Oleksndr Petruk v. Loretta E. Lynch

607 F. App'x 740
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 12, 2015
Docket12-74152
StatusUnpublished

This text of 607 F. App'x 740 (Oleksndr Petruk v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oleksndr Petruk v. Loretta E. Lynch, 607 F. App'x 740 (9th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Oleksndr Petruk (Mr. Petruk) and Haly-na Petruk (Ms. Petruk) petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

Petitioners are citizens of the Ukraine and members of the Church of Evangelist Christian Baptists, a minority religion in Ukraine. Forensic document analysis of Petitioners’ immigration materials supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioners entered the United States using fraudulent admission stamps and then attempted to gain permanent residency status using those same stamps. The BIA’s conclusion that Petitioners’ purported ignorance of the fraud was implausible was based on Mr. Petruk’s education and previous experience with the United States visa application process, and did not rely on conjecture or speculation: Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioners are removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for knowingly attempting to procure an immigration benefit by fraud or wilful misrepresentation. Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir.2006) (“We review the BIA’s findings of fact, including credibility findings, for substantial evidence and must uphold the BIA’s finding unless the evidence compels a contrary result.” (quoting Monjaraz-Munoz v. INS, 327 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir.2003))).

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s adverse credibility finding, which served as the basis for the denial of Mr. Petruk’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA’s adverse credibility détermination considered the totality of the circumstances and rested on “specific and cogent reasons” related to . Mr. Petruk’s demeanor, evasiveness, numerous non-trivial inconsistencies in his testimony, and the reasonable rejection of the explanations Mr. Petruk provided for these inconsistencies. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-46 (9th Cir.2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Without credible testimony, the documentary evidence in the record is insufficient to demonstrate Mr. Petruk suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his Baptist religion. Shoafera v. I.N.S., 228 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (9th Cir.2000) (past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution is necessary element of asylum claim). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the denial of Mr. Petruk’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. 1 Farah *742 v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003).

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of CAT protection. Mr. Pe-truk’s testimony was not credible, and the BIA concluded that the other evidence in the record did not support a finding that it is “more likely than not” Mr. Petruk will be tortured upon his return to Ukraine. Alviaghzar, 457 F.3d at 922-23. The police and medical records, country condition reports, and other documentary evidence in the record do not compel a contrary conclusion.

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to remand to the IJ. Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir.2006). Mr. Petruk was given an opportunity to explain inconsistencies between his testimony and the medical records. Even if a corroborating medical opinion could have provided additional information about Mr. Petruk’s injuries, it would not have affected the adverse credibility determination underpinning the BIA’s denial of relief.

PETITION DENIED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publi- ■ cation and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

1

. Ms. Petruk was listed as a derivative beneficiary on her husband’s asylum-, withholding *742 of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) applications.

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Related

Jamal Ali Farah v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
348 F.3d 1153 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Shrestha v. Holder
590 F.3d 1034 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Almaghzar v. Gonzales
457 F.3d 915 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)

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607 F. App'x 740, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oleksndr-petruk-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2015.