Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System v. K12, Inc.

66 F. Supp. 3d 711, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156888, 2014 WL 5780936
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedNovember 5, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 1:14-cv-108 (AJT/JFA)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 66 F. Supp. 3d 711 (Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System v. K12, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System v. K12, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 711, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156888, 2014 WL 5780936 (E.D. Va. 2014).

Opinion

CLASS ACTION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ANTHONY J. TRENGA, District Judge.

Defendant K12, Inc. (“K12”) is a publicly traded company that provides online classroom services. In this securities class action, plaintiff Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System (“plaintiff’), a public pension fund, purchased K12’s common stock, whose stock price declined by nearly 40% on October 9, 2013, following K12’s announcement of the results of its Fall 2013 enrollment season. Bringing this action, on behalf of all purchasers of K12 stock from February 5, 2013 through October 8, 2013 (the “Class Period”), plaintiff alleges that K12 and certain of its officers (collectively “K12” or “defendants”) violated Section 10(b), 20(a) and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”) when they made a series of false or misleading statements during the Class Period during several investors’ conference calls and in K12’s 2013 10-K annual report.1 Defen[714]*714dants filed their Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 39] (the “Motion”) on June 20, 2014. The Court heard oral argument on the Motion on August 8, 2014, following which it took the matter under advisement.2 For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.

1. Standard of Review

The sufficiency of plaintiffs complaint is governed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (the “PSLRA”). Under the PSLRA, plaintiff is required to prove: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Yates v. Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC, 744 F.3d 874, 884 (4th Cir.2014) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008)).

A statement constitutes a “misrepresentation” if it either (1) is materially false or (2) contains an omission that renders the statement materially misleading. Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 682 (4th Cir.1999). “[A] fact stated or omitted is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable purchaser or seller of a security (1) would consider the fact important in deciding whether to buy or sell the security or (2) would have viewed the total mix of information made available to be significantly altered by disclosure of the fact.” Id. at 683. The materiality of an alleged misrepresentation or omission must be considered in the full context in which it was made. Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors of the Cnty. of Dinwiddle, Va., 103 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir.1996). Cautionary language in a document may negate the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation or omission. Id. (citing In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Lit., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, Gollomp v. Trump, 510 U.S. 1178, 114 S.Ct. 1219, 127 L.Ed.2d 565 (1994)).

Certain statements are legally incapable of satisfying these requirements. “Forward-looking statements” that are either accompanied by cautionary language, immaterial, or made without actual knowledge of their falsity are statutorily protected under the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l). Likewise, statements that are commonly referred to as “puffery” are not material as a matter of law. In re Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings Sec. Litig., No. 1:03cv591, 2006 WL 1367428, at *9 (M.D.N.C. May 18, 2006) (“[Statements that consist of nothing more than indefinite statements of corporate optimism, also known as ‘puf-fery,’ are immaterial as a matter of law.”) (citing Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir.1993)); see also In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 332 F.Supp.2d 896, 900 (E.D.Va.2004) (defining [715]*715an immaterial statement as “a certain kind of rosy affirmative commonly heard from corporate managers and familiar to the marketplace — loosely optimistic statements that are so vague, so lacking in specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the speaker, that no reasonable investor could find them important to the total mix of information available”).

In order to satisfy the scienter requirement, the plaintiff must also establish that defendants made the false or misleading statements with an “intention to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 808, 313, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (citation omitted). In order to satisfy that requirement, the plaintiff must allege in its complaint facts that show that a defendant had actual knowledge that a forward-looking statement was false at the time it was- made. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B); In re CIENA Corp. Sec. Litig., 99 F.Supp.2d 650, 660-61 (D.Md.2000). The “actual knowledge” requirement may be satisfied by a showing of “recklessness.” Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 181 (4th Cir.2009) (“Pleading recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement.”). A “reckless” act is defined as an act that is “so highly unreasonable and such an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care as to present a danger of misleading the plaintiff to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.” Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Phillips v. LCI Intern., Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir.1999)). Overall, in order to satisfy the scienter requirement, the alleged facts must raise a “strong inference” that the required level of scienter accompanying the alleged material misrepresentation is “at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference.” Matrix Capital at 181-82 (4th Cir.2009).3

[716]*716II. Analysis4

Plaintiff has alleged, and defendants have not disputed, that it purchased K12 stock during the Class Period and suffered a loss as a result of a decrease in K12 stock prices in October 2013.

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66 F. Supp. 3d 711, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156888, 2014 WL 5780936, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oklahoma-firefighters-pension-retirement-system-v-k12-inc-vaed-2014.