Oge Arum v. Tabithah Marcacci and William Demuth

Opinion

rhday, 46 AUQUST, 24UL0 □□□□□□□□ Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

OGE ARUM, ) Plaintiff, ) v. Case No. 22-cv-3252 TABITHAH MARCACCI and WILLIAM DEMUTH, ) Defendants. ) OPINION COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge: Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 36). Plaintiff Oge Arum, a black male, filed a single-count Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, when Defendants Tabitha Marcacci and William Demuth took actions which eventually resulted in the termination of Plaintiff's employment as a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police (“ISP”). Defendants proffer several reasons as to why they are entitled to summary judgment while Plaintiff alleges there are factual disputes which preclude the entry of summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Parties and ISP Hierarchy From March 2020 until January 8, 2021, Plaintiff was employed by the ISP as a forensic scientist trainee in the Division of Forensic Services in the Biology □ DNA Section

Page 1 of 13

of ISP’s Forensic Science Laboratory in Springfield, Illinois. (Doc. 36, J 1). The ISP is organized into seven divisions and the commander of each division reports directly to the ISP Director. (Id. at { 2). Plaintiff was employed in the Southern Region of the Division of Forensic Services, Forensic Sciences Command. (Id. at J 3). At all relevant times, Defendant Marcacci was a training coordinator at the Springfield Forensic Science Laboratory who reported directly to the Laboratory Director, Defendant Demuth. (Id. at { 4). Demuth reported directly to Bureau Chief Timothy Tripp. (Id. at J 5). Tripp was the Bureau Chief of ISP’s Forensic Science Command, Southern Region, and his duties included oversight of the Springfield Forensic Science Laboratory. (Id. at § 6). At all relevant times, Bureau Chief Tripp’s chain-of-command within ISP was that he reported directly to the Commander - Forensic Sciences Command. The Commander reported directly to the Assistant Deputy Director— Division of Forensic Services. The Assistant Deputy Director reported directly to the Deputy Director - Division of Forensic Services. Finally, the Deputy Director reported directly to the First Deputy Director - Office of the Director, who reported directly to the ISP Director. (Id. at 7). B. Forensic Scientist Training Program Academic Criteria ISP’s training program required Forensic Scientist Trainees to pass certain tests, including practical criterion tests, and if necessary, to re-take those tests. (Id. at 7 8). At all relevant times, ISP’s Forensic Scientists Command, Division of Forensic Services, had in place Training Policy TRN-10, “Academic Criteria for Successful Completion of a Forensic Sciences Command Formal Training Program (For New Employees).” (Id. at J 9). ISP Policy TRN-10 established evaluation criteria and required managerial actions in Page 2 of 13

the event an individual failed a tested area. (Id. at §] 10). Pursuant to ISP Policy TRN-10, if an individual failed a makeup criterion test, the required action was dismissal. (Id. at J 11). The policy also required a memorandum by the training coordinator recommending dismissal from the program. (Id. at {| 12). Practical criterion tests were graded on a pass/fail basis with a score lower than 100% equating to a failed test. (Id. at J 13). C. First Practical Criterion Test Plaintiff began working at the ISP Laboratory in Springfield in March 2020 as a Forensic Scientist Trainee. (Id. at J 14). Plaintiff was hired to go through the training with the intention of ultimately working to reduce the backlog of sexual assault kits after the training was completed. (Id. at § 15). As part of the training program, Plaintiff was required to pass with a score of 100% a practical criterion test on module FB-IA-14, which covered DNA IQ Isolation and Maxwell extraction (“DNA IQ Extraction Module”). (Id. at J 16). On September 25, 2020, Plaintiff took a practical criterion test on the DNA IQ Extraction Module. (Id. at { 17). A portion of the test covered clean technique which was described in Plaintiff's training program as “the laboratory practices which minimize the potential for contamination of the sample you are working on.” (Id. at J 18, 19). Contamination is the unintentional introduction of exogenous (or other) DNA into a DNA sample or PCR reaction. (Id. at { 20). Aerosols, liquids, dry flakes, unclean gloves, and materials on lab coats can all be sources of contamination. (Id. at § 21). Defendants allege Plaintiff did not score 100% on the DNA IQ Extraction Module test, which meant he did not pass the required practical criterion test. (Id. at § 22). Plaintiff agrees that the score provided by Defendant Marcacci was not 100% but denies the score Page 3 of 13

was objectively appropriate. (Doc. 40, Resp. { 22). Plaintiff admits he circled the word “concur” in the sentence “I concur with the evaluation of this exam” on the Examination Grade Report Form for the DNA IQ Extraction Module test. (Doc. 36, { 23). Plaintiff admits he did not circle the words “do not concur” on the Examination Grade Report Form for the test. (Id. at { 24). Plaintiff states that he signed the form but did not agree with the content. On October 15, 2020, Plaintiff was issued a letter of reprimand for failing his first attempt to successfully pass the practical criterion test for the DNA IQ Extraction Module test. (Doc. 36, § 25). D. Second Practical Criterion Test On October 28, 2020, Plaintiff took the makeup practical criterion test for the DNA IQ Extraction Module test. (Id. at { 26). Plaintiff was again required to score 100% to pass the October 28, 2020 test. (Id. at □ 27). Defendants allege Plaintiff did not score 100% on the October 28, 2020 makeup DNA IQ Extraction Module test. (Id. at { 28). Once again, Plaintiff acknowledges that the score provided by Marcacci was not 100% but denies the score was objectively appropriate. (Doc. 40, Resp. { 28). Plaintiff admits he circled the word “concur” in the box for student acknowledgement on the Examination Grade Report Form for this practical criterion test. (Doc. 36, J 29). Plaintiff again states that he signed the form but did not agree with it. E. Termination Process Defendants contend that when Plaintiff failed the original and makeup DNA IQ Extraction Module tests, that issue was identified and notifications were properly made through the chain of command. (Doc. 40, 4 30). On December 17, 2020, Bureau Chief Page 4 of 13

Tripp submitted an investigation report, charges and rebuttal documents, and a recommendation of termination in line with the policies in place at that time to ISP’s Office of Labor Relations. The Office of Labor Relations reported back to Tripp that it concurred with the recommendation of termination. (Doc. 36, § 31). On December 22, 2020, Bureau Chief Tripp provided the recommendation of termination to Defendant Demuth, whereupon Demuth prepared and forwarded the required Recommendation for Discipline Packet (“Discipline Packet”) through the chain of command. (Id. at § 32). The Discipline Packet contained an investigation report including a summary of the issue, relevant policies broken, test materials, interview with Plaintiff, the makeup test evaluation report, the Department and Command policies to include policy TRN-10, a review of past test performance issues, a review of test monitoring metrics to ensure objectivity, and the charges and input from the Office of Labor Relations. (Id. J 33). On or about December 22, 2020, Bureau Chief Tripp reviewed the Discipline Packet and thereafter developed an Illinois State Police Route Slip which included his comments, “Attached is DII20AA01895 for FST Oge Arum for the failed make-up practical criterion test. After consideration of the rebuttal and discussion with OLR (OLR concurred); discharge per training policy TRN 10 is recommended by management. I concur with the recommendation. The Pre-D[isciplinary] meeting was held 11/24/20 and the rebuttal is included. The 45-day close expires Friday January 15, 2021.” (Id. at J 34). On January 8, 2021, ISP terminated Plaintiff's employment for failing to pass a second practical criterion test in the same subject matter (also referred to as a “makeup” test) as required by ISP Policy. (Id. at J 35). Page 5 of 13

F. Plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination and Complaint Plaintiff alleges he was discriminated against because of his race (black) when his employment was terminated. (Id. at { 36). When asked to produce all documents that support his claim that he was discriminated against by Defendants Marcacci and/or Demuth because of his race and/or terminated because of his race, Plaintiff admitted that no document contains any specific direct evidence of discrimination. (Id. at | 37-40). When asked to produce all documents to support his claim that Marcacci or Demuth took any adverse action against him other than termination because of his race, Plaintiff admitted that no such documents exist. (Id. at [J 41-42). Plaintiff admits he did not observe his co-worker’s performance on criterion tests. (Id. at J 43). Plaintiff's criterion tests on September 25, 2025, and October 28, 2020, were graded by Marcacci. (Id. at § 44). Plaintiff admits that he does not know if any of the trainees who were in the same ISP lab training program group as him were treated more favorably on criterion tests. (Id. at § 45). Plaintiff's knowledge of other trainees making mistakes of clean techniques is limited to observations he made outside of their performance on criterion tests. (Id. at { 46). Plaintiff did not observe any other trainee in his ISP lab training group taking their criterion test for module FB-IA-14. (Id. at § 47). He does not know what score the other trainees in his ISP training group received on their criterion tests, including the test for module FB-IA-14. (Id. at 48-49). Plaintiff is not aware of any other trainee in his ISP lab training group who failed the original and makeup criterion test for module FB-IA-14 or any other module. (Id. at 4 50-51).

