UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MICHAEL OGIDI-GREGBAJE, Plaintiff, 25-CV-5801 (LLS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL RISEBORO HOUSING; ROMMEY, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. By separate order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with 30 days’ leave to replead. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are drawn from the complaint. Plaintiff Michael Ogidi-
Gregbaje’s claims arose in June 2025, at 315 West 94th Street in Manhattan. Defendant “Rommey” is a client manager providing services through RiseBoro Housing. Rommey and an individual named Jason recorded Plaintiff without his consent and later played the recording back to him on a cellphone. They said that they recorded Plaintiff’s voice “because of the noise.” (ECF 1 at 6.) Plaintiff contends that recording him violated New York Penal Law 250.05, and infringed his right to privacy. Plaintiff brings suit against Defendants RiseBoro Housing and “Rommey,” seeking $200 million as damages. He asserts claims for a violation of his right to privacy under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, and claims under New York Penal Law § 250.05. DISCUSSION The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is
common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative . . . .”). A. Federal Question Jurisdiction Courts can exercise federal question jurisdiction when a plaintiff’s claims arise “under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Merely invoking federal jurisdiction, without pleading any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, but he relies on New York civil and criminal laws, not federal law. Although the U.S. Constitution protects a right to privacy in limited circumstances, the facts alleged do not implicate rights arising under the U.S. Constitution or other federal law.1 Plaintiff’s claims, which are for alleged violations of New
York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, and New York Penal Law § 250.05, do not provide any basis for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction.2 B.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MICHAEL OGIDI-GREGBAJE, Plaintiff, 25-CV-5801 (LLS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL RISEBORO HOUSING; ROMMEY, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. By separate order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with 30 days’ leave to replead. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are drawn from the complaint. Plaintiff Michael Ogidi-
Gregbaje’s claims arose in June 2025, at 315 West 94th Street in Manhattan. Defendant “Rommey” is a client manager providing services through RiseBoro Housing. Rommey and an individual named Jason recorded Plaintiff without his consent and later played the recording back to him on a cellphone. They said that they recorded Plaintiff’s voice “because of the noise.” (ECF 1 at 6.) Plaintiff contends that recording him violated New York Penal Law 250.05, and infringed his right to privacy. Plaintiff brings suit against Defendants RiseBoro Housing and “Rommey,” seeking $200 million as damages. He asserts claims for a violation of his right to privacy under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, and claims under New York Penal Law § 250.05. DISCUSSION The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is
common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative . . . .”). A. Federal Question Jurisdiction Courts can exercise federal question jurisdiction when a plaintiff’s claims arise “under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Merely invoking federal jurisdiction, without pleading any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, but he relies on New York civil and criminal laws, not federal law. Although the U.S. Constitution protects a right to privacy in limited circumstances, the facts alleged do not implicate rights arising under the U.S. Constitution or other federal law.1 Plaintiff’s claims, which are for alleged violations of New
York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, and New York Penal Law § 250.05, do not provide any basis for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction.2 B. Diversity Jurisdiction Plaintiff also does not allege facts demonstrating that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of this action. To establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where he or she is domiciled, which is defined as the place where a person “has his [or her] true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he [or she] is absent, he [or she] has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A corporation is a citizen, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “of every State
and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has
1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects a privacy interest in certain personal information from government intrusion, but Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest that Defendants encroached on any constitutionally protected interest in personal information, or that any state actor was involved. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (“[T]he zone of privacy protects the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”); Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). The Court therefore will not liberally construe the complaint as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The Court also notes that a private party cannot prosecute criminal charges. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 87 (1981) (“[T]he decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.”). its principal place of business.” § 1332(c)(1); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (a corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve center,” usually its main headquarters). In addition, to establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the
statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff does not invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction or plead facts about the citizenship of the parties. Moreover, he lists addresses for all parties in New York, suggesting that the citizenship of the parties is not diverse. Plaintiff thus has not satisfied his burden of showing that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of this matter. C. Leave to Amend Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Moreover, a district court generally
should allow a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint in order “to drop dispensable nondiverse defendants whose presence would defeat diversity of citizenship.” Jaser v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 815 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1987). It is unclear if Defendant Rommey resides in New York, or if he is a citizen of a State other than New York, in which case Plaintiff and Defendant Rommey might have diverse citizenship. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to amend his complaint to detail his subject matter jurisdiction allegations and replead his claims. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action. CONCLUSION Plaintiff's complaint, filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), with 30 days’ leave to replead. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered. SO ORDERED. Dated: August 21, 2025 New York, New York Louis L. Stanton U.S.D.J.