O'Grady, Michael v. Garrigan, Daniel

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 9, 2021
Docket3:18-cv-00368
StatusUnknown

This text of O'Grady, Michael v. Garrigan, Daniel (O'Grady, Michael v. Garrigan, Daniel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Grady, Michael v. Garrigan, Daniel, (W.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

MICHAEL O’GRADY,

Plaintiff, v.

DANIEL GARRIGAN, CHARLES POCHES, MATTHEW FOSTER, PETER HIBNER, ROBIN KVALO, BRAD MEIXNER, KENNETH OPINION and ORDER MANTHEY, JASON STENBERG, ROBERT BAGNELL, KEITH KLAFKE, BENJAMIN 18-cv-368-jdp NEUMANN, PETER WARNING, ANTHONY BRAUNER, MICHAEL SCHUTZ, SCOTT KLICKO, BRIAN NOLL, DAVID CLARK, MARK SMIT, ALEXANDER AGNEW, BENJAMIN OETZMAN, CORY MILLER, and GREGORY BISCH,

Defendants.

OPINION and ORDER CITY OF PORTAGE, PORTAGE COMMUNITY

SCHOOLS, ROBIN KVALO, DANIEL GARRIGAN, 18-cv-582-jdp CHARLES POCHES, PETER HIBNER, MATTHEW FOSTER, BRAD MEIXNER, JASON STENBERG, PETER WARNING, SUSAN CONNER, and KEITH KLAFKE,

Defendants. MICHAEL O’GRADY,

Plaintiff, v. OPINION and ORDER

CITY OF PORTAGE, PORTAGE COMMUNITY 19-cv-515-jdp SCHOOLS, KEVIN TODRYK, MARIE MOE, and DAWN WILCOX,

COLUMBIA COUNTY, CITY OF PORTAGE, PORTAGE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, VERN GOVE, OPINION and ORDER JOSEPH RUF, SHAWN MURPHY, MATHEW FOSTER, CHARLES POCHES, MARK HAZELBAKER, 19-cv-518-jdp ANYTIME FITNESS CORP., ANDREW GUNDLACH, MARK SMIT, BENJAMIN OETZMAN, ALEXANDER AGNEW, DENNIS RICHARDS, MAX JENATSCHECK, and CHARLES CHURCH,

I granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment in these four cases. Plaintiff Michael O’Grady filed a notice of appeal in the ‘368 and ‘582 cases. O’Grady has now filed eight motions in the four cases. Defendants ask me to deny the motions and sanction O’Grady. O’Grady filed three motions in each case in which he cited to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the basis for relief, and he filed three motions in each case in which he cited to Rule 60. O’Grady filed an additional motion in the ‘518 case, requesting that I vacate a previous sanctions order. Dkt. 273. In all of his motions, O’Grady argues that the court erred by granting summary judgment to defendants without permitting him to conduct additional discovery. He also complains that the court did not respond adequately to his arguments or to the evidence he presented. Defendants argue that the court should deny O’Grady’s motions because the ‘368 and ‘582 cases are on appeal, because Rule 52 does not apply to cases decided on summary

judgment, and because O’Grady has not identified any valid basis for relief under Rule 60. Defendants also ask for Rule 11 sanctions for O’Grady’s post-judgment motions. I’ll deny all O’Grady’s motions because he has not identified any valid basis for relief from judgment in any of these cases. I will also deny defendants’ request for monetary sanctions. (So I will deny as unnecessary O’Grady’s requests for additional time to respond to defendants’ sanctions motions.) I will not bar O’Grady from making pro se filings as defendants request, but I will limit his filings. From now on, O’Grady will need permission from the court before serving any document on an opposing party in any future litigation, and I will impose a

five-page limit on any document that O’Grady files in this court, unless the court authorizes a larger filing in advance.

ANALYSIS A threshold question is whether this court has jurisdiction to consider O’Grady’s motions. Defendants argue that because O’Grady filed notices of appeal in the ‘368 and ‘582 cases, this court cannot resolve his motions, at least in those two cases. But defendants are incorrect. District courts retain jurisdiction to consider timely motions filed under Rule 59(e). Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); Sultan v. Fenoglio, 775 F.3d 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2015); Katerinos

v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 368 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2004). And, although O’Grady cited Rules 52 and 60 in support of his motions, the court construes motions for relief from judgment that are filed within 28 days of the date of judgment to be motions filed under Rule 59(e). See Carter v. City of Alton, 922 F.3d 824, 826 n.1 (7th Cir. 2019) (Rule 59(e) governs motions to reconsider filed within 28 days of entry of judgment); Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008). Because O’Grady filed two motions in each case challenging the merits of the

court’s decision within 28 days of the entry of judgment, those motions are governed by Rule 59(e). The motions that O’Grady filed more than 28 days after the entry of judgment are governed by Rule 60(b). See Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1994). And district courts retain jurisdiction to consider and deny Rule 60(b) motions during the pendency of an appeal. Simons v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 1248, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983). So this court has jurisdiction to resolve O’Grady’s motions. But O’Grady is not entitled to relief under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). A Rule 59(e)

motion is successful only where the movant clearly establishes: (1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment. Cincinnati Life Insurance Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013). O’Grady’s arguments do not fit into either category. Instead, he raises the same arguments and evidence that I considered and rejected in granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment. As I explained previously, the undisputed evidence did not support a conclusion that any defendant violated O’Grady’s constitutional rights. Because O’Grady has identified no errors of law or fact in my previous decision and no newly discovered evidence, he cannot obtain relief under Rule 59(e).

Rule 60(b) authorizes district courts to vacate a judgment for the following reasons: 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

4) the judgment is void;

5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). O’Grady has not shown that he is entitled to relief for any of the reasons listed above. He argues that he could have obtained additional evidence to support his claims if the court had permitted him to conduct additional discovery before resolving defendants’ summary judgment motions. But at the time of the summary judgment decision, the ’515 and ’518 cases had been pending for more than a year, and the ’368 and ’582 cases had been pending for more than two years. O’Grady does not provide a good explanation for why he failed to collect the evidence he needed while discovery was ongoing. Nor does O’Grady explain how additional evidence would alter the outcome of these cases.

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