Olguin 211897 v. Thornell
This text of Olguin 211897 v. Thornell (Olguin 211897 v. Thornell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Eric Samual Olguin, No. CV-24-00581-PHX-GMS
10 Petitioner, ORDER and 11 v. DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILILTY AND IN FORMA 12 Ryan Thornell, et al., PAUPERIS STATUS
13 Respondents. 14 15 Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of 16 Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine (Doc. 18). The R&R recommends that Petitioner’s 17 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissed with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge 18 advised the parties that they had fourteen days to file objections to the R&R. (R&R at 30 19 (citing United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner was 20 granted an extension through February 21, 2025, within which to file specific written 21 objections (Doc. 20). Petitioner filed objections on February 19, 2025 (Doc. 21) and 22 Respondents filed a reply on March 4, 2025 (Doc. 22). 23 In his objections, Mr. Olguin asserts that the trial court deprived him of his Sixth 24 Amendment right to effectively cross-examine his co-defendant, and he appropriately 25 “federalized” his claim by citing to United States Supreme Court cases in his appellate 26 briefing. (Doc. 21, p. 2). However, as the R&R sets forth, Petitioner did not fairly present 27 this constitutional claim in a procedurally appropriate manner. (Doc. 18, p. 13). Because 28 Mr. Olguin did not fairly present his Ground One Claim to the Arizona Court of appeals in 1 a procedurally appropriate manner, the claim was not exhausted. 2 Mr. Olguin also asserts that his citation to Arizona Rules of Evidence in his appellate 3 briefing should be construed to include citations to the Federal Rules of Evidence because 4 they are identical (Doc. 21, p. 7). Nevertheless, reference to federal evidentiary rules 5 would be insufficient to apprise the state court of a federal constitution claim. Cf. Castillo 6 v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that citation to a federal case that 7 “discussed federal evidentiary rules, not due process principles” was insufficient to “alert[] 8 the Arizona court to his [federal constitutional] claim”). 9 Mr. Olguin further asserts that he cited to “relevant United States Supreme Court 10 cases” in his opening brief. (Doc. 21, p. 9). However, as noted in the R&R, it is well 11 established that raising an analogous or closely similar state claim to a federal claim is not 12 sufficient for exhaustion. See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998–99; Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 13 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106-07. (Doc. 18, p. 13). Further, Olguin’s 14 citations to federal cases did not alert the state courts that he was making any federal 15 constitution claims (Id., pp. 13-15). 16 Mr. Olguin objects to the R&R’s rejection of his claim that his appellate counsel 17 was ineffective because she failed to raise an issue regarding the absence of a limiting 18 instruction on the use of the co-defendant’s plea agreement (Doc. 21, pp. 10-12), which he 19 asserts was highly prejudicial. (Id. at 11). However, as pointed out in the R&R, Olguin 20 was unable to show that the courts had unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 21 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) in determining he had not shown the required prejudice from the 22 absence of the instruction or appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue.(Doc. 18, pp. 28- 23 29). 24 The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determinations. Mr. Holguin’s 25 objections do not refute her resulting conclusions about procedural default, or that 26 Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail on the merits. 27 The Court thus accepts the recommended decision within the meaning of Rule 28 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and overrules Petitioner’s objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) || (stating that the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the 2|| findings or recommendations made by the magistrate”). 3 IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 18) is accepted. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment denying 6 || and dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 7\| § 2254 (Doc. 1) with prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 8 Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 9|| Courts requires the district court to “issue or a deny a certificate of appealability when it 10 || enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. A certificate || of appealability should be denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and because jurists of reason would not find the Court’s 13 || rejection on constitutional grounds of Petitioner’s claims to be “debatable or wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 15 Dated this 5th day of March, 2025. 16 off
18 Senior United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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