Olding v. Pima County Prosecutor's Office

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Candace Sutherland Olding, No. CV-25-00158-TUC-RM (JEM)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Laura Conover, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by 16 Magistrate Judge James E. Marner, recommending that the Court dismiss Plaintiff 17 Candace Sutherland Olding’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) with prejudice. (Doc. 18 21.) Plaintiff filed an Objection (Doc. 22) and a Supplemental Objection (Doc. 23). For 19 the following reasons, the Court will overrule Plaintiff’s Objections and accept 20 Magistrate Judge Marner’s R&R. 21 I. Background 22 Plaintiff initiated this action on April 7, 2025, by filing a pro se Complaint (Doc. 23 1) and an Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). In her original Complaint, 24 Plaintiff sued the Pima County Prosecutor Office (“Pima County Attorney’s Office”), 25 Pima County Attorney Laura Conover, and Pima County prosecutors Bradley Roach and 26 Alex Lambdin, raising constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law 27 claims. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleged that she is a victim in a state-court criminal case, and 28 she accused Defendants of defaming and retaliating against her, concealing exculpatory 1 evidence, and rushing an illegal plea deal for her husband. (Id.) 2 Plaintiff attached several exhibits to the Complaint, including a decision in an 3 Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) administrative hearing, a family-court 4 ruling, and filings from a Pima County Superior Court criminal case, State of Arizona v. 5 Christopher Olding, CR20210376-001. (Doc. 1-3.) The attachments indicate that DCS 6 received a report indicating that Plaintiff, her husband, and her minor daughter had been 7 involved in a domestic violence incident; that Plaintiff’s husband was charged with 8 aggravated assault and kidnapping in connection with the incident; that an administrative 9 law judge declined to sustain a DCS proposed finding that Plaintiff had neglected her 10 daughter; and that the father of Plaintiff’s daughter was awarded sole custody and legal 11 decision-making authority following the incident. (Id.) 12 In a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued on April 16, 2025, Magistrate 13 Judge Jacqueline M. Rateau recommended granting Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to 14 Proceed in Forma Pauperis and dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint on screening under 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 10.) Magistrate Judge Rateau found that Plaintiff failed to 16 state § 1983 claims upon which relief could be granted because her Complaint failed to 17 satisfy the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8; the Pima County 18 Attorney’s Office is a non-jural entity incapable of being sued; Defendants Roach and 19 Lambdin are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for the conduct alleged in the 20 Complaint; and Plaintiff failed to plead any facts showing that Conover was personally 21 involved in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or that she maintained a 22 policy or custom that resulted in such a deprivation. (Id. at 4-10.) Magistrate Judge 23 Rateau recommended dismissing the claims against the Pima County Attorney’s Office, 24 Roach, and Lambdin with prejudice, dismissing the claims against Conover with leave to 25 amend, and declining to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. (Id. at 11- 26 12.) District Judge Raner C. Collins reviewed the R&R pursuant to General Order 21-25, 27 accepted and adopted it in full, granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and 28 dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to amend. (Doc. 16.) The case was 1 subsequently assigned to the undersigned and referred to Magistrate Judge Marner. 2 (Docs. 17, 18.) 3 On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed her FAC (Doc. 19) and an untimely Objection 4 (Doc. 20)1 to Magistrate Judge Rateau’s R&R. In her FAC, Plaintiff sues Pima County, 5 Laura Conover, Alex Lambdin, and Bradley Roach, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 6 1983 for violation of due process, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, failure 7 to train prosecutors on their obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 8 and unconstitutional customs; conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and state-law claims 9 for defamation, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of 10 A.R.S. § 13-4434. (Doc. 19.) On May 15, 2025, Magistrate Judge Marner filed an R&R 11 recommending that Plaintiff’s FAC be dismissed without further leave to amend. (Doc. 12 21.) 13 II. Standard of Review 14 A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a 15 magistrate judge’s “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 16 objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district judge “may accept, reject, or 17 modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate 18 judge.” Id. 19 The Prison Litigation Reform Act states that a district court “shall dismiss” an in 20 forma pauperis complaint if, at any time, the court determines that the action “is frivolous 21 or malicious,” that it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that it 22 “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915(e)(2). “[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those 24 filed by prisoners.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see 25 also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 26 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

