Okwudili Chukwuani v. City of Solon, Ohio, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJune 24, 2026
Docket1:24-cv-02257
StatusUnknown

This text of Okwudili Chukwuani v. City of Solon, Ohio, et al. (Okwudili Chukwuani v. City of Solon, Ohio, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Okwudili Chukwuani v. City of Solon, Ohio, et al., (N.D. Ohio 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

OKWUDILI CHUKWUANI, ) CASE NO.: 1:24-cv-2257 ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN ) v. ) ) CITY OF SOLON, OHIO, et al., ) OPINION AND ORDER ) Defendants. )

Pro se Plaintiff Okwudili Chukwuani sued the City of Solon and his ex-wife, Vivian Chukwuani, alleging each violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1, Complaint.) On August 11, 2025, the Court granted the City of Solon’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 25, Opinion and Order.) In the same Opinion and Order, the Court granted Ms. Chukwuani’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Id.) A copy of the Opinion and Order along with the corresponding Judgment Entry were mailed to Plaintiff at his Winchester Drive address. (See Docket Entry 8/11/2025 noting copy mailed to Plaintiff’s Winchester Drive address.) On September 2, 2025, the City of Solon moved for dismissal with prejudice, arguing in part that the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination in the state court proceeding obviated any § 1983 claim as a matter of law and dismissal with prejudice was warranted. (Doc. 27.) A copy of the motion was mailed to Plaintiff at his Winchester Drive address. (Id. at 144 (Certificate of Service).)1 More than two months passed without any response. On November 12, 2025, the Court granted the motion as unopposed and stated the arguments presented in the motion warranted dismissal with prejudice. (Doc. 28, Dismissal Order.) A copy was mailed to Plaintiff at the Winchester Drive address. (See Docket Entry 11/12/2025 noting copy mailed to Plaintiff’s Winchester Drive address.)

On November 20, 2025, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Granting Solon’s Request to Amend Judgment Entry to Reflect a Dismissal with Prejudice. (Doc. 29.) He asserts he “was not notified by the clerk’s office that there was a pending motion that requires [his] response after the opinion and judgement was issued on August 11, 2025.” (Id. at 147.) Plaintiff goes on to say “[t]he only notification Plaintiff got from the Clerk’s Office, after the opinion and judgement entry, was the Judgement entry on November 12, 2025, which he received when he visited his old residence last Saturday, November 15, 2025.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not address the merits of the Dismissal Order, nor does he assert any legal basis for vacating the Dismissal Order by way of

reconsideration. Instead, Plaintiff reasserts he should be given electronic filing privileges in order to respond to motions.2 (Id. at 147-48.) No other relief is requested. The City of Solon challenges reconsideration, primarily arguing Plaintiff has not demonstrated relief is warranted under Rule 60(b) for three reasons. (Doc. 30.) First, a copy of the City of Solon’s motion for dismissal with prejudice was also emailed to Plaintiff. (Id. at 152.) Attorney Matthew T. Fitzsimmons declared under penalty of perjury a copy of the motion

1 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.

2 Attached to the Motion for Reconsideration is an application for “Pro Se Litigant Registration for Electronic Filing.” (Doc. 29-1.) was emailed to Plaintiff. (Doc. 30-1 at ¶ 2.) The email did not return as “undeliverable.” (Id.) A copy of the email Attorney Fitzsimmons sent Plaintiff is attached to the City’s response in opposition. (Doc. 30-2.) Second, plaintiffs have an obligation to notify courts of address changes, similar to one’s obligation to duly advise the postal service so important mail is properly forwarded to a recipient’s new location. (Doc. 30 at 152 (citing Yeschick v. Mineta, 765

F.3d 622, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2012)).) This Chukwuani did not do. Finally, because the matter was properly dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiff can present no meritorious challenge. (Doc. 30 at 153.) Plaintiff has not replied. LAW AND ANALYSIS The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit motions for reconsideration after the dismissal of an action. Plaintiff’s only means of relief are to seek an amendment of judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Plaintiff cites Rule 59(e) as the basis for his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order

Granting Solon’s Request to Amend Judgment Entry to Reflect a Dismissal with Prejudice. (Doc. 29 at 147.) Rule 59(e) states that any “motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of the judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). If timely filed, a district court may grant such relief only if the movant shows “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005). The party seeking relief under Rule 59(e) bears the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief. While Rule 59 permits alterations or amendments to judgments, “it ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 171 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2008) (quoting 11 WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)); Morgan & Morgan v. Zoll & Kranz, LLC (In re E. Palestine Train Derailment), 160 F.4th 751, 759 (6th Cir. 2025) (affirming denial of belated Rule 59(e) motion because filing was publicly available and a copy was sent to an email address associated with

movant). What is more, “‘[t]he substance of the motion, rather than its form, controls [the] inquiry.’” Hobbs v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., No. 24-3763, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 28996, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (dismissal of pro se motion to vacate) (quoting Brown v. Local 58, Int’l Bd. Of Elec. Workers, 76 F.3d 762, 768 (6th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff’s Motion is not a Rule 59(e) motion. While styled as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the Court’s Order dismissing his claims against the City of Solon with prejudice, its contents reveal Plaintiff seeks electronic filing privileges. (See Doc. 29.) He makes a cursory reference to manifest injustice, but that reference is limited to his lack of electronic access. (See

id. at 147.) Plaintiff does not meaningfully address the bases on which Rule 59(e) relief could be granted, let alone present argument as to why such extraordinary relief is warranted here. (See id.) Other than the caption, he makes no reference to the Dismissal Order. (Id.) To be sure, pro se filings receive liberal construction, but the Court is not required to make Rule 59(e)-specific arguments on Plaintiff’s behalf. This is not a Rule 59(e) motion, even by liberal construction standards. But even if it was, it falls short of demonstrating any entitlement to such relief.

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Related

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
128 S. Ct. 2605 (Supreme Court, 2008)
Intera Corporation v. George Henderson III
428 F.3d 605 (Sixth Circuit, 2005)
Gregory Esparza v. Ed Sheldon
765 F.3d 615 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)

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Okwudili Chukwuani v. City of Solon, Ohio, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/okwudili-chukwuani-v-city-of-solon-ohio-et-al-ohnd-2026.