignores the actual damages limitation for 15 leases, assumes the lowest mileage figure for the offset calculation, and does not factor in 16 any of the new offsets. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12–14 (identifying the mileage for subsequent 17 issues as 33,147, 57,170, and 58,532)). In addition, the Complaint did not contain the 18 information needed to calculate the new statutory offsets. While Defendant may have a 19 duty to multiply figures, it cannot be expected to supply them. Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 20 1141 (“[W]e conclude that [Defendant] was not obligated to supply information which 21 [Plaintiff] had omitted.”); Harris, 425 F.3d at 694 (holding that removability is based on 22 the pleadings rather than “subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry”). 23 Finally, although attorney fees available under a fee-shifting statute may be factored into 24 an amount in controversy, the Complaint itself does not state a figure. Fritsch v. Swift 25

26 1 The mileage offset based on the Complaint would be ($28,155.00 x (28,630/120,000)), coming to 27 $6,717.31. Subtracting that amount from $28,155.00 is $21,437.69. This calculation reflects only what is revealed by the face of the Complaint, not the actual amount in controversy, which is not presently 28 1 Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2018). An amount in controversy 2 over $75,000 was therefore not evident “through examination of the four corners of the 3 applicable pleadings.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. Accordingly, the thirty-day clock did not 4 start upon service of the Complaint and Defendant remained free to remove the action “on 5 the basis of its own information” within one year of commencement of the action. Roth, 6 720 F.3d at 1125; § 1446(c)(1). Defendant’s March 2, 2026 removal was well within one 7 year of the action’s commencement on November 3, 2025. (Notice of Removal 9; Compl. 8 9). Removal was therefore timely, and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied. 9 C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 10 “Although [Plaintiff does] not contest jurisdiction [], [the Court has] an independent 11 obligation to ensure subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 12 888 F.3d 413, 415 (9th Cir. 2018). “[A] defendant’s notice of removal need include only 13 a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold” 14 with additional evidence only being required “when the plaintiff contests, or the court 15 questions, the defendant’s allegation.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 16 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “[A]lthough litigants cannot stipulate to subject matter jurisdiction 17 where it does not otherwise exist, . . . [Plaintiff’s] concession of diversity jurisdiction [] is 18 strong evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Chavez, 888 F.3d at 19 416; (see Reply 3 (“The allegations within Plaintiff’s Complaint establish the amount in 20 controversy is well over $75,000.00”)). “Such a concession is tantamount to a plaintiff 21 expressly alleging damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount, which we accept as the 22 amount in controversy if done in good faith.” Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416. That concession 23 is bolstered by Defendant’s assertion that after the initial disclosures and a preliminary 24 investigation, it was able to calculate actual damages including any offsets. (See Notice of 25 Removal 4–5). The Court finds there to be a plausible allegation that the amount in 26 controversy exceeds the threshold and therefore finds subject-matter jurisdiction on the 27 present record. 28 I IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: July 7, 2026 2» J \ 5 Yn - 6 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28