27 1 The Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s untimely Objection, as it was filed after Judge Collins had adopted Magistrate Judge Rateau’s R&R, and concurrently with Plaintiff’s 28 FAC, which supersedes the original Complaint in its entirety. See Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). 1 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 2 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 3 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 4 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 5 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The complaint must contain sufficient factual 6 content to allow for a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 7 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 8 relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 9 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 10 Courts must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 11 (9th Cir. 2010). A complaint filed by a pro se litigant “must be held to less stringent 12 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 13 Nevertheless, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 14 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 15 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 16 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 17 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 18 of the action. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127-29. 19 III. Discussion 20 Magistrate Judge Marner’s R&R finds that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a 21 cognizable federal claim; that further attempts by Plaintiff to state a federal claim would 22 be unsuccessful; and that judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor declining to 23 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. (Doc. 21 at 13.) The 24 Court addresses the R&R’s specific findings, and Plaintiff’s objections thereto, below. 25 A. Section 1985 Conspiracy 26 Plaintiff’s FAC alleges a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 involving a 27 “[c]oordinated effort with paternal family to deny custody/rights.” (Doc. 19 at 3.) 28 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges collusion with her daughter’s paternal grandmother to: 1 “[p]ostpone trial” until Plaintiff’s daughter turns 18, “weaponize falsified [DCS] records 2 in family court,” and coordinate “with Clark County prosecutors to release nonpublic, 3 sensitive documents that were confiscated from inmates in the Clark County Detention 4 Center.” (Id. at 2-3.) The R&R finds that the FAC fails to allege factual matter plausibly 5 supporting the elements of a claim under § 1985. (Doc. 21 at 11.) In her Objection and 6 Supplemental Objection, Plaintiff argues that gender-based animus can be inferred from 7 the FAC’s factual allegations, because Defendants targeted her as a mother seeking to 8 protect and gain custody of her child. (Doc. 22 at 2; Doc. 23 at 2.) 9 To state a claim for a conspiracy to deprive a person “of the equal protection of the 10 laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws” under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a 11 plaintiff must plead specific factual allegations showing “an agreement or meeting of the 12 minds.” Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999) 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must also plead an “act in furtherance of 14 the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property,” 42 15 U.S.C. § 1985(3), as well as “class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the 16 conspirators’ action,” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). 17 Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The FAC 18 contains only conclusory allegations in support of the § 1985 claim and, contrary to the 19 arguments in Plaintiff’s Objection and Supplemental Objection, the allegations do not 20 give rise to a reasonable inference of class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. 21 Furthermore, Plaintiff has entirely failed to plead specific facts showing an agreement or 22 meeting of the minds. Plaintiff does not even specify which defendants were involved in 23 the purported conspiracy. Nothing in Plaintiff’s Objection or Supplemental Objection 24 indicates that Plaintiff would be able to state a plausible § 1985 claim if granted further 25 leave to amend; accordingly, the Court will adopt the R&R’s recommendation to dismiss 26 Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim with prejudice. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 B. Defendants Lambdin and Roach 2 Plaintiff’s FAC asserts § 1983 claims against Lambdin and Roach premised on 3 alleged due process and First Amendment violations. (See Doc. 19 at 2-3.) Plaintiff 4 contends that Defendants withheld exculpatory evidence; fabricated allegations, engaged 5 in retaliatory leaks, suppressed Plaintiff’s motions, and barred Plaintiff from hearings. 6 (Id. at 3.) As factual support, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants withheld Judge 7 Abraham’s 2023 ruling exonerating Plaintiff of failing to protect her child from 8 aggravated assault”;2 that “Lambdin violated A.R.S. § 13-4434 by meeting Plaintiff’s 9 minor daughter pre-interview, disparaging Plaintiff, and coercing fabricated allegations 10 (e.g., ‘I didn’t know who she was’)”; that Defendants concealed records of purportedly 11 fraudulent DCS hotline calls; that Defendants endangered Plaintiff’s safety by leaking 12 unredacted court/DCS documents to inmates in Nevada jails;3 that “Lambdin threatened 13 criminal charges to silence Plaintiff”; that “Roach submitted plea agreements without 14 Plaintiff’s input”; and that “Defendants barred Plaintiff from speaking at her husband’s 15 sentencing and ignored her motions for 2 years.” (Id. at 2.) 16 The R&R recommends dismissing the claims asserted in the FAC against 17 Lambdin and Roach with prejudice on the grounds that Judge Collins’ Order adopting 18 Magistrate Judge Rateau’s R&R already dismissed the claims against them with 19 prejudice, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory, and the defendants are entitled to 20 absolute prosecutorial immunity. (Doc. 21 at 6-10.) In her Objection and Supplemental 21 Objection, Plaintiff argues that the FAC alleges investigative, administrative, and 22 retaliatory conduct not subject to absolute prosecutorial immunity. (Doc. 22 at 2; Doc. 23 23 at 1-2.) 