Ojo v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: September 12, 2025
• Docket: 24-2055-cv
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-2055-cv Ojo v. United States

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of September, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

Olukayode David Ojo,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 24-2055-cv

United States of America, Warden Frank Strada, Assistant Warden Shirley White,

Defendants-Appellees, Medical Director John Doe #1,

Defendant. _____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Olukayode David Ojo, pro se, East Orange, NJ.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Varuni Nelson, Daniel G. Saavedra, Assistant United States Attorneys, of counsel, for John J. Durham, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Ross, Judge; Bloom, Magistrate Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the July 25, 2024, order of the District Court

is AFFIRMED.

Olukayode David Ojo, who proceeds here pro se and in forma pauperis,

appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion “pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b), requesting that [the court] vacate its prior judgment

dismissing the case with prejudice.” Pl.’s Second Mot. for Reconsideration at 1,

2 Ojo v. United States, 1:15CV06089(ARR)(LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2024), ECF No. 133

(hereinafter the “60(b) Motion”). Ojo commenced this action against the United

States and three individual defendants in 2015 asserting claims arising out of his

pre-trial detention in federal custody. The District Court granted summary

judgment to the defendants on all but one of Ojo’s claims. In 2019, the United

States and Ojo settled the remaining claim and stipulated to dismissal of the case

with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a). The District Court entered judgment on

September 10, 2019.

Nearly four years later, on July 24, 2023, Ojo moved to reopen the case and

to enforce the settlement, arguing that the United States had improperly offset the

settlement amount against an “alleged restitution.” App’x at 176. The District

Court denied the motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the

settlement and that vacatur of the judgment was not warranted. Ojo moved for

reconsideration of the denial, which the District Court also denied.

Ojo then filed a motion he entitled a “second motion for reconsideration.”

60(b) Motion at 1. The motion was in fact a motion to vacate the judgment

pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly citing and

relying on that rule, and the District Court properly treated it as such. The District

3 Court denied this motion as well. See Ojo v. United States, No. 1:15CV06089

(ARR)(LB), 2024 WL 3535415 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2024). Ojo timely appealed.

“A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. . . . Under this standard, we must affirm the denial of vacatur,

unless the ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous

assessment of the evidence.” Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 88 F.4th 353, 359 (2d Cir.

2023) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The District Court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Ojo’s motion.

First, the District Court was correct that Ojo’s Rule 60(b) motion was

untimely. Ojo’s motion did not specify a subsection of Rule 60(b) under which he

was seeking relief. Construing his pro se submissions generously, we assume that

he was seeking relief under subsection (6), that is, vacatur for “any . . . reason that

justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made

within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Ojo’s motion does not meet this

standard. He signed the settlement agreement and stipulated dismissal in 2019,

but he made no attempt to enforce the settlement agreement in the District Court

until 2023 – nearly four years later. He has offered no explanation, either on appeal

or before the District Court, for why he did not seek relief earlier. Instead, on

4 appeal he contends that the District Court should have construed his motion as

seeking “enforcement of the settlement agreement rather than vacatur of the

dismissal.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. But the motion speaks for itself. It begins by

asserting that plaintiff “respectfully submits this Second Motion for

Reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), requesting that

this Court vacate its prior judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.” Rule

60(b) Motion at 1.

Second, even assuming the motion was timely, the District Court was also

correct that the motion was meritless. Ojo argues that his “consent to the

settlement agreement [was] unknowing and involuntary.” Id. Specifically, he

contends that he would not have entered into the settlement agreement had he

known that the District Court would not retain jurisdiction to enforce it, and he

wants the District Court to take jurisdiction because he wishes to challenge the

government’s offset of the settlement funds to pay restitution he owed pursuant

to his separate judgment of criminal conviction. But the settlement agreement

expressly stated that Ojo would receive the funds “provided that [he] owes no debt

that is subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program.” Settlement

Agreement at 3, Ojo v. United States, 1:15CV06089(ARR)(LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 20,

5 2024), ECF No. 122-2. And at the settlement conference, the Magistrate Judge

expressly addressed the fact that the funds would be offset. Counsel for the

government stated: “We’ve spoken about this extensively and I have explained to

Mr. Ojo that when the payment is processed by Treasury it will be offset against

his restitution judgment and he has told me that he understands that.” App’x at

87. The Court followed up with Mr. Ojo:

THE COURT: What I'm trying to make sure of is that when the Government executes against this settlement that you’re not going to try to withdraw from this settlement saying that you didn’t know that they were going to offset the restitution. Do you understand that?

MR. OJO: I understand that, Your Honor.

App’x at 88. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial

of the 60(b) Motion.

We have considered Ojo’s remaining arguments and conclude they are

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the July 25, 2024, Order of the District

Court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court