Page 6 of 13

Plaintiff admits he has no direct evidence that Demuth treated other trainees more favorably because of Plaintiff's race. (Id. at § 52, Doc. 40, Resp. § 52). Based on the documents he reviewed prior to recommending termination, Bureau Chief Tripp did not believe there was evidence of racial animus, racial bias, or discrimination due to Plaintiff's race. (Id. at { 53). Plaintiff does not have any evidence that Tripp relied on racially biased factual information in deciding to terminate Plaintiff's employment. (Id. at 54). The recommendation of termination after the failed makeup criterion test was dictated by policy. (Id. at 55). No other Forensic Scientist Trainee in Plaintiffs training program was disciplined pursuant to JSP Policy TRN-10 for failing a makeup criterion test because no other Forensic Scientist Trainee in the program failed a makeup criterion test. (Id. at { 56). No exceptions to ISP Policy TRN-10 were made for any Forensic Scientist Trainee in Plaintiff's training program. (Id. at ¥ 57). II. DISCUSSION In seeking summary judgment, Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination for the following reasons: (1) he cannot show that he met his employers’ legitimate expectations; (2) he did not suffer an adverse employment action because of his race; (3) Defendants were not decision-makers who decided Plaintiff's termination; and (4) Plaintiff cannot show that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. Defendants further assert they had _ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision and Plaintiff cannot establish those reasons are a discriminatory pretext.

Page 7 of 13

Plaintiff contends that circumstantial evidence exists from which a jury could reasonably conclude he was subjected to discrimination based on race. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges he is proceeding under a cat’s paw theory of liability under § 1983, which requires personal involvement and not that Defendant is the final decisionmaker. A. Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is properly supported and “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the suit, and a factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Biggs v. Chic. Bd. of Educ., 82 F.4th 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court views the evidence and construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Driveline Systems, LLC v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 936 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2019). To create a genuine factual dispute, however, any such inference must be based on something more than “speculation or conjecture.” See Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence.” Driveline Systems, 936 F.3d at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted). B. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination and points to no evidence in the record showing racial animus. The same legal standard Page 8 of 13

applies in analyzing racial discrimination claims under § 1983 and Title VII. Gamble v. County of Cook, 106 F.4th 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2024). A plaintiff pursuing a protected-class equal protection claim must show that “defendants acted with a nefarious discriminatory purpose and discriminated against him based on his membership in a definable class.” Word v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 2020). To withstand summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that “the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Burton v. Will Cnty. Sheriff's Merit Comm’n, 176 F 4th 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2026). Plaintiffs may do this by using the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), “which gives the plaintiff the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, after which the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate justification, before finally shifting back to plaintiff to establish that such justification was pretextual.” Dunlevy v. Langfelder, 52 F.4th 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2022). “To support a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he met his employer's legitimate job expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of the protected class were treated more favorably.” Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Plaintiff has presented no evidence that a similarly situated individual of a different race was treated more favorably, the Court concludes Plaintiff cannot assert a prima facie case using the McDonnell Douglas framework. The Court will now evaluate the evidence as a whole in Page 9 of 13

considering whether Plaintiff has presented enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of his race. Plaintiff asserts Defendants Marcacci and Demuth overlook certain evidence by improperly focusing on the failed tests which resulted in immediate termination. Plaintiff claims it is significant that the test is not an objective test with a scoring key. The test was graded by Marcacci in a subjective manner. Plaintiff further alleges Marcacci had issues with him from the very beginning of his employment. Plaintiff states he is a well- regarded scientist with many advanced degrees and it is difficult to believe he would not understand the proper procedure to insure an uncontaminated sample. When asked if he believes it is impossible that he failed the makeup criterion test, Plaintiff responded: I'm a scientist. Nothing is impossible. It is a matter of varying degrees of probability. The probability that someone [is a] double major bachelors from Berkeley, doctorate from Colorado Boulder, has successful published research at Michigan Ann Arbor and SIU School of Medicine, a few, nothing special, but a few grants from the National Institute of Health, that has had that type of educational and professional success failed this exam with training coordinator Marcacci. Then not only succeeded, but had a pleasant and constructive dialogue with training coordinator Cormier. Then went right back to knowing absolutely nothing about clean technique and failed this exam, although they weren't informed they had failed the exam until after they had completely completed the exam, which is different from how they were assessed during the first failure of the exam.

So, I would say it highly strains credulity that I used to be good enough to do peer-reviewed publication-level science. Then all of a sudden I sucked. Then I was good enough again. Then all of a sudden I sucked. And then after that, I’m good enough again. (Doc. 36-1, 140-41). While his credentials are impressive, Plaintiff's argument at its core is that he disagrees with the nature of the test and the result as determined by Defendants. Page 10 of 13

However, disagreement with an evaluation “does not mean that the evaluations were the result of unlawful discrimination.” Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. and Prof. Reg., 988 F.3d 948, 958 (7th Cir. 2021). Additionally, while Plaintiff now says he did not agree with either practical criterion test result, Plaintiff circled the word “concur” in the sentence “I concur with the evaluation of the exam” on both Examination Grade Report Forms. Furthermore, questioning the evaluator’s veracity “is a conclusory allegation that does not defeat summary judgment.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has held that “an employer's use of subjective criteria may leave it more vulnerable to a finding of discrimination, when a plaintiff can point to some objective evidence indicating that the subjective evaluation is a mask for discrimination.” Montgomery v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 396 (7th Cir. 2010). The problem for Plaintiff is that he has not pointed to any evidence suggesting that the subjective evaluation is a mask for discrimination. Plaintiff argues it is apparent that Defendants had issues with him from the beginning of his employment. However, even if a supervisor personally dislikes an employee and/or makes a faulty or mistaken employment decision as to that employee, that is not enough to merit a trial absent some evidence of racial discrimination. See Wilson v. AIM Specialty Health, 176 F.4th 977, 981 (7th Cir. 2026). Plaintiff points to no such evidence here — only speculation. Plaintiff next alleges Marcacci and Demuth did not comply with ISP policy requiring a written performance evaluation within three days of a failed test and a written remediation plan before the second test. Plaintiff notes that an employer's deviation from policy can be probative of discriminatory intent. See Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 694 Page 11 of 13

(7th Cir. 2012) (“Significant, unexplained or systematic deviations from established policies or practices can no doubt be relative and probative circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.”). Plaintiff contends that, because of these deviations from policy, a jury could reasonably look at the facts and conclude Defendants were determined to have Plaintiff removed from the program from day one, which could lead to an inference of discrimination. Defendants have submitted exhibits with their reply brief which demonstrate Plaintiff's assertion that ISP did not comply with its policies is largely inaccurate. Specifically, Plaintiff received a written performance evaluation within four days of his first failed test. Plaintiff also received a remediation checklist before his second test. Plaintiff also received notice of a pre-disciplinary meeting and statement of charges. Because ISP substantially complied with its policies, the Court finds no basis to infer discrimination due to deviation from policy. III. CONCLUSION It is apparent that Plaintiff believes Defendants harbored animus towards him and wanted Plaintiff out of the program from the outset. That may be true. However, Plaintiff offers nothing beyond speculation that any animus was due to Plaintiff's race. After viewing the evidence and construing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the Court finds there are no genuine factual disputes and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.!

Court need not address whether Plaintiff has waived proceeding under the cat’s paw theory, as Defendants argue. For a cat’s paw theory claim to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must Page 12 of 13

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants Tabithah Marcacci’s and William Demuth’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) is GRANTED. This case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk will enter judgment and terminate this case. ENTER: August 28, 2026 Lo LL Soo {f “ COLLEEN R. LAWLESS UNI STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

present evidence that “the biased subordinate actually harbored discriminatory animus” and that the “subordinate’s scheme proximately caused the adverse employment action.” Gaines v. Dart, 158 F.4th 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2025). Assuming the issue is not waived, Plaintiff's claims would fail because he has not offered evidence that Defendants harbored discriminatory animus. Page 13 of 13