24 2 Plaintiff appears to reference the DCS administrative ruling attached to her original 25 Complaint. Plaintiff did not attach the ruling to her FAC, nor does she allege any specific facts concerning the DCS administrative proceedings in the FAC. 26 3 Plaintiff does not provide any details in the FAC concerning who leaked the records, which records were leaked, how the records were leaked, to which inmates they were 27 leaked, or how the leak endangered her safety. In her Supplemental Objection to Magistrate Judge Marner’s R&R, Plaintiff indicates that Lambdin shared unredacted case 28 documents with the Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, which led to the confiscation of materials from inmates at Clark County Detention Center. (Doc. 23 at 1-2.) 1 State prosecutors have absolute immunity for conduct “intimately associated with 2 the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 3 (1976). Absolute prosecutorial immunity “covers the knowing use of false testimony at 4 trial, the suppression of exculpatory evidence, and malicious prosecution.” Milstein v. 5 Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001). It applies when a prosecutor engages in 6 administrative activities “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. 7 Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009). It also applies when a prosecutor “evaluat[es] 8 evidence and interview[s] witnesses” in preparation for trial, although not “[w]hen a 9 prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or 10 police officer.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). 11 As Magistrate Judge Marner’s R&R notes, Lambdin and Roach have already been 12 dismissed from this action with prejudice on the grounds of absolute prosecutorial 13 immunity. (See Docs. 10, 16.) Plaintiff did not timely move for reconsideration of that 14 dismissal, nor does her FAC, her Objection, or her Supplemental Objection show that 15 reconsideration of the dismissal is warranted. The threadbare and conclusory allegations 16 of Plaintiff’s FAC fail to satisfy the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil 17 Procedure 8. Furthermore, despite the lack of factual specificity in the FAC, it appears 18 clear that Plaintiff’s claims against Lambdin and Roach are premised on actions taken in 19 connection with the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff’s husband. Plaintiff alleges that 20 Defendants suppressed exculpatory evidence, fabricated allegations, interviewed a 21 witness, disseminated unredacted court documents, ignored Plaintiff’s motions, barred 22 Plaintiff from hearings, and submitted plea agreements without Plaintiff’s consent. These 23 alleged actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” 24 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, and nothing in Plaintiff’s Objection or Supplemental Objection 25 indicates that she can plead factual allegations plausibly stating a § 1983 claim against 26 Lambdin or Roach that falls outside the bounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity. 27 Accordingly, the Court will accept and adopt the R&R’s recommendation to dismiss the 28 claims against Lambdin and Roach with prejudice. 1 C. Defendant Pima County 2 Plaintiff’s FAC alleges municipal liability under § 1983 based on a failure to train 3 prosecutors on their Brady obligations. (Doc. 19 at 3.) Plaintiff also alleges that Pima 4 County systematically suppressed Brady material and was deliberately indifferent “to 5 fraudulent hotline calls involving law enforcement affiliates.” (Id.) The R&R finds that 6 the FAC fails to state a § 1983 claim against Pima County because Plaintiff does not 7 allege facts showing that her constitutional rights were violated as a result of a municipal 8 policy or custom. (Doc. 21 at 11.) In her Objection, Plaintiff argues that the FAC’s 9 allegations plausibly show municipal liability because the FAC alleges a custom of 10 suppression of Brady material and deliberate indifference to fraudulent hotline calls. 11 (Doc. 22 at 2.)4 12 Local governments are not vicariously responsible under § 1983 for the actions of 13 their employees. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). A municipality can be 14 held liable under § 1983 only if action taken pursuant to official municipal policy or 15 custom inflicted the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of 16 City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “In limited circumstances, a local government’s 17 decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ 18 rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983,” but 19 “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a 20 claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. Such a claim is cognizable 21 only if the municipality’s “failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the 22 constitutional rights of its inhabitants.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 23 392 (1989). “Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that 24 a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick, 25 563 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted). “A pattern of similar

26 4 In her Supplemental Objection, Plaintiff also contends that the FAC alleges a policy of failing to train prosecutors on custody-case protocols and a policy of colluding with 27 family courts to weaponize custody proceedings. (Doc. 23 at 2.) The FAC does not contain these allegations, and it would be futile to grant Plaintiff leave to amend the 28 pleading to add them, as they are merely conclusory, without any specific facts plausibly showing liability. 1 constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate 2 deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 62 (internal quotation 3 marks omitted). A plaintiff alleging municipal liability based on a failure to train 4 prosecutors on their Brady obligations must show a pattern of similar violations. See id. 5 at 63-68. 6 Plaintiff’s FAC relies solely on conclusory allegations in support of its municipal 7 liability claim. Plaintiff does not allege any facts plausibly showing a pattern of similar 8 Brady violations or a pattern of ignoring indications of fraud in hotline calls. Plaintiff has 9 already been granted one opportunity to amend her pleading, and nothing in her 10 Objection or Supplemental Objection indicates that she would be able to state a plausible 11 municipal liability claim if granted further leave to amend. Accordingly, the Court will 12 accept the R&R’s conclusion to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s municipal liability 13 claim under § 1983. 14 D. Defendant Laura Conover 15 Plaintiff’s FAC alleges a claim for “[s]upervisory liability” against Conover based 16 on a failure to train prosecutors on their Brady obligations. (Doc. 19 at 3.) The FAC 17 further alleges that Conover “[a]ttended meetings directing Lambdin to ignore 18 exculpatory evidence” and “[r]atified misconduct by failing to investigate Plaintiff’s 19 complaints.” (Id.) The R&R appears to interpret Plaintiff’s claim against Conover as an 20 official-capacity claim and recommends dismissal on the grounds that Plaintiff does not 21 plead facts showing that a municipal policy or custody resulted in a deprivation of her 22 constitutional rights. (Doc. 21 at 10-11.) Plaintiff argues in her Objection that the FAC 23 alleges Conover personally directed Lambdin to ignore exculpatory evidence, failed to 24 investigate misconduct, and failed to train prosecutors on their Brady obligations. (Doc. 25 22 at 2.) 26 In an official-capacity suit against a government official, the real party in interest 27 is the governmental entity of which the official is an agent, and therefore the plaintiff 28 must plead facts showing that the constitutional deprivation at issue resulted from a 1 policy or custom of the governmental entity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). As 2 discussed above, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to plead sufficient facts to plausibly show that 3 Pima County is subject to municipal liability under § 1983 based on a failure to train 4 prosecutors on their Brady obligations. 5 In a personal-capacity suit, a plaintiff “seek[s] to impose individual liability upon 6 a government officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. 7 A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of her subordinates under a 8 respondeat superior theory of liability and, therefore, a plaintiff must plead facts 9 plausibly showing that the official, through her “own individual actions, has violated the 10 Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff alleges that Conover personally directed 11 Lambdin to ignore exculpatory evidence, but she fails to plead specific facts in support of 12 this conclusory allegation. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Conover 13 directed Lambdin to suppress exculpatory evidence during the criminal trial of Plaintiff’s 14 husband, absolute prosecutorial immunity applies. 15 To the extent that Plaintiff alleges Conover ratified misconduct by failing to 16 investigate Plaintiff’s Complaints, Plaintiff has failed to plead non-conclusory factual 17 allegations showing that Conover knew of a subordinate’s constitutional violation and 18 approved of it. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff does 19 not specify what complaints she made, how Conover became aware of the complaints, 20 and what, if anything, Conover did upon learning of the complaints. 21 Plaintiff has already been granted an opportunity to amend her pleading to cure 22 deficiencies in her allegations against Conover, and nothing in her Objection or 23 Supplemental Objection to Magistrate Judge Marner’s R&R indicates that Plaintiff would 24 be able to cure the deficiencies if granted further leave to amend. Accordingly, the Court 25 will adopt the R&R’s recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Conover with 26 prejudice. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 E. State-Law Claims 2 Plaintiff’s FAC asserts state-law claims for defamation, intentional infliction of 3 emotional distress, negligence, and violation of A.R.S. § 13-4434. (Doc. 19 at 3-4.) 4 Magistrate Judge Marner’s R&R recommends declining to exercise supplemental 5 jurisdiction over these claims. (Doc. 21 at 11-12.) In her Objection, Plaintiff argues that 6 judicial economy favors retention of the state-law claims because they arise from the 7 same facts as Plaintiff’s federal claims. (Doc. 22 at 2-3.) 8 In any civil action of which a district court has original jurisdiction, the court also 9 has “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the 10 action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 11 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A 12 district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the court 13 “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(3). In 14 determining whether to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the court may 15 consider a “host of factors,” including “the circumstances of the particular case, the 16 nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the 17 relationship between the state and federal claims.” Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 18 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). 19 None of Plaintiff’s federal claims have survived screening under 28 U.S.C. § 20 1915(e)(2), and judicial economy, convenience, and fairness do not favor retention of 21 Plaintiff’s state-law claims. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the state-law claims 22 without prejudice to Plaintiff filing them in state court. 23 IT IS ORDERED: 24 1. Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 20) to Magistrate Judge Rateau’s Report and 25 Recommendation is denied as moot. 26 2. Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 22) and Supplemental Objection (Doc. 23) to 27 Magistrate Judge Marner’s Report and Recommendation are denied. 28 . . . . 1 3. Magistrate Judge Marner’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 21) is 2 accepted and adopted, as set forth above. 3 4. The claims asserted in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Doc. 19) 4 under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are dismissed with prejudice. The 5 state-law claims asserted in the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 19) are 6 dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff filing the state-law claims in state 7 court. 8 5. The above-captioned matter is dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to 9 enter judgment against Plaintiff and close this case. 10 Dated this 30th day of May, 2025. 11 12 ff aH) i Honorable Rostsiary □□□□□□□ 15 United States District □□□□□ 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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