Oliver, III v. United States of America

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EDDIE VAN OLIVER, III, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04074 (UNA) v. ) ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”),

ECF No. 2. As discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and it dismisses this

case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Parties instituting a civil action are required to pay the applicable filing fee, 28 U.S.C. §

1914(a), unless granted IFP status under § 1915. Whether to permit or deny an application to

proceed IFP is within the sound discretion of the Court. See Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140

(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941 (1988); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir.

1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963). An individual need not “be absolutely destitute to enjoy

the benefit of the [IFP] statute.” McKelton v. Bruno, 428 F.2d 718, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting

Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). But a party should

demonstrate that because of poverty, the party cannot “pay or give security for the costs . . . and

still be able to provide [for] the necessities of life.” Id. at 719–20 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[C]ourts will generally look to whether the person is employed, the person’s annual salary, and any other property or assets the person

may possess.” Lin v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 16-cv-645, 2020 WL 7695973, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 28,

2020) (citation omitted).

Although Plaintiff attests that he is not currently earning any income, that he pays monthly

rent and utilities, and that he owes student loan debt and is responsible for three dependents, he

also attests that he possesses nearly $185 million dollars in stocks and other assets. See IFP App.

at 1–2. Accordingly, he has not made the requisite showing to proceed IFP, and his Application

is denied.

With respect to the Complaint, Plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, sues approximately 14

defendants, including the United States, various federal agencies, the U.S. Marine Corps,

Democratic Party, countries, continents, and the National Football League. See Compl. at 1–2.

The Complaint totals 439 pages, including prolific accompanying unexplained exhibits, ECF Nos.

1-1 through 1-26, that contravene D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(e), (g). The allegations are rambling

and difficult to discern. It appears that Plaintiff challenges the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s

purported determination not to investigate multiple alleged suspicious incidents that are of

apparent concern to Plaintiff, involving, for example, Russian spies, the Buffalo? Bills, the federal

government, international borders, a high school in Virginia, and his neighbor. See id. at 3–4. He

demands that the FBI investigate these people, places, and things. See id. at 4.

First, the Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint

because it is frivolous. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (“Over the years, this

Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise

within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of

merit.’”) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent

insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of

surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins.”). A court shall dismiss a complaint

as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly

fanciful kind,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

Second, even if Plaintiff’s allegations had merit, the Court lacks jurisdiction to compel an

investigation by any law enforcement agency. See Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141,

141–42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982).

The Executive Branch has absolute discretion to decide whether to conduct an investigation and

such decisions are not subject to judicial review. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974);

see Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Powell v.

Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,

831 (1985) (“[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal

process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.”).

For these reasons, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed without

prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: March 12, 2026